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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSE R, JR. Case No. 200S0309-CA 
D efen d ant / Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPE LLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possessing clan lab equipment, a fir st degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37d-4(1)(b), 58-37d-5(1)(c) (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under UT.lli CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (West 2004). 
, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's reques t for a lesser-included 
offense ins truction? A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Kl'Uger, 2000 UT 60, ~ 11 , 6 P.3d 1116 (citing Sta te v. H amilton , 827 P. 2d 232, 238 
(Utah 1992)). In reviewing the court's refusal to instruct on a lesser-included offense, an 
appellate court views the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the defense. S tate v. Cri ck, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). 
2. Did defendant preserve an objection to a remark the trial court m ade to th e 
jury p anel wh ere he failed to s ta te any b asis for his mistrial request? Because defendant 
does not claim plain error, no standard of review applies to this unpreserved issue. 
3. Does the Fourth Amendment require police to obtain a search warrant before 
taking a second look at previou sly inventoried items in their lawful custody? A trial 
court's factual findings underlying a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed 
for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ~ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. Its legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ~ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
4(A) . Did police reasonably rely on a third-party's consent to search the third-
p arty's vehicle, where meth lab equipment was found? Because defendant does not claim 
plain error, no standard of review applies to tlus unpreserved issue. 
4(B). Has defendant shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging 
police reliance on a third-party's consent to search the third-party's vehicle, where meth 
lab equipment was found? ''When a question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for tile 
first time on appeal and the review is confined to tile trial court record, me question o f 
ineffectiveness of counsel is a matter of law, to be reviewed for correctness." State v. Boyatt, 
854P 2d550,554 (Utah App. 1993). "lDJefendant bears tile burden of assuring the record is 
adequate" to review his claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litherland, 2000UT 7 6,'11 6, 12P .3d 92. 
5. Did the trial court properly admit eyewitness identification testimony that 
defendant was one of two purchasers of iodine tincture? A trial court's adnussion of 
eyewitness identification evidence is reviewed for correctness, State v. Ramirez , 817 1)2d 774, 
781 n.3 (Utah 1991), and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, State v. 
Thurman, 846 P 2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993). 
6. Did the trial court properly adnut an incriminating letter b ased on defendant' s 
former girlfriend's authentication of defendant's handwriting? The decision to admit 
2 
• 
nonexpert opinion to authenticate a handwriting samples is a mixed question. State v.Jacques, 
924 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah App. 1996). The trial court's legal decision under rule 901, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, is reviewed for correctness and its determination that the nonexpert "properly 
authenticated the writing sample" is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. The decision will 
not be reversed absen t prejudicial error. Id 
7. Did the trial court properly exclude hearsay and general impeachment 
testimony? A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Paulos v. Coven ant Transport, Inc. , 2004 UT App 35, ~ 8, 86 P.3d 752. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are attached in addendum H . 
STATEME NT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possessing clan lab equipment, a fIrst degree felony, in 
violation ofUHH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37d-4(1)(b), 58-37d-5(1)(c) (West 2004). R62-61. He was 
convicted as charged. R834-833;see alsoR836. The trial court imposed the statutory five-to-life 
term, with credit for time served. R1484. D efendant flied a timely appeal notice. R1490. The 
supreme court transferred the case to this Court. R1492. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 21 January 1999, Tim Hasch showed police a meth lab in the trunk of a car on his 
property in Cedar City, Utah. R1255:156,1 93;R1 256:372-73,403,430-31. Hasch said the meth 
lab belonged to defendant, who also had a key to the trunk. R1 255:157,206;R1256:378. Police 
found defendant's fingerprints, and those of his then girlfriend, Karen H ardy, on the meth lab 
equipment. R1 256:335,337,341,343,349, 354-57,380. 
3 
D efendant and Hardy purchase iodine tincture. Approximately one week earlier, 
on 14 January 1999, defendant and H ardy bought four gallons of iodine ti ncture from Overson 
Farm Center in Cedar City. R1 255: 11 8,123,134;R1 257:469;R1258:786. Larry Overson waited 
on them. Id at 11 8. H e found the sale suspicious for several reasons. First, defendant's white 
attire and pony tail distinguished him from the typical store customer. Id. at 122-25. Second, 
Overson knew most local ranchers, but did not recognize defendant or H ardy. Id. at 123. Third, 
it was unusual for any farmer or rancher to purchase such a large amount of iodine tincture in 
J anuary. Id. at 124. According to Overson, people in the livestock business use iodine during 
the lambing and calving seasons, or from March through May. Id at 119. Overson could not 
recall selling even one gallon o f iodine tincture in the month of January in the past 30 years. Id. 
at 124. Finally, customers purchasing that amount of iodine tincture generally used a pickup 
truck, not a sports car. Id. at 124. Having been educated by local law enforcement that iodine 
tincture can be used to make meth, Overson wrote down d1e license plate number of the silver 
sports car and reported the sale to law enforcement. Id. at 123. 
Police put Hasch's property under surveillance. Based on this and other 
information, police suspected defendant of making meth. Id. at 138. After "trac[ing] [defendant] 
to property owned by Mr. Hasch," police set up 24-hour surveillance of H asch's property. Id. 
at 138-39,140-41,186;R1256:364. Three days later, police spotted defendant's silver Mitsubishi 
Eclipse. R1 255:1 42;R1256:365;R1257:480;R1258:806-07. He stayed a few minutes and left. 
R1 255:143;R1256:365. 
Defendant's arrest. Police followed defendant southbound on 1-1 5, exiting the freeway 
at Toquerville, Utah. R1 255:144. They then lost track of defendant for a time, but picked up the 
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pursuit at Dr. Rowe's dental office, where defendant's sister worked. R1255:146-47; 
R1 256:287,366-67;R1257:480,539. Shortly thereafter, one of t11e officers noticed t11at defendant 
was also traveling with Hardy, a violation of his parole, and decided to pull him over. 
R1255:147,212;R1256:390. Upon noticing the lights and siten, defendant accelerated and turned 
into a subdivision near LaVerkin, Utah. R1 255:148. After a short "wild ride" police stopped 
defendant and secured hin1 at gun point. R1255:149-50,213; 1257:482. A short distance from 
where defendant was stopped, police also secured Hardy. R1 255: 149,214. D efendant had 
thrown her from the car approximately one half block before being stopped. 
R1255:213;R1257:482,484. Defendant was arrested and his car was in1pounded. 
R1255:151,214;R1 256:265;R1 257:482;R1258:811. H ardy was taken to the hospital. Jd. 
Hardy te lls police about a meth lab. H ardy later told police t11at there was a meth lab 
on Hasch's pmperty, that defendant' s aod her fingerprints would be found on the equipment, 
and that she was an experienced meth coole R1255: 152-53,191;R1 256:371-72,392;R1 257:483-
84,537 . Police returned to H asch's property that night and asked to see the meth lab. 
R1 255:154-55. Hasch got a key and went over to an old Chevrolet Corsica that was up on 
blocks, opened the trunk, and showed police the meth lab. R1255:156,193;R1256:372-
73,403,430-31. Hasch said the Cat was his wife's, butthe lab was defendant's, and defendant also 
had a key to the trunk. R1 255: 157,206; R1256:378. 
Defendant's fingerprints found on the m eth lab equipment. In an inventory of the 
meth equipment, police found an empty box for a two-way radio , latex gloves, filter masks from 
a dental office, and materials to make meth. R1255:1 81-82;R1 256:286,375. Police also identified 
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eight fingerprints belonging to defendant and three belonging to H ardy. 
RI256:335,33 7 ,341,343,349,354-57,380. 
Police also inventoried the contents of defendant's car incident to the impound. 
RI256:270. One of the items found was a Raclio Shack two-way radio. R1 255:215,R I 256:270. 
Iron County police later determined that the two-way raclio matched the empty box found with 
the meth lab equipment. R1255: 182-83;R1256271,378. 
Police find a li st of meth ingredients . While police were interviewing Hardy, 
defendant was booked into the Purgatory Correctional Facility. D efendant' s personal property 
included a D allas Cowboys Jacket, various keys, an encoded "owe sheet," a list of chemicals and 
items needed to make meth, and magazine ads for psuedoephedrine tablets. RI255:167,1 79,227-
28;R1256:379,404;R1257:490-91,494. The list of items necessary to make meth included rubber 
gloves. R1257:498. D efendant attempted, without success, Lo have his property released to 
another inmate being clischarged as he was being booked. R1256:245-47,259. 
D efendant asks H ardy and another associate to conceal the meth lab . Later that 
evening, defendant participated in a three-way telephone conversation with Hardy and another 
associate, J ohn Cammack R1 257 :485-86,590. D efendant asked Cammack to pick up his 
property from the Purgatory jail. R1 257:486-87,591,603,605. He also asked Cammack and 
H ardy to dispose of the medl1ab. R1 257:486,590,609; see also Exh. # P-28 (addendum E). 
Cammack ttied to rettieve defendant's personal property from the jail on 10 February 1999, but 
it had already been seized by Detective Gower of dle Cedar City Police Department. 




had been found, the meth list, an encoded owe sheet, a jacket, and the psudeoephredrine ads. 
R1255:171-72;R1256:378,428. 
Hardy and Cammack cooperate with law enforcement. A few weeks after 
defendant's arrest, Hardy and Cammack met wid1 Officer Millet of me Cedar City Police 
Department. R1256:383;R1257:503,593. They told Officer Millet the meth lab belonged to 
defendant, and mat they had used it to cook med1 a few days before defendant's arrest. 
R1256:384;R1257:474,479,504,576,595,598. H ardy and defendant cooked the mem willie 
Camma«kacted as a lookout. R1257:531,577,589,605. The "cook" took place in a shed twenty-
four feet from Hasch's home. R1256:428;R1257:472,475. Hardy and Cammack received full 
immunity for meit testimony. R1257:532,594. 
D efendant's theory. At trial, defendant claimed to be aware of, but wunvolved in d1e 
meth lab operation. Thus, he admitted helping Hardy pLUchase iodine tincture, and mat he 
thought it would be used to make meth, but denied possessing the lab equipment. R1258:786-
87,800. According to defendant, Ius fingerprints were on me meth lab equipment only because 
he had been looking for a car part at Hasch's and Hasch had handed him the lab equipment. 
R1258:794-96,859,861-62. Defendant also claimed me key seized from his personal property 
at Purgatory jail-which unlocked d1e car trunk where the meth lab was found-actually 
belonged to Hardy. R1258:806,881,883,928,930,932. He made me same claim wim regard to 
the jacket in wluch police found me meth cook list and other incriminating papers. R1258:810-
813. Finally, two of defendant's friends testified that they had heard H ardy and Canul1ack say 
they would do anydung to stay out of jail and incriminate defendant. R1257:654, 661,670. 
Defendant never told the police tlus story because mey never asked. R1 258:885-87. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. The trial coun properly denied defendant's request for a lesser-included 
offense instruction. Defendant was not entitled to the instruction two reasons. First, the 
charged offense did not overlap with the alleged lesser-included offense. Second, there is no 
rational basis in the evidence for acquitting him of the charged offense. The trial court did not 
precisely rule on these grounds, but its ruling may be affirmed on any ground apparent on the 
record. 
POINT II. Although defendant requested a mistrial based on a comment the trial court 
made to the jury panel, he failed to articulate any legal basis for his request. His claim of 
prejudicial error is thus unpreserved. Moreover, because defendant asserts no exception to the 
preservation rule, it is also procedurally barred. Finally, it may also be rejected as inadequately 
l.>tiefed. 
POINT III . T he trial court properly ruled that police did not need a warrant to take 
a second look at defendant's previously inventoried personal property at the Purgatory jail and 
his impounded vehicle. Although an issue o f first impression in Utah, virtually every court to 
consider this issue has permitted a second inspection. 
POINT IV. Defendant failed to preserve his claim that police unreasonably relied on 
the consent of a third-party to search the vehicle containing the meth lab equipment. Moreover, 
because the third party had at least common control over the vehicle, defendant has not and 
cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the third-party consent. 
POINT V. The trial coun properly admitted eyewitness testimony identifying defendant 
as one of two individuals who purchased iodine tinctw:e from a farm store. In any event, 
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defendant suffered no prejudice because he himself testified that he assisted in the purchase and 
carried the iodine tincture out of the store. 
POINT VI. The trial court properly admitted an incrirninating jailhouse letter from 
defendant to his then girlfriend. A nonexpert witness may authenticate handwriting if the 
witness has a basis for familiarity with the handwriting that was not gained for litigation 
purposes. D efendant' s former girlfriend was familiar with his handwriting based on the many 
threatening letters he sent her during his incarceration. 
POINT VII. The trial court properly excluded hearsay testimony from a jailhouse 
witness because defendant failed to give the required notice. D efendant's claim is also 
inadequately briefed and unpreserved. D efendant's claim that he should have been allowed to 
impeach a pro secution witness with extrinsic evidence is contrary to controlling authority and 
therefore must also be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FORA LESSER-INCLU DE D OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an alleged 
lesser-included offense. Aplt. Br. at 16-24. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Proceedings b elow. Defendant was charged with one of several variations of a clan lab 
offense-"possess[ion o~ laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
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clandestine laboratory operation"-enhanced to a firs t degree felony, in violation of U L\'H 
CODE ANN. §§ 5S-37d-4(1)(b), 5S-37d-5(1) (West 2004). R62-61 1 
D efendant proposed an instruction on the charged offense. R S03-S02. Although he was 
charged under only the lab equipment variation in § 5S-37d-4(1)(b), defendant's proposed 
instruction also included an ttnthargedvariant of the offense found in § 5S-37d-4(1)(a), possession 
of a "controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
[methamphetamineJlaboratory operation." Compare R61-62 and RS03 . 
In addition to his proposed instruction on the charged offense, defendant proposed an 
instruction on an alleged lesser-included offense, "[uJnlawful [pJossession of a [cJontrolled 
[sJubstance [pJrecursor, a class A misdemeanor." RS01; see a/so RS03-02. Defendant's proposed 
lesser-included offense instruction specified the following elements: 
1. That the [dJefendant acted knuwingly and iUleutionaily; 
2. That the [dJefendant did: 
(a) obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any controlled 
substance precursor, and 
(b) the [dJefendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the 
controlled substance precursor was intended to be used in the unlawful 
manufacture of any controlled substance, and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14, 1999, through January 
21,1999, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
R801. D efendant's proposed lesser-included offense instruction tracks the language of ULIH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) (West 2004) . A violation of § 58-37c-3(12)(k) is not a 
misdemeanor, but a second degree felony. U L\'H CODE ANN. § 58-37c-11 (2) (West 2004). 
Outside the presence of the jury and before the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
'Copies of the information, the proposed and actual JUry instructions, verdict form, 
and pertinent transcript pages, including the oral mling, are attached in addendwn A. 
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observed that to be convicted fm a misdemeanor offense, the evidence would have to show that 
defendant possessed t\velve ounces o f epruedrine or psuedoephredrine, m two ounces of nystal 
iodine. R1258: 7 54. However, the trial COillt noted that it had "not in this entire trial so far seen 
any weight testimony at all. And I don't know how I could give that lesser-included [.]" Id. 
D efense counsel responded that one of the State's experts testified "that you could take tinctille 
of iodine and boil it and reduce it to crystalline iodine." Id. The trial COillt agreed, but noted that 
there was no testimony regarding the amount of cqstal iodine that would result from reducing 
" [four] gallons of [seven] percent solution [.] [IJt would take a much better chemist than me to 
know what the weight of iodine would be in a gallon container that's [seven] percent of that 
liquid volume[.]" Id. at 755. Moreover, the trial court noted, there was no clear evidence that 
the iodine tinctille purchased from Overson had in fact been reduced to nystal iodine. Id. 
D efense counsel replied that defendant "told Q1im] [that] morning he wants to testify that he was 
in the store on the 14'h, Overson store." Id. The trial court observed that defendant's testimony 
"might tie it down[,] [b]ut [the coillt] still didn't know what weigh t we have, how many ounces 
... from reducing that solution." Id. 
The lesser-included offense instruction was discussed again after defendant testified. 
D efense counsel argued there was "sufficient evidence ... before [the] jury to indicate that 
[defendant], during the tin1e period covered by the information, did in fact possess what he 
estimated to be [two] pounds of cqstalline ... iodine." R1258:913. The trial COillt disagreed 
and again refused to give the lesser-included offense instruction. R1258:912-916. 
The trial court ruled that while defendant's testimony that he possessed approxin1ately 
t\vo pounds of nystal iodine supported the lesser-included offense instruction, it was incredible. 
11 
Jd. at 914-15. The trial coun found defendant's testimony incredible because the court 
disbelieved that it was possible to reduce four or five gallons of iodine tincture to twO pounds 
o f crystal iodine, as defendant claimed. Id. Nor did the trial court believe that it was possible 
to reduce that amount of iodine tincture to even one pound of cl),stal iodine, the threshold 
amount the trial court believed necessary to trigger criminal prosecution. Jd.' Therefore, having 
"no idea" as to the actual weight of the iodine cl),stals defendant may have possessed, the trial 
court refused to give defendant's lesser-included offense instruction. Jd. 
Although the trial court declined to give the lesser-included offense instruction, It 
adopted wholesale the first two paragraphs of defendant's proposed instruction on the charged 
clan lab offense, including the umharged precursor variation in § 58-37d-4(1)(a). See R826. 
Notably, the trial court did not include the precursor variation of the clan lab offense on the 
verdict form, only the lab equipment variant. See R834-833. 
Lesser included offense instruction. Under well-established law, lesser-included 
offense instruction requested by a defendant must be given if two requirements are met: 
(1) the two offenses are related because some of their statutOl), elements overlap, 
and the evidence at trial of the greater offense involves proof of some or all of 
'Contrary to the trial court's perception, § 58-37c-3 (12)(k) does not require that an 
actor attempt to obtain or possess any specific amount of controlled substance precursor for 
criminal prosecution, but radler dlat an actor possess it "knowing or having a reasonable 
cause to believe that the controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the 
unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance." 
H owever, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37c-8(6) (West 2004), exempts from criminal 
prosecution any actor purchasing "two ounces or less of crystal iodine in a single 
transaction," so long as the transaction complies wid1 the record keeping requirements of 
UT,\H CODE ANN. § 58-37c-18 (West 2004). iin actor possessing "more than two ounces of 
Cl),stal iodine" is guilty of a class A misdemeanor under UT,lli CODE ANN. § 58-37c-
19.5(2)(a) (West 2004), and may be guilty of a felony if dle possession is in violation of either 
§ 58-37c-3(12)(k) or § 58-37d-4(1)(a). 
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those overlapping elements; and (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the 
defendant of the lesser-included offense. 
State v. K ell, 2002 UT 106, ~ 23, 61 P.3d 1019; see also State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-159 
(Utah 1983). 
As a general rule, the Utah supreme court has liberally construed the above requirements 
to allow a lesser offense instruction when requested by a defendant. State v. H ansen, 734 P.2d 
421,424 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion); see also State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P. 2d 861, 871 (Utah 
1998) . This "serves [the] fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of 
any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor 
chooses to file and an acquittal." H an sen , 734 P.2d at 424. Also, a lesser offense insu-uction 
in some cases may be necessary to allow a defendant to put his theory of the case before the jury. 
See Piansiakson e, 954 P.2d at 870; State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 2'14, 2(,6-67 (Utah 1988). 
Nevertheless, a defendant' s right to a lesser offense instruction is not absolute. B ak er, 
671 P.2d at 157; see also Stancliford, 769 P.2d at 266-67; State v. Crick , 675 P2d 527, 531-32 
(Utah 1983). The right to such an instruction is not based on "some supposed notion of the 
Jury's compassion or leniency," and the "'jury's power to dispense mercy, by favoring the 
defendant despite the evidence, should not be allowed so to dominate the trial proceedings as 
to impede or interfere with the jury's prinlaty fact-finding function. '" Bakel', 671 P. 2d at 157 
(quoting United States v. J ohnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233 (9,h Cit. 1980), and P eople v. 
Mussenden, 127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ny. 1995)). 
Therefore, it is not enough that the evidence provide a rational basis for convicting of 
the lesser offense. Crick, 675 P.2d at 530-31. Rather, the evidence must also provide a rational 
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basis for ai'quitting the defendant of the greater offense. Id "[WJhere the evidence would not 
justify any verdict other than conviction or acquittal of the charged offense, an instruction on 
an included offense would be improper because it 'might well be an invitation to the jmy to 
return a compromise or otherwise unwarranted verdict.'" Id. at 531 (quoting ALI 1I1odei Penal 
Code, Tent. Draft No.5, p. 43 (1956». 
Consequently, "'[t]he submission of an included crime is justified only where there is 
some basis in the evidence for finding the defendant innocent of the crime charged and yet 
guilty of the included crime.'" Id (quoting ALI Model Penal Code, T ent. Draft No. 5, p. 43) 
(citations omitted). See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266 (defendant entitled to have his theory 
presented to jury only "if it would not be superfluous to do so because of an absence of any 
evidence to support the theory"); State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ~ 17, 6 P.3d 1116 (rejecting 
Kruger's request for manslaughter instruction because he failed to adduce "as is required under 
the second prong of B aker, a 'sufficient quantum of evidence' to create a jury question as to 
whether" he committed felony mmder) . 
Analysis. D efendant claims that the trial court "erred in refusing to give the jury the 
option of convicting ~um] on the lesser included offense." Aplt. Br. at 17. D efendant asserts 
the trial comt erred because the offenses of possessing clan lab equipment and possessing 
pre ems or "overlap." Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing § 58-37d-4 and § 58-37c-3(12)(k» .' He also claims 
that there was a rational basis in the evidence "that would [have] aHow[ed] the jury to acquit 
'Defendant cites § 58-37c-10Q<), wluch does not exist. The State presumes defendant 
meant to cite § 58-37c-3 (12)(k), which contains the language quoted in defendant's brief. 
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lhim] of d1e offense charged while finding him guilty of the lesser included offense." Aplt. Br. 
at 18. Defendant's claims are meridess and should be rejected. 
Defendant was not entided to lesser-included offense instruction for two reasons. First, 
the charged offense and the alleged lesser-included offense do not overlap. Second, even 
assuming overlap, there was no rational basis in d1e evidence for convicting him of the lesser-
included offense, possession of precursor, and acquitting him of the charged offense, possession 
of clan lab equipment. Defendant is not therefore en tided to a lesser-included offense 
instruction. These were not precisely the grounds relied upon by the trial court in rejecting 
defendant's lesser-included offense instruction, but this Court may affirm d1at ruling upon any 
alternative ground "apparent on the record." See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, '1110,52 P.3d 
11 58 (stating that an appellate court may affirm on "any legal ground or theory apparent on d1e 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that sta ted by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action" (citations omitted» . 
A. Obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance 
precursor is not a lesser included offense of possessing 
clandestine laboratory equipment or supplies. 
Defendant's claim of entidement to lesser-included offense instruction rests on the faulry 
asswnption that he was convicted of the clan lab offense under the precursor variant of § 58-
37d-4(1)(a) . As explained above, the jury was given defendant's proposed superfluous 
instruction containing the precursor variant, but was never asked to find defendant guilty under 
d1at variant. Compare R826 and R834-833. The Jury found him guilty under the lab equipment 
varian t. The precursor variant is thus irrelevant. 
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Moreover, contrary to defendant's-and the trial court's-assumption, obtaining or 
attempting to obtain controlled substance precursor in violation of § 58-37c-3(12)(k), is not a 
lesser included offense o f possessing lab equipment in violation of§ 58-37 d-4(1)(b), the charged 
offense. The elements of the charged equipment offense are (1) possessing lab equipment or 
supplies, (2) "with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation." § 58-37d-4(1)(b) 
The elements of the uncharged precursor offense, on the other hand, are (1) obtaining or 
attempting to obtain controlled substance precursor (2) "knowing or having a reasonable cause 
to believe that the controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful 
manufacture of any controlled substance." § 58-37c-3(12)(k). 
Based on the above, fInding defendant guilty of possessing clan lab equipment did not 
require the jury to fInd any element of § 58-37c-3(12)(k), or that defendant obtained or 
attempted to obtain controlled substance precursor. All the jury had to fInd in order to convict 
defendant under § 58-37d-4(1)(b) was that he possessed the meth lab equipment found in the 
trunk of Hasch's vehicle, which was covered with his fIngerprints, and that he did so with "the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation." See R 834-833. Section 58-37d-4(1)(b) 
does not require proof of possession of any precursor. See § 58-37d-4(1)(a) . 
While the precursor offense in § 58-37c-3(12)0<) may overlap with the precursor offense 
in § 58-37 d-4(1)(a), it is does not overlap with clan lab offense set forth in § 58-37 d-4(1)(b), the 
charged offense, see R62-61, and the only offense for which defendant was found guilty, see 
R834-833. Given the absence o f overlap between § 58-37d-4(1)(b) and § 58-37c-3(12) (k), the 




instruction on this ground alone. Accordingly, this Court should affIrm the trial court's ruling. 
B ailey , 2002 UT 58, ~1 0. 
B. Even assuming overlap , there is no ration al b asis in th e eviden ce for 
acquitting defendant of the charged offense. 
Even assuming the two offenses do overlap, however, defendant still cannot prevail 
without demonstrating that "the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting [him) 
of the offense charged and convicting Ullin) of the lesser-included offense." KeD, 2002 UT 106, 
~ 23; see also B aker, 67 1 P.2d at 157-159. H owever, defendant focuses entirely on evidence he 
asserts was su ffIcient to "convictD [him) on the lesser-included offense," and makes no attempt 
to show that there was a rational basis in the evidence for m·quitting him of the charged offense, 
possessing clan lab equipment. Id. at 17. This is inadequate as a matter oflaw and defendant's 
claim should therefore be rejected. See Crick , 675 P .2d at 53 1 (not enough to show that 
evidence provides a rational basis for convicting of lesser offense). 
Indeed, defendant' s argument wholly ignores evidence of the meth lab equipment found 
in H asch's vehicle and other evidence linking him to the equipment, including his and Hardy's 
fingerprints thereon. See Aplt. Br. at 5-8, 16-24. Instead, defendant attacks the trial court's 
ruling that his own incredible testimony was insufficient to justify giving the lesser-included 
instruction. See Aplt. Br. at 19-21. Thus, even assuming defendant is correct, or that the trial 
court erred in ruling that the evidence was insufficient to convict him for the lesser-included 
offense instruction, defendant still could not prevail here. H e has not, and cannot, show that 
there is a rational basis in the evidence for acquitting him of the equipment offense. K eD, 2002 
UT 106, ~ 23; B aker, 671 P.2d at 157-159; Krugel", 2000 UT 60, ~~ 17-19. To the contrary, 
defendant's characterizations of the evidence of his mental state in his brief serve more to 
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buttress his conviction for intentionally possessing meth lab equipment, than they do to show 
a basis for acquittal. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 21 ("[B]ased on the record as a whole, the jury could 
believe that the [d]efendant himself was the individual who intended to use the crystalline iodine 
for the production of a controlled substance."). 
In sum, even if the evidence does demonstrate that defendant possessed a precursor, 
defendant has not argued that there was evidence from which the jury could rationally find that 
he did not possess clan lab equipment. Consequently, defendant has not shown that he was 
entitled to the lesser included offense instruction. Click, 675 P.2d at 531; Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 
POINT II: DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE A SPECIFIC 
OBJECTION TO A REMARK THE TRIAL COURT MADE TO THE 
JURY PANEL WHEN HE FAILED TO STATE ANY LE GAL GROUND 
FOR HIS MISTRIAL REQUEST 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that his conviction should be reversed because 
the trial court denied his mistrial motion "without explanation or justification." Aplt. Br. at 24. 
Defendant's claim of error is unpreserved and lacks merit. 
Proceedings below. After the Jill), panel was passed for cause, the trial court explained 
the selection process to the potential jurors. RI255:52-53 (copies of the pertinent transcrip t 
pages are attached in addendum B). The trial COllit also reflected on the importance of jury duty 
and his positive experiences with the jill)' system, and expressed gratitude for the Jurors' service. 
Id. at 53-54. Toward the end of his remarks, the trial court also observed that, 
RzgiJ! now, our system oj govermnent, our wqy oj life is under assault. And Zt~r good people like 
you who stand up and SUpP01't it. And for your willingness to come here to take the 
time out of your day for the insufficient pay that we give you and, basically, 
volunteer for this process, let me extend my personalL] and the court'sL] thanks 




Jd. (emphasis added). 





Jd. at 59. 
It's a motion for mistrial, Your Honor. As I heard it during jury 
selection, the court advised the jury panel in part, and I think I'm 
quoting, 'Our society is under assault now. It is your job to - Dit's 
up to you to defend it.' 
All right, counsel. That motion's overruled and denied. 
Thank you. 
T hank you. Anything else except-
Waiver. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court's comment "to the jury was 
highly inappropriate and prejudicial inasmuch as it appeared that the judge was referencing 
criminal elements in society, like the [dJefendant, that are threatening our way of life and that it 
was the jury's duty to do something about it by convicting the [dJefendant." Aplt. Br. at 25. 
D efendant broadly concludes that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion "without 
explanation or justification." Aplt. Br. at 24. However, defendant offered the trial court no legal 
ground for his mistrial request, and none is "apparent from the context." Utah R. Evid. 
l 03(a)(l); see also R1 255:59. Because the trial court's remarks are susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, if defendant truly feared the jury would draw an improper inference from the 
remarks, he should have informed d1e trial court and requested a curative instruction. Because 
defendant failed to do so, he has not preserved his allegation of error for review. See State v. 
Cl"UZ, 2005 UT 45, ~~ 33-34,122 P.3d 543, and od1er authorities discussed at Point IV(A), infra. 
As defendan t asserts no exception to the preservation rule, his claim of error is also procedurally 
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barred. See State v. Pledger, 896 P 2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review claim of 
unpreserved error absent request for plain error review). 
Inadequate briefing. In any event, defendant' s one and one/half page argument is 
inadequately briefed. H e cites four cases, but does not analyze them or show how they support 
his claim. See Aplt. Br. at 25 n.2. Moreover, notwithstanding defendant's failure to request a 
curative instruction, the trial court did instruct jurors generally that they must decide the case 
"without regard to what [they] may believe D1e thought] about it[:] My opinion is immaterial. 
If any statement or ruling of mine seemed to indicate that I held an opinion of any fact, this was 
unintentional and you are instructed to disregard it." R831 . See Addendum B. Defendant does 
not cite the instruction, let alone assert that the jury was incapable of following this or any other 
the court's instructions. Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant's inadequately briefed claim should therefore 
be rejected. See Utah R. App. P . 24(a)(9), G). See Srare v. L ee, 2006 UT 5, ~ 23,543 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (declining to review claim on its merits due to Lee's failure "to meet the threshold of 
argumentative completeness mandated by rule 24"). 
POINT III: THE FOU RTH AMENDMENT DOE S NOT REQUIRE 
POLICE T O GET A SEARCH WARRANT BEFORE TAKING A 
SECOND LOOK AT PREVIOUSLY INVEN T ORIED PROPE RTY 
ALREADY IN THE IR LAWFU L CUSTODY 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that once an inventory search is completed, 
police need a \varrant befo re taking a second look at property held in their lawful custody' See 
Aplt. Br. at 32-33 (" [O]nce that [booking] procedure was completed, a law enforcement agent 
"The State here addresses the preserved Fourth Amendment issue raised in Point IV 
of defendant's brief. Defendant's claim of ineffec tive assistance with regard to an 
unpreservcd Fourth Amendment issue raised in Point III of his brief is addressed in Point IV 




would need a search warrant to seize any other items from [d]efendant's personal property 
because the purposes of the inventory had been fulfilled."). On this theory, defendant 
challenges the pos t-inventory seizures of a key taken into police custody when he was booked 
into the Purgatory jail, and a radio taken into police custody when his vehicle was impounded. 
Aplt. Br. at 30-38. D efendant's claims lack merit. 
Proceedings below. On 20 October 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on 
defendant's m otion to suppress a key seized from his previously inventoried personal property 
held in custody at the Purgatory jail. See R73-72 (motion); R93-92 (supporting memorandwn); 
R1 259 (evidentiary hearing). Following the conclusion of the evidence, defendant's former 
counsel, Randall Gaither, moved to suppress the key, and a radio found in defendant's 
previously impounded car. See, e.g., R1 259:157, 168. See aiso R204-189 ("State's Response to 
D efendant's Motion to Suppress 'One Radio Shack FM Radio' and Memorandum in Support 
Thereof," flied 8 November 2000). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the key and radio in a written 
Order filed on 27 February 2001. R278-260. The trial court found that: 
4. Defendant attempted to have an inmate who was being released take all 
of [d]efendant's property out of the jail with him. 
6. While inventorying [defendant's] property, Deputy Bruckner became 
suspicious of a 'grocery list' which she recognized as being ingredients 
necessary in the production of methamphetamine. 
9. Corporal Endter turned seven items of [d]efendam's property, including 
[d]efendant's keys, over to Detective Gower of the Iron County Drug 
Task Force[.] 
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10. Detective G ower returned to Mr. Hasch's property and found that 
[d]efendant's key opened the car trunk containing the methamphetarnine 
lab. 
12. Because the [d]efendant was taken into custody and Ms. H ardy was taken 
to the hospital, [d]efendan t's car was taken to the St. George Police 
Department's impound lot. 
13. Pursuant to police regulations, Dan Endter performed an impound search, 
and listed a 'Radio Shack' radio as one of the items inventoried. 
R268-266 (a copy of the ruling is attached in addendum C). 
Based on these findings, the trial court ruled that Detective Gower did not need a warrant 
to seize previously inventoried property held in the lawful custody of a law enforcement agency. 
R265 (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), and Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Sei'{!ire, § S.3(b) (2nd ed. 1987» . The trial court reasoned that "this type of second look is valid" 
because "'the items in question have been exposed to police view under unobjectionable 
circumstances, so that no reasonable expectation of privacy is breached by an officer's taking 
a second look at matter with respect to which expectation of privacy already has been partially 
dissipated'" R264-263 (quoting United States v. Grill, 484 F.2d 990, 991 (S,h Cir. 1973». 
Represented by new counsel, defendant requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling. 
See R332-327, which motion was denied. R1 260:S ("I am not going to revisit any o f those things 
I have already ruled on"). 
Represented by yet another counsel, defendant again requested reconsideration. R61 7-
609. The trial court heard oral argument, but found that it was "satisfied with the analysis [it] 
already conducted" and ruled that the " [m]orion to suppress [was] still overruled and denied." 
R1 261 :52. 
22 
Analysis. The issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment requires law 
enforcem ent to obtain a search warrant before taking a second look at previously inventoried 
property held in lawful police custody. The trial court ruled that no warrant is required in tlus 
circumstance and that sound ruling should be upheld. Altl10ugh it is an issue of fust impression 
in Utah, it has been addressed by a large number of courts, including tl1e United States Supreme 
Court. As \vill be set forili below, virtually every court to consider the issue has held that a 
search of property already held in lawful police custody does not require a warrant. 
A. Police were not required to obtain a search warrant b efore 
taking a second look at property lawfully in their custody. 
The Ututed States Supreme Court addressed tlus issue irllnited States v. Edwards, 415 
U .S. 800 (1974) . Edwards was arrested and jailed near nlidnight on 31 May 1970, on a charge 
of attempted burglary. Id. at 801. Shortly thereafter, police discovered tl1at the attempted entr)' 
was "made tluough a wooden window which apparently had been pried up with a pi)' bar," 
leaving paint chips on the sill. !d. Police concluded that it was thus probable paint chips would 
also be found on Edwards' clotlung. Id. at 802. The next morning police took Edwards' clothing 
from llim and exanlined it. Id. That examination revealed paint chips matching those found at 
tl1e scene, which evidence was adnlitted against Edwards at trial and he was convicted. Id. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Edwards' conviction, holding that tl1e "tl1e 
warrantless seizure of the clo tlu ng carried out 'after tl1e adirunistrative process and the 
mechanics of the arrest have come to a halt' violated the Fourth Amendinent." Id. (citation 
onlitted). T he United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. 
Even accepting the Sixtl1 Circuit's " terms," tl1at a "warrant is required where ilie search 
occurs after the adJrunistrative mechanics of arrest have been completed," ilie Supreme Court 
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disagreed that "tbe administrative mechanics of arrest [had] been completed" in Edwards' case 
when he was placed in his cell on May 31. Id at 804-805. Rather, it was not until the next 
morning that police were able to provide Edwards with substitute and suitable clothing for jail. 
Id at 805. The "reasonable dely in effectuating" the removal of Edwards' clothing did not, in 
the Court's view, "change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have 
been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of detention. 
The police did no more on June 1 than they were entitled to do incident to the usual custodial 
arrest and incarceration." [d. 
The Edwards Court also held, however, that "other closely related considerations" 
Justified the warrantless seizure of Edwards' clothing, emphasizing the fact tl1at police already 
had lawful custody of the clotlung: "Indeed, itis difficult to perceive whatis unreasonable about 
the police's examining and holding as evidence those pcrsonal effects of the accused that they 
already have in tl,eit lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest." Id at 806. The Edwards 
Court further recognized that there would be nothing unreasonable in a case, unlike E dwards, 
where tlle defendant's "clotlung or effects [were] immediately seized upon arrival at the jail, held 
under the defendant's name in tlle 'property room' of the jail, and at a later time searched and 
taken for use at the subsequent trial." Id at 807 & n. 7 (affumatively discussing United States 
v. Caruso, 358 F. 2d 184 (2nd Cit. 1966), and Baskerville v. U1lited States, 227 F.2d 454 (l och 
Cit. 1955» . 
As noted, in addition to tl,e Uluted States Supreme Court, virtually every other court to 
consider this issue has upheld similar "second look" or post-inventory inspections of property 
lawfully held in police custody. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, SearciJ a1ld Seizure, § 5.3 (b), p.159 
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n. 7 4 (4th ed. 2004) (collecting twenty-two cases from eighteen jurisdictions). T hese courts have 
upheld "second look" searches when they were made for an investigatory purpose unrelated to 
the initial charges, and even when they occurred several days-if not months-after the initial 
inventory or seizure. See United States v. Turner, 28 F.3d 981, (9,h Cir. 1994) (Turner's cap 
taken into custody when he was jailed on state charges was later lawfully seized without a 
warrant by fed eral agent); Grill, 484 F.2d at 990-91 (key found on Grill's person and placed with 
inventoried property at his arrest was lawfully retrieved one month later and used to open lock 
on duffle bag suspected to contain drugs); State v. CalTiger , 599 P.2d 788, 791 (Ariz. 1979) 
(police properly removed Carriger'S keys from property locker, where they had been placed 
ninety-seven days earlier when he was arrested, and found they unlocked a briefcase found to 
contain stolen property); J ackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1364-65 (Del. 1994) 0 ackson's 
sneakers, taken into police custody upon his arrest for weapon and drug charges, properly seized 
without a warrant when police later realized their evidentiary value to murder investigation); 
Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 386-87 (Fla. 1983) (rejecting Lightbourne's claim that 
personal property taken from him at the tin1e of his arrest on a weapons charge was inadmissible 
in murder trial, holding that "the belongings had already been exposed to police view under 
lawful circumstances," and thus later "inspection did not breach [Lightbourne'sJ privacy interest 
in such belongings"); People v. Richards, 445 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ill. 1983) (police properly 
allowed burglary victim to examine Richards' property, which had been taken into custody upon 
his earlier and unrelated arrest for failure to comply with work-release regulations, as the 
" second look was not conducted to search for and discover evidence previously concealed in 
some way from the inventory officer"); State v. Bryant, 325 So.2d 255, 258-259 (La. 1976) 
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(knife seized and inventoried upon Bryant's traffic anest properly retrieved for use in rape 
investigation); State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830, 832-839 (Wash. 2003) Q10lding under state 
constitution that once police conduct valid inventory search of inmate effects at booking, 
inmates lose any privacy interest therein and their effects may be inspected pursuant to 
investigation of other crimes). Professor LaFave characterizes these "second look" cases as 
being the "essentialD equivalent of a plain view case and consequently not such a significant 
intrusion as to require the prior authorization o f a judicial officer." LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 5.3(b), p.1 61 (4th ed. 2004). 
D efendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Indeed, no t one of the cases cited by 
defendant in SUppOH of his challenge to Detective Gower's seizure of the key involves law 
enforcement taking a second look at property held in lawful police custody. Ratl1er, defendant's 
authorities involve challenges to the validity of an initial inventory search, or to the validity of 
an initial administrative inspection.' Because none of these cases address the validity of law 
enforcement taking a second look at property lawfully inventoried and held in police 
custody-the sole issue here-defendant's reliance on them is misplaced. 
United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2"d Cir. 1986), upon which defendant places 
primary emphasis, involves neither an inventory nor an administrative search. Rather, Cohen 
involved an investigative search of a detainee's prison ,·ell. Id. at 21. See also Willis v. Artuz, 301 
F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2002) Qirniting Cohen). Thus, as with defendant's other authorities, Cohen 
'See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S . 1 (1990): Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US. 367 (1987); 
Soutl, Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U .S. 364 (1976); State v. H ygh , 711 P2d 264 (Utah 
1985); see also New YOlk v. Bwgel; 482 U.S. 691 (1987); United States v. Bulacal1, 156 




says nothing about the validity of law enforcement taking a second look at previously 
inventoried property lawfully retained in police custody, and is similarly unavailing. 
Finally, defendant complains that he was not allowed to release his personal property to 
another inmate apparently being released as defendant was booked. Aplt. Br. at 33 (,, [p]rior to 
and/or at the conclusion of the booking inventory, [d]efendant should have been allowed to 
release his property (except for the 'cook sheet') to anyone he wanted, including Brett 
Rasmussen") . The only supporting authority defendant cites is Hygh, which as noted, holds 
that a vehicle inventory search must be conducted pursuant to standardized procedures. 71 1 
P.2d at 268-270. Although the Hygh Court criticized the officer in that case for, among other 
failings, not giving Hygh an opportunity to arrange for the disposition of his legally parked 
vehicle, id. at 268, the case says nothing about whether the Fourth Amendment requires police 
to release an inmate's personal property inventoried at booking to another, soon-to-be released, 
inmate. Indeed, the State is aware of no such authority. As recognized irEd wards, "[w]ith or 
witll0ut probable cause, the authorities [are] entitled [upon arrest, or during booking,] not only 
to search [an arrestee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep it in official custody," 415 
U.S. at 804, particularly where, as here, it is apparent the property includes evidence of additional 
crinunality. Cj zd. at 806 (''When it became apparent tlnt the articles of clothing were evidence 
of the crime for which Edwards was being held, tlle police were entitled to take, examine, and 
preserve them for use as evidence, just as they are normally pernutted to seize evidence of crune 
when it is lawfully encountered.")6 
~he Purgatory jail policy does not pern1.it release of property to another illmate, but 
is discretionary with regard to release to other individuals. See Defendant's Exh. # 1 at R733 . 
Defendant does not cite the jail policy or otherwise assert that it mandated the release of his 
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B. Police were not required to obtain a search warrant before taking a 
second look at a radio inside defendant's impounded vehicle. 
The above analysis applies equally to defendant's challenge to D etective Gower's seizure 
of the radio from his previously impounded vehicle. See Aplt. Br. at 36 ("1L]aw enforcement 
officers, when they returned on February 2, 1999 to obtain [the radio] from [d] efendant's 
veh.icle, should have obtained a warrant to search [d] efendant's car"). For the all the same 
reasons police were justified in taking a second look at the key held in lawful custody at the 
P urgatory jail, police were also justified in taking a ~econd look at a radio inside defendant's 
vehicle, which defendant admits was lawfully impounded. See Aplt. Br. at 35 ("Regarding the 
impound lot, it is clear from the record [d]efendant was arrested and booked into the Purgatory 
OJail whzle his mr was lawfully impounded') (emphasis added). 
As before, defendant's cited authorities are not to the contrary. Of the approximately 
twenty- five cases he cites in support of his challenge to Detective Gower's seizure of the radio, 
only one addresses the validity of police taking a second look at properly inventoried property. 
See Aplt Br. at 37 (citing United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948 (11 'h Cir. 1990)). 
In Khoury, a DEA agent examined Khoury's notebook in the course of an inventory 
search, but did not find anything of evidentiary value. 901 F.2d at 959. The agent examined the 
notebook again later and decided that it did have evidentiary value. Id. The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the agent's second look at the notehook, without a warrant, violated 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. Notahly, in so holding, Khoury does not acknowledge the 
overwhelming weight of contrary authori ty, including Edwal·ds. Id. At least one state court has 
personal property here. 
28 
• 
expressly declined to follow Khoury. See State v. Mejia, 579 So.2d 766, 767 n.2 (Fla. App. 
1991) (reasoning "that the article seized from the defendant's person incident to an on-the-
crime-scene arrest was the fruit of a valid search, subject to a la ter exa.mination even if its 
evidentiary value was not known at the time of the arrest") . 
Notwithstanding its questionable precedential value, Kbo1l1yis factually distinguishable 
here. Although police did not immediately recognize the evidentiary value of the key or the 
radio observed during the initial inventories of defendant's personal property and vehicle, it is 
undisputed that they were then aware of their existence. Thus, this is not a case where the 
second look included items or information-as irKho1l1y-about which police were previously 
unaware. See United States v. Andrews, 22 F. 3d 1328,1337 (5,h Cir. 1994) (distinguishing 
Kbourj). See also United States v. Thompson, 837 F.2d 673, 675 (5 'h Cir.) (noting that no 
exception to the warrant requirement is available where a "second inspection [of evidence in 
government custody is] undertaken to look for something that had not been discovered at the 
time of the inventory"), art. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988). Notably, in holding that a warrant is 
required where police conduct a second inspection "upon the mere hunch that something of 
evidentiary value ... might be found," the Fifth Circuit Court takes a clear minority view. See 
W LaFave Search and Seiz ure, § 5.3(b) at 162 & n.84 (4'h ed. 2004) (collecting cases). Based 
on the above, Khoury fails to offer compelling support for defendant's challenge here. 
The remaining t\venty-four authorities defendant cites are all inapposite for one reason 
or another. For example, the authorities cited at pp. 35-36 of defendant's brief all involve 
challenges to I"ltlal searches of vehicles not already held in police custody, and which were 
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conducted pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrantrequirement7 SirrUlarly, the bulk 
o f defendant's authorities cited at pp. 37-38 of his brief, involve challenges to the validity of an 
initial veh.icle impound or inventory search8 
D efendant's reliance on both categories of cases is m.isplaced. Indeed, defendant's 
reliance on the automobile exception cases is m.isplaced for two reasons. First, that exception 
to th e warrant requirement is not at issue here, and second, defendant has conceded the validity 
o f the initial search and seizure of his car. See Aplt. Br. at 35 ("[defendant'S] car was lawfully 
impounded") . D efendant's concession as to the propriety of the initial impound and inventory 
of his vehicle also necessarily renders his reliance on the inventory search cases he cites 
unavailing. The sole issue on appeal is the propriety of police taking a second look at a 
previously-and indisputably properly- impounded vehicle, an issue unaddressed in the 
inventory cases upon which defendant relies. 
D efendant' s rema.ining authorities, United States v. J acobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), 
/1linois v. L aFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), and United States v. J ohnson, 820 F.2d 1065 (9,h 
'See United States v. Chad wick, 433 U.S . 1 (1977); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Smith v. Thombe1'g, 136 F.3d 1070 (6,h Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cit. 1994); United S tates v. MalMing, 7 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365 (11 th Cir. 1991); Pinkney v. K eane, 920 F.2d 
1090 (2nd Cir. 1990); United States v. Mal'tin, 806 F. 2d 204 (8th Cir. 1986); and Lavicky v. 
Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985) . 
8See Wells, 49 5 U.S.l ; B ertine, 479 U.S. 367; Opperm an , 428 U.S. 364; United 
States v. L age, 183 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999), United States v. Franks, 864 F.2d 992 (3m Cir. 
1988) , Uni ted States v. Castro, 129 F. 3d 752 (5th Cir. 1997), United States v. Blaz e, 143 
F.3d 585 (10,h Cir. 1998), United States v. D ecker, 19 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 1994), United 
States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62 (2nd Cir. 1994), United States v. Ford, 986 F.2d 57 (4th 
Cir. 1993), United States v. Mal'shall, 986 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1993), United States v. 
Rodrig uez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780 (1" Cir. 1991). 
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Cir. 1987), differ from those discussed above in that none involves a challenge to the initial 
search or seizure of a vehicle conducted pursuant to either the automobile exception, or 
alternatively, the impound/inventory exception. However, like the authorities discussed above, 
none of the three cases supports defendant's clain1 that the radio was illegally seized. 
Defendant cites Jacobsen for the proposition that "police would need a warrant to 
repeat a search already conducted for a more extensive search," Aplt. Br. at 36-37 (citing 
J acobsen , 466 u.s. at 11 5-21). However,facobsen is inapposite because the issue in that case 
was whether the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement to obtain a warrant before 
searching a damaged package that had already been searched by a private party, not law 
enforcement. Id. at 117. The scope of the police search was thus limited by the scope of the 
private search. Id. Because J acobsen did not involve police taking a second look at property 
lawfully in their cus tody, however, it has no bearing here. 
The same is true of L aFayette. That case merely clarifies that it is "not 'unreasonable' 
for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search 
any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures." 
462 U.S. at 648. L aFayette says nothing about the issue here, the propriety of police taking a 
second look at previously inventoried property. 
Finally,fol1flson, contrary to defendant's characterization, actually supports admissibility. 
Sin1ilar to this case, J ohnson involved an initial search of Johnson's jacket at the time of his 
DUI arrest, which search revealed currency. 820 F.2d at 1072. The currency was "inventoried 
and placed in a sealed envelope." Jd. The envelope was later opened at the request of an FBI 
agent, who compared tbe serial numbers on] oh115on's currency with a list of serial numbers 
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from stolen money. Id On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the "second 
search" "because [Johnson's] expectation of privacy was significantly reduced by the initial, valid 
search." Id. (citing United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9,h Cir.), fert.denied, 461 
u.s. 936 (1983)). See also authorities cited in sub point (A) at pp. 25-30 supra. 
Given ti,e wealth of autllority upholding second looks at property held in lawful police 
custody-like the key and radio here-the trial court properly ruled that Detective Gower did 
not need a warrant to seize either item. That sound ruling should be affIrmed. 
POINT IV: DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE CONSENSUAL 
SEIZURE OF METH LAB EQUIPMENT FROM A THIRD PARTY'S 
VEHICLE IS UNPRESERVED AND THE RECORD DOES NOT 
SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
FOR NOT CHALLENGING THE THIRD PARTY CONSENT 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts tI,at he maintained an expectation of privacy 
"in ti,e bags in the trunk of [Tim Hasch's] car," and that therefore Hasch's third-party consent 
did not Justify ti,e seizure of meth lab equipment found in the trunk of Hasch's vehicle. Aplt. 
Br. at 27; see also Aplt. Br. at 25 ("The purported methamphetamine lab central to tlus case was 
discovered in contravention of the fourth amendment as it came about due to an invalid tlllid-
party consent" (capitalization and bolding onlitted)). Defendant alleges that Hasch's consent 
was insufficient to justify ti,e seizure because police knew the meth lab equipment was 
defendant's. Aplt. Br. at 26. Thus, defendant claims police should have sought his consent or 
obtained a warrant. Id. ("Hasch was ti,e one tI,at gave consent upon wluch the officers relied, 
for ti,e search of the contents of the trunk, even tllough 0 Hasch made clear those items did not 
belong to llim and belonged instead to the [d]efendant"). Defendant's claims are L1npreserved. 
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A. D efendant failed to p reserve his claims tha t he m aintain ed 
an expectation of p rivacy in th e contents of H asch 's trunk 
and tha t H asch's third-p arty consent was invalid. 
Defendant was represented by three successive defense counsel pretrial, each of whom 
filed motions to suppress evidence. Significantly, defendan t never sought to suppress the lab 
equipment found in H asch's car. See R 73-72, R93-92, R332-328, R614-610. Rather, as set forth 
in Point III , supra, defendant challenged the warrantless seizures (1) of a key from his personal 
effects held at tl1e Purgatory jail and (2) a radio removed from his previously impounded vehicle. 
Id. Accordingly, defendant' s challenge to the admissibility of the meth lab equipm ent found in 
tl1e trunk of Hasch's vehicle is unpreserved. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987). 
"[A)n objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial 
[court) can consider it. '" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ~ 33, 122 P. 3d 543 (quo ting State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (internal quotations omitted in original)) . H ere, 
defendant's multiple motions to suppress the key and the radio were insufficient, as a matter of 
law, to alert tl1e trial court to his claim on appeal, tl1at he maintained an expectation of privacy 
in the contents of Hasch's trunk, and that H asch's consent to search was therefore invalid with 
regard to tl1e contents of the trunk. See Cruz , 2005 UT 45, ~ 34 010lding that Cruz's objection 
to jurors' conversation did not preserve his objection to alleged juror bias); Sta te v. E Jdl'edge, 
773 P 2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) ('''An objection based on competency does not call the trial court's 
attention to the reliability issue"), a rt. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)); Sta te v. Braun, 787 P.2d 
1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990) ~olding defendant's discovery objection did not alert trial court 
to "foundation [) problem" of the witness's testim ony and thus the objection was unpreserved). 
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B. Defendant has the burden to provide an adequate record to 
support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
While a defendant's failure to preserve a claim generally precludes appellate review, 
defendant asserts that an exception to the preservation rule applies here-ineffective assistance. 
Aplt. Br. at 29 n.3. Cf State v. Pledger, 896 P. 2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to 
review unpreserved error absent request for plain error review). Specifically, defendant claims 
that "[b]y no t moving to suppress the evidence found in the car on Mr. H asch's property, 
counsel for [d]efendant was deficient in his representation." Aplt. Br. at 29 n.3. D efendant 
further asserts that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged deficient performance because 
the meth lab equipment in Hasch's trunk was the "key" evidence against him. Id. Defendant's 
claim of ineffectiveness lacks record support and must therefore be rejected. 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant "m ust first demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fe ll below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~ 16, 12 P.3d 92. "The necessary 
consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is 
aware." Id. at ~ 17. When the record is "inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding d1at counsel performed 
effectively" Id. Furthermore, it is well-settled that "[a] n appellate court's 'review is ... limited 
to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, ,]7,974 P .2d 
279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P 2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985» . See 
also Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P. 2d 121, 123 (U tah 1986) (per curiam) (appellate court cannot 




1983) (same); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 11 57, 11 62 (Utah Ap p. 1998) ("An appellate court 
simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alJeged facts unsupported 
by the record" (citation omitted)). 
C. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel I S not 
supported by the record or relevant authori ty. 
Defendant asserts that H asch's consent to search H asch's vehicle was insufficient to 
justify the seizure of meth lab equipment found in the trunk because Hasch told police the 
equipment was defendant's. Aplt. Br. at 26. D efendant thus asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not moving to suppress the lab equipment. Id. at 29, n.3. Defendant's claim of 
ineffec tiveness fails because the suppression claim is not so obviously meritorious that any 
reasonable attorney would have identified it, advanced it, and succeeded on it. On the contrary, 
the claim lacks merit. 
A warrandess-but consensual-search is reasonable. Florida v. jim en 0, 500 U.S. 248, 
250-252 (1991); see also State v. Bmwn, 853 P. 2d 851,855 (Utah 1992) ("Recognized exceptions 
[to warrant requirementJinclude consent searches."). Moreover, it is reasonable, not only if the 
defendant consents, but also if a person od1er than the defendant, with authority over the 
premises, voluntarily consents. United S tates v. Matlock, 41 5U.S.164, 170 (1974); see also 
Brown, 853 P. 2d at 855 ("If a third party rather than the defendant consents to a search, the 
third party must be one who possesses 'common authority' over d1e area or has some other 
'sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected"') (citation omitted) . 
In A1atlock , the woman with whom Matlock lived consented to a search of the bedroom 
t11ey shared and police found $4,995 hidden inside a diaper bag in the closet. 415 U.S. at 166-67. 
Upholding the validity of the consensual search, the United States Supreme Court "reaffirmed 
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that a warrantless entry and search by law enforcement officers does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of'unreasonable searches and seizures' if tlle officers have obtained 
the consent of a third party who possesses common authority over tlle premises." IJJinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990) (discussing Matlock). The supreme court explained in 
Matlock that under the doctrine of common authority, co-inhabitants "assumeD the risk that 
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. In 
Roruiguez, the supreme court extended j\1atlock to hold tlut a "warrantless entry is" also 
"valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, 
reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do 
so." 497 U.S. at 179. 
As record support for his claim of ineffectiveness-or his claim tlut police unreasonably 
relied on Hasch's consent-defendant cites Officer Millet's sllppression ane! tria I resrimony, Jee 
Aplt. Br. at 10, 26 (citing R1 259: 123-124 and R1256:372-374), Officer Edwards' trial testimony, 
see Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing R1256:430-431), and Hasch's trial testimony, see Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing 
R1256438)9 
According to Officer Jv1illet, after defendant was arrested, his then girlfriend, Karen 
Hardy, told police about a meth lab on Hasch's property in Iron County. R1259:123-24. 10 
Police then traveled to Hasch's property and asked him to show them where tlle meth lab was 
located. R1256:372. In response, Hasch "led" several officers "to an older Chevy [C]orsica 
'Copies of the pertinent transcript pages are attached in addendum D. 
10Detective Gower also testified at the suppression hearing that"U(aren] said she D 
'knew where the lab was but it was just not all [defendant's] lab.'" R1 259:11 2. 
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parked out in his driveway area, reached down with a set of keys and opened the trunk. Inside 
the trunk were two large suitcases and a large duffel bag, ... and a backpack." Id. at 373. When 
Hasch opened the trunk, Officer Millet immediately detected an odor he associated with meth 
labs. Id. at 375. Another officer opened the baggage to confirm that it contained the meth lab 
equipment and it was thereafter seized for a later inventOlY- Id. at 374. At the time he turned 
the meth lab equipment over to police, Hasch claimed that it belonged to defendant. R1259: 124. 
He further informed police that he had given defendant a key to the trunk. Id. Officer Edwards' 
brief trial testimony was consistent. R12S6:430-32. 
Hasch, on the other hand, agreed that he consented to the search of his Corsica, but 
denied that he, or anyone else, opened the trunk of the Corsica until after police obtained a key 
from defendant's belongings at the Purgatory jail. R1256:437. Hasch also denied giving 
defendant a key, surmising that defendant must have taken the key as it was "parked out by the 
road." Id. at 439; see also id. at 440. Finally, Hasch claimed to have been "surprised" when police 
found a meth lab in the trunk of his Corsica. Id. at 442. He also claimed to have had no idea 
who the meth lab belonged to, and further denied telling police that it belonged to defendant. 
Id. ("They asked me ifI knew anything about it. I told them I, you know, I didn't putitin there. 
I don't know how it got there."); .fee also id. at 443 (denying defendant or Hardy asked to store 
the meth lab in his Corsica) . 
Contrary to defendant's claim, this evidence does not undercut the State's theory of a 
valid consent. It follows that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make that claim. 
Indeed, construing any possible ambiguity in the light most favorable to trial counsel's 
performance below, see Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~ 17, nothing in the above evidence suggests 
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that police unreasonably relied on Hasch's consent. This is true even assuming, for purposes 
of argument only, that defendant maintained a minimal expectation of privacy in th.e trunk of 
Hasch's Corsica. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) ("Passengers, no less 
than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property they transport 
in cars") . In leaving his meth lab in the trunk of Hasch's Corsica, defendant ran the risk H asch 
would tUIn it over to police. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171n.7; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179; see 
also United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 111 5, 111 9 (10,h Cir. 1995) ("By leaving his bag in the 
possession and control of Hollis, [Austin] assumed the risk that Hollis would allow the 
authorities access to the bag"). 
The fact that in turning the lab over to police Hasch said that it belonged to defendant 
did not render police reliance on Hasch's consent unreasonable. To the contrary, police 
reasonably viewed Hasch's conduct and statements as acquiescence to their request to see the 
meth lab. See United States v.Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430,436-37 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that third-
party's statements: "It's not up to me, I don't own the stuff," were reasonably interpreted by 
officer as "simple acquiescence to the request for consent," rather than notice of lack of 
authority to consent). Indeed, given Hasch's conduct and statements in opening the trunk when 
they requested to see the meth lab, police reasonably believed that Hasch had authority to 
consent to their opening the baggage inside to verify his revelation. See R R1256:372-73. See also 
United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7'h Cir. 2000) ("Generally, consent to search a 
space includes consent to search containers within that space where a reasonable officer would 
construe the consent to extend to the container") ( it/ing Jimen o, 500 U.S. at 251 and 




performance, uial counsel acted reasonably in not seeking to suppress the meth lab equipment. 
See Lithel1and, 2000 UT 76, ~ 17. 
Given that the med1 lab was found on Hasch's property, inside the uunk of Hasch's car, 
police reasonably believed that H asch had aud10rity to grant d1em access to the med1 lab inside. 
Matlock, 415 U.S . at 171 n. 7; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179; Austin,66 F.3d at 1119; Jenkins, 
92 F.3d at 436-37; Melgar., 227 F.3d at 1041. D efendant's ineffectiveness claim should 
therefore be rejected. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS ONE 
OF THE PEOPLE WHO PURCHASED IODINE TINCTURE 
In Point V of his brief, defendant asserts that the uial court erroneously allowed Larry 
Overson to identi fy 11in1 at uial as one of two people iliat purchased four gallons of iodine 
tincture from Overson Farm Center. Aplt. Br. at 38. Specifically, defendant claims that 
Overson's identification was "forever tainted" at the preliminary hearing because the prosecutor 
asked if Overson could identify defendant by inquiring, "Is one of the individuals that you saw 
on January 14'h in your store seated at the table on my left?" Aplt. Br. at 39; see also R071:9. 
Defendant's assertion of error is frivolous and should be rejected on that ground. Even 
assunung any possible error in the admission of Overson's identification, defendant himself 
testified that he helped to purchase the iodine tincture from Overson, and in fact, carried it out 
of the store. See R1258: 786-87 . 
Proceedings below. As a consequence of the prosecutor's question at the prelimimu:y 
hearing, defendant moved to suppress Overson's identification of him. R634-32. The uial court 
heard argument on 11 October 2001, and took the matter under advisemen t. R1261:17-24. 
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Prior to trial on 22 October 2001, the trial court heard Overson's testimony, see R1255:59-60, 
and thereafter entered oral fInclings in support of its ruling denying defendant's motion to 
suppress Overson's identifIcation testimony.'l 
SpecifIcally, the trial court found that Overson obsen'ed defendant for approximately 
four to six minutes, that Overson paid particular attention to the unusual purchase of iodine 
tincture, that Overson's observations of defendant were unobstructed, that Overson wore 
glasses when he observed defendant and was wearing them in court, that Overson viewed 
defendant "at a distance of some [five] feet away. across the counter," and fInally, that 
Overson's identifIcation was not the product of any suggestion. R1255:101-03. Rather, 
defendant's "appearance, dressed all in white, even the white shoes with a long ponytail," "was 
distinctive" enough that Overson could remember what defendant looked like, and would have 
identified defendant even absent the prosecutor's suggestion . Id. at 103. Thus, the trial court 
found that Overson's identifIcation was constitutionally reliable. Jd. at 104. 
Analysis. . The trial court's sound ruling should be upheld. The ruling reflec ts 
consideration of all the factors identifIed by the Utah Supreme Court for evaluating the reliability 
of eyewitness identification testimony, including 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the wib1ess's identifIcation was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during tl1e 
"Copies of the pertinent transcript pages are attached in addendwn E. 
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time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's. 
State v. R amil'ez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). Compare R1255:101 -04. H aving considered 
all of the above factors, and finding none compelled suppression of Overson's identification of 
defendant, the trial court properly ruled Overson's identification was untainted by the 
prosecutor's question at the preliminary hearing. Id. 
Additionally, defendant's cursory analysis in his brief is inadequate to show any error in 
the trial court's ruling. See Aplt. Br. at 38-40. Although defendant recites the R amirez factors, 
he engages in no analysis. Indeed, defendant makes no attempt to show that the trial court's 
legal conclusion was erroneous, or that its underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous. 
See Aplt. Br. at 39-40. Instead, defendant broadly asserts that Overson's identification was 
necessarily tainted by the prosecutor's question, merely because Overson could not also identify 
defendant's female companion. Id. However, the trial court found that Overson paid more 
attention to defendant than he did to the female, given defendant's "distinctive" all white attire 
and ponytail, and defendant has not challenged this finding on appeal. Defendant's allegation 
of error can be rejected on this ground alone. See e llen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ~ 3, 100 P.3d 
1177 ("Because defendants have failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings of fact, we do not consider those findings properly challenged and, therefore, 
assume the evidence suppons them"). 
In any event, even asswning any possible error in the admission of Overson's eyewitness 
identification of defendant, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice. Defendant himself testified 
that he was with Hardy when she purchased iodine tincture from Overson, and that he carried 
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it to the car. See R1258:786-87. Given his admission, defendant's frivolous challenge to 
Overson's eyewitness identification should be rejected. 
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED AN 
INCRIMINATING LETTE R WRITTEN BY DEFENDANT 
In Point VI of his brief, defendant asserts that there was "insufficient foundation" for 
the adrnission of an incriminating jailhouse letter from defendant to Karen Hardy. Aplt. Br. at 
40-41 (citing Exh. # P-28). The trial court admitted the letter based on its authentication by 
Hardy, defendant's former girlfriend. See R1257:519 ("It is coming in based on this sole reason 
for foundation ... Ms. H ardy is testifying that she recognizes that handwriting as [defendant's) 
and for no other reason''); see a/so id. at 520. Because a nonexpert may authenticate handwriting 
under rule 901 (b) (2), Utah Rules of Evidence, defendant's clain1 of insufficient foundation lacks 
merit and should be rejected. See State v. J acques, 924 P .2d 898, 900-01 (Utah App. 1996) 
0101ding nonexpert may authenticate handwriting). 
Rule 901 governs the admissibility of documentary evidence. Under the rule, "the 
proponent, prior to introducing such evidence, must first authenticate the evidence by showing 
that it is what the proponent Clain1S it to be." J acques, 924 P.2d at 900-01. Rule 901 provides, 
"by way of illustration, several possible methods for authenticating a writing" and specifically 
"provides that a trial court may allow a nonexpert witness to state an opinion as to the 
authenticity of handwriting, provided that two requirements are satisfied[.]" Id. at 901 (citing 
Utah R. Evid. 901 (b) (2)) . Those requirements are "first, that the witness is shown to be farniliar 
with the handwriting, and second, that it is established the witness's familiarity was not gained 
for purposes of the litigation." Id. It is not necessary in establishing the nonexpert's familiarity 
with the handwriting to show that the "nonexpert personally observe[d) the act of writing." Id. 
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Rather, familiarity may be established if the nonexpert witness has viewed writings "pmporting 
to be those of the person in question under circwnstances indicating their genuineness." Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original) . 
Under the second prong of 901 (b) (2), a nonexpert may offer an opinion as to the 
genuineness of the handwriting sample so long as it is established that the witness did not gain 
"familiarity for purposes of testifying in an action in which the handwriting is at issue." Jacques, 
id. at 902. "In other words, the witness's familiarity with the handwriting must predate the 
present litigation." Id. 
Here, outside the presence of the jury, on voir dire by defense counsel, Hardy testified 
that she had not seen defendant write the incriminating letter, but she recognized his 
handwriting in Exh. # P-28. R1257:508.'2 Upon further questioning by the prosecutor, Hardy 
testified that she was familiar with defendant's handwriting based on the many threatening letters 
he had written from the Purgatory jail during his incarceration. Id. at 51 1. Hardy turned the 
letters over to her probation officer and sought a protective order against defendant. !d. Based 
on this testimony, the trial court received the incriminating jailhouse letter into evidence. Id. at 
515; see also id. at 519-520; Exh. # P-28. 
Hardy's testimony meets the requirements of rule 901 (b) (2) . Hardy had previously 
viewed threatening writings ''pmportillgto be d10se of[defendant] under circwnstances indicating 
their genuineness." Jacques, 924 P.2d at 901 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
in original). She thus possessed a degree of familiarity with his handwriting as required by the 
first prong of rule 901 (b )(2). Id. Additionally, Hardy did not gain her familiarity with 
12Copies of Exh. # P-28 and pertinent transcript pages are attached in addendum F. 
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defendant's handwriting "for purposes of the litigation." Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(2). Thus, the 
requirements of rule 901 (b) (2) are satisfied and the trial court's admissibility ruling should be 
upheld. 
Defendant's aged authorities are not the contrary. Indeed, State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 
442,85 P. 447,448 (Utah 1906), is affIrmatively quoted in Jacques for the proposition that it 
is "settled that no great degree of familiarity with handwriting is required to render a witness 
competent to give an opinion." Furtl1er, 1I1urdock v. Farrell, 49 Utah 314, 163 P. 1102, 1003 
(Utah 1917), merely notes that a letter there at issue was properly excluded due to insufficient 
foundation, but never identifies tl1e deficiency. 
Even assuming any possible error in the admission of the jailhouse letter, defendant 
suffered no unfair prejudice. Given tl1e incriminating evidence taken from defendant's person 
when he was booked into Purgatory, and that defendant's fingerprints were found on the meth 
lab, the jury did not convict hin1 for possessing the meth lab merely because he also incrllllnated 
l1in1self in a letter to Hardy asking her to dispose of evidence and back his clain1s of innocence. 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
HEARSAY AND GENERAL IMPEACHMENT 
In Point VII of his brief, defendant asserts that "the [trial] court erred in disallowing the 
testimony of a defense witness, Mr. Paul Halstead, on the basis of hearsay." Aplt. Br. at 42 
(capitalization and bolding omitted). He also asserts that the trial court erred in disallowing the 
testimony of Troy Thode. Aplt. Br. at 43. These clain1s are inadequately briefed, unpresen' ed, 
and/ or lack merit. 
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Proceedings below. Outside the jury's presence, Halstead testified that he was in jail 
with State's witness Tim Hasch in Febuary 1999, and that Hasch told him he did not "want to 
go down" for the meth lab offense, and that "he wanted to help Karen and Jonathan try to put 
it on [defendant]." R1257:674-75.13 Defense counsel broadly argued that the testimony was 
admissible under rules 803(2) (excited utterance), 803(24) (catchall), and 804(5)(b) (multiple 
hearsay exceptions), Utah Rules of Evidence. See R1257:675-680. However, the trial court 
excluded Halstead's testimony under former rule 803(24) because defendant failed to comply 
with the notice requirement of that rule. 14 Id. at677. The trial court also found that the testimony 
did not meet the excited utterance exception of rule 803(2), but was not asked to rule on 
defendant's cursory claim under rule 804(5)(b). Id. at 679-80. 
Also outside the presence of the jury, defendant examined Troy Thode regarding his 
previous e"'Perience with Karen Hardy, who had been one of his bail bond clients, and who had 
also jumped bail. See R1 258:746-756. The prosecutor objected to Thode's testimony and 
defense counsel offered no theory of admissibility. Id. at 752. Accordingly, the trial court ruled 
that Thode's testjrnony was inadmissible "impeachment in a far too collateral issue with respect 
to the impeachment of the testimony of Karen Hardy." Id. at 752-53. 
13Copies of all pertinent transcript pages are attached in addendum G. 
14Fo=er rule 803(24) provided in pertinent part that 
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless 
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of tl1e trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse the party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
tl1e proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
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Analysis. On appeal, defendant asserts that the notice requirement of fonner rule 
803(24) should have been relaxed because H alstead's testimony was critical to his defense. Aplt. 
Br. at 42. Alternatively, he asserts that Halstead's testimony should have been admitted under 
rules 801(d)(1)-(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 42. Both claims lack merit. First, 
defendant's claim under former rule 803(24) is inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 
24 (a) (9), G). The argument is devoid of citation to, or discussion of, any authority supporting 
his sketchy claim, and consists of a single sentence, or the last sentence of the fIrst full paragraph 
on page 42 of his brief. It should be rejected on this ground. Id. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, ~ 23. 
Second, defendant did notraise rules 801(d)(1)-(2) in the trial court; therefore, he has not 
preserved his claims under these rules for appellate review. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ~~ 33-34, and 
other authorities discussed at Point IV(A), supra. Because defendant does not assert any 
exception to the preservation rule, his claims under rule 801 (d) (1 )-(2) are barred. See Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
Defendant's claim of error with regard to the trial court's ruling disallowing Thode's 
testimony, wholly lacks merit. Utah Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic 
evidence for general impeachment. See Sta te v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988) 
(harmless error to admit extrinsic evidence to attack defendant's credibility in "direct 
contravention of the plain language of rule 608"). Cj State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481-82 n.2 
(Utah App. 1991) (no error to admit extrinsic evidence of defendant's drug use when he opened the 
door) .15 While rule 608( c) does allow extrinsic evidence to prove "bias, prejudice or any motive 
15The extrinsic evidence at issue in R eed was admitted on rebuttal only after Reed 
opened the door by denying that he used drugs and that he was intoxicated as the victim 
claimed. Id. at 480-81. See Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, UTAH EVIDENCE LAW, 6-203, 
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to misrepresent," defendant never claimed Thode's testimony showed Hardy's bias here. See 
R1258:746-756,752. While this was not precisely the ground relied upon by the trial court in 
disallowing Thode's testimony, that ruling may be affirmed on any alternative ground "apparent 
on the record." Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ~10. 
In any event, given the wealth of evidence against defendant, including his incriminating 
letter and fingerprints on the meth lab equipment, the jury was not reasonably likely to acquit 
him based on H alstead's or Thode's testimony. Therefore, any evidentiary error had not affect 
on defendant's substantial rights. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. " [Olral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
~ 10, 110 P .3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
2nd ed. 2004. Thus, the extrinsic evidence in Reed involved more than witness 
impeachment, but also established the facts surrounding the offense itself. See State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 (UtahApp. 1993) (explaining Reed). Here, however, Thode's 
general impeachment of Hardy was not intrinsic to the facts of defendant's meth lab offense. 
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In the case at bar, the decisional process would ''be significantly aided by oral argument." 
UtahR.App.P.29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on al February 2006. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., ) Criminal No. 991500647 
d.o.b. 03120173, Task Force Case No. 1999-00120 
SS# 573-19-4154, ) Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Defendant. ) 
The undersigned complainant, Mary-Kathleen Wolsey, ClllefDeputy Iron County Attorney, 
states on infonnation and beliefthat the above-named Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., 
committed the following crime, to wit: 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR 
SUPPLIES, First-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 
37d, Section 4(b), Utah Code Anllotated, 1953 as amended, enhanced 
to a First-Degree Felony pursuant to Title 58, Chapter 37d, Section 
5(c) as the Defendant illegally possessed, tTansported, or disposed of 
hazardous or dangerous material or while transpOlting or causing to 
be trallspOlted materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory 
operation, created a substalltiallisk to human health or safety or a 
, 05 2 
\ \\. 
, 
danger to the envirol1l11ent; or (d) as the intended laboratory operation 
was to take place or did take place within 500 feet of a residence; or 
(g) the clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of a 
methamphetamine base; in that on or between the dates of J anualY 
14, 1999, and January 21, 1999, in Iron County, State of Utah, the 
said Terry Arnold Messer, Jr., did mowingly and intentionally 
possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in 
a clandestine laboratory operation; or did knowingly or intentionally 
possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in 
a clandestine laboratOlY operation. 
This infOlmation is based on evidence provided by Agents Mark Gower and Keith Millett 
of the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force and Criminalist John Gerlits. 
DATED this ~ day of November, 1999. 
~~ 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attomey 
-2-
061 
SCARTH, DENT & WHITELEY, PC 
Jim R. Scarth (2870) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East 
P.O. Box 160 
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INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
Case no. 991500647 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
Defendant. 
The Defendant, by and through his attorney, Jim R. Scarth, requests that this Court, in its 
charge to the jury, give the following instructions, number. a through!' inclusive. 
--r'~ 
Dated this a day of October, 2001 . 
~70 t:#-~/AV ' Jim R. Scarth 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERYIFAXINGIMAILING 
~RBBY CERTIFY that a full, true, correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was hand delivered, _ faxed and/or _ mailed, first class mail, postage fully prepaid, this . 
,2:Z~yof October, 2001 , to: Paul J3ittmellU, Iron County Attorney at 97 North Main, P .O. 
Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84721. ~ _ /7 ~ ifiJ~~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., guilty of the offense of 
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information, the 
State must prove and you must find , unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant did: 
(a) possess laboratory equipment and supplies with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine. 
laboratory operation; or 
(b) posses. a controlled substance precursor with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratqry operation; and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14,1999, through January 21, 1999, 
in Iron County, State of Utah. 
lfthe State of Utah has failed to prove anyone or more of the previously described 
elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Unlawful Possession of 
Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Infomlation. lfthe State has proved, 
however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Unlawful Possession of 
Laboratory Equipment of Supplies, as charged in the Information. 
In the event you find the Defendant not guilty of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory 
Equipment or Supplies, you should disregard the balance of this Instruction and proceed to the 
next numbered Jury Instruction which deals with Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, 
.!o , . 
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a class A misdemeanor. 
If you find that the Defendant is guilty of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment 
or Supplies, as charged in the Information, then and only then, should you consider whether or 
not said acts took place under the following conditions, to wit: 
(a) The Defendant illegally possessed, transported, or disposed of hazardous or 
dangerous material while transporting, or causing to be transported, materials in 
furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, that created a substantial risk to 
human health or safety or danger to the environment. 
(b) The intended methamphetamine laboratory op.eration took place within 500 feet of 
a residence. 
( c) Said clandestine laboratory operation was for the prodU(;tion of methamphetamine 
base. 
If, you find the Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, and you find unanimously 
and beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the special conditions exist, then you should so indicate 
on the special verdict form provided with these instructions. 
80 2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. b 
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., guilty of the offense of 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor, a lesser 
included charge of the one charged in the Information, the State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements: 
I . That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant did: 
(a) obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any 
controlled substance precursor, and· 
(b) the Defendant lmew or had reasonable cause to 
to believe that the controlled substance precursor 
was intended to he used in the unlawful manufacture 
of any controlled substance, and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14, 1999, through January 21, 1999, 
in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described 
elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of a Controlled Substance 
Precursor. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to 
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty 
ofUnlawfurPossession ofa Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor. 
< • 
801 
· , . 
IN THE FIFTH mDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, VERDICT 
) 
Plaintiff, 
) Criminal No. 991500647 
vs. 
) 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., Jl\dge James L. Shumate 
) FILED Defendant. 
-~----------------------~)--------------m~~~~ffiM---o eli 5 200i 
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory 
Equipment or Supplies 
6tM OISTFlIO'l' COURT 
IRONCOYNiV 
DriPY!" QJ.5RK Vv-\ M 
We, the jUly duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find the Defendant, TERRY 
ARNOLD MESSER, JR., 
Not Guilty of unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or 
Supplies, as charged in the Information 
ENHANCEMENTS 
We, the jury duly imparieled in the above-entitled action, find the Defendant, TERRY 
ARNOLD MESSER, JR., guilty of committing the following enhancements while Ulliawfully 
possessing laboratory equipment or supplies: 
Did Not 
possessing, transporting, or disposing of hazardous or 
dangerous material, while transporting or causing to b e 
transpOl1ed materi als in the fut1herance of a methamphetamine 
laboratory operation, causing a substantial risk to human health 




using a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory within 500 
feet of a residence; 
operating a clandestine laboratory operation for tbe production 
of methamphetamine base; 
The jury foreperson should mark only one space on this jury verdict for the offense 
" committed, if any, and mark only those enhancements which the jury finds, if any, unanimously 
and beyond reasonable doubt, were cormnitted by the Defendant. 





INSTRUCTION NO. I i-A 
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER,JR., guilty of the offense of 
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information, the State 
must prove and you must find, lmanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and «very one of 
the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted lmowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant did: 
(a) possess laboratory equipment and supplies with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratOlY operation; or 
(b) possess a controlled substance precursor with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine methampbetamine 
laboratory operation; and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14, 1999, through JanualY 21, 1999, in 
Iron County, State of Utah. 
Ifthe State of Utah has failed to prove anyone or more ofthe previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory 
Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information. If the State has proved, however, each and 
everyone of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is 
your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Unlawful Possession ofLaboratOlY Equipment or Supplies, 
as charged in the Infonuation. 
If you find that the Defendant is guilty of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or 
Supplies, as charged in the Information, then and only tben, should you consider whether or not said 
acts took place under the following condi tions, to wit: 
,C )<,' " ,··82G 
(a) The Defendant illegally possessed, transported, or disposed of 
hazardous or dangerous material while transporting, or causing 
to be transported, materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory 
operation, that created a substantial risk to human health or safety 
or danger to the environment. 
(b) The intended methamphetamine laboratory operation take place within 
500 feet of a residence. 
(c) Said clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
methamphetanline base. 
In the event you find the Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, and you 
find lUlaninlOusly and beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the special conditions exist, then 
you should so indicate on the special verdict form provided with these instmctions. 
l:.. 'i .. :; ~ 
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ORIGINAL 
witness . And that would be Todd Farnswo r th . Oh , two 
additional ones , and Joseph Jordan . 
THE COORT: When a r e Mr . Farnsworth and Mr . Jordan 
coming . 
MR . SCARTH : I think Todd Farnsworth will be here any 
minute and should have been here at nine . And Joe Jordan will 
be here at 10 . 
THE COORT: Good . We ' l l be ab le to do this very 
easily . Counsel , let me ta lk about one thing that is troubling 
to the court . As I ' m working on the jury instructions , Mr . 
Scarth , your lesser included of a Class A Misdemeanor , 
possession of a precursor substance , as I look at the statute 
in 1998 , the onl y way that Mr . Messer could be convicted of a 
precursor substance , possession , Class A Misdemeanor , is if the 
evidence and testimony before the jury had under any reasonable 
inte rpretati on the ability to e stablish th at he possessed more 
than 12 ounces of either ephedrine or pseudoephedrine or 
2 ounces of crystal iodine . We have those weight limits that 
we a re dealing with . And I have not in this entire trial so 
far seen any weight testimony at all . And I don 't know how I 
could give that lesser included , unless I'm looking at 
completely the wr ong place . 
MR . SCART H: The testimony of the first expert witness 
for the state was that you could take tincture of iodine and 
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THE COURT : Correct . 
MR . SCARTH : We didn ' t get any testimony from her as 
to what weight would be produced by doing that . I ' m talking 
about 4 gallons . You follow? 
THE COURT : Well , and I follow that , counsel . But 
even using the mathematical calculation of we have 4 gallons of 
7 percent solution , it would take a much better chemist than me 
l to know what the weight of iodine would be in a gallon 
container that ' s 7 percent of that liquid volume comes to what 
o weight . I just don ' t think we have made that connection . But 
1 I think you are right . That ' s probably as close as we could 
2 get . But we don ' t even know if that iodine that was in 
3 Overson ' s was ever reduced . There is some evidence that we 
4 have before us , not in front of the jury as I recall , that 
5 there was a proposal by some person to trade chemicals for 
.6 4 gallons of iodine , ma y be the same . That ' s as close as I can 
.7 come to whether or not that iodine even existed . And there is 
l8 still a question as to whether or not this defendant , because 
19 you would have your eye witness identification problems that 
20 the jury could still 
21 MR . SCARTH : Well , he told me this morning he wants to 
22 testify that he was in the store on the 14th , Overson store . 
23 THE COURT : Well , that might tie it down . But I still 
24 don ' t know what weight we have , how many ounces you have from 
25 





:11 litigation, Now , it is incumbent on the court to finish the 
2 final jury instructions and give counsel a chance to read 
those . This is going to be a lengthy recess , Probab ly nearly 
a half an hour , I have already done the instructions , but we 
5 • need to make a record on them afte r I give counsel an 
. ~ 
.6 opportunity to read through this multipage document . Once we 
get it done , then I will photocopy it so that you ' ll all have 
your set of jury instruct i ons again as I fi ni sh reading them to 
j, 
9 you . And counsel will have the opportunity to address you in 
10 . the form of a closing statement . And then the matter will be 
11 submitted to you probably before 5 o ' clock for your final 
12 deliberations . But for now , we are going to have to take a 
r" 
II recess of about a half an hour . Remember , do not discuss the 
!4 case among yourselves or with anyone else , don ' t form or 
.5 express any opinion about the innocence or guilt of the 
defe ndant until the matter is finally submitted to you . If 
.7 you ' ll accompany the bailiff back to the jury room , we ' ll get 
8 to work madly and wildly. 
(Whereupon , a brief recess was taken.) 
o (Whereupon , the following proceedings were held in 
1 open court outside the presence of the jury . ) 
2 THE COURT : All right . We are back on the record in 
3 State vs. Terry Arnold Messer , Jr . The defendant ' s present 
4 with his counsel , Mr. Scarth . State is here with Mr . Bittmenn . 





to the court ' s proposed jury instructions . We have reviewed a 
special verdic t f orm and the proposed jury instruction s i n 




or exceptions to the court ' s proposed jury instructions ? 
MR . BITTMENN : No . 
THE COURT: Al l right . Mr . Scarth , let me turn to 
7 you . 
8 MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , the defendant takes e x ception 
9 to the court ' s failure t o give any of the defendant ' s p r oposed 
10 instruct i ons "A" through " G." I believe that ' s correct . 
THE COURT : It is correct , counsel . 11 
12 
13 
MR . SCARTH : And specifically focussing on ou r 
instruction " A, " which is the elements ins t ruction of unlawful 
14 possession of laboratory equipment or supplies , and 
15 specifically taking exception to instruction " B," which is the · 
16 instruction on a lesser included offense , a Class A 
17 Misdemeanor , offense of unlawful possession of a controlled 
18 substance p r ecursor . It appears that there is sufficient 
19 evidence in the record bef o re this jury to indicate that Mr . 
10 Messer , during the time period covered by the information , did 
11 in fact possess what he estimated to be 2 pounds of 
12 crystalline --
THE COURT : Iodine . 13 
24 MR . SCARTH : -- iodine . I withdraw my exceptions to 






and withdraw our exception to proposed instructi on " E ." They 
are no longer required in light o f the testimony of Mr . Messer . 
And as to exceptions 
THE COURT : Counsel , your set that is with the court , 













MR . SCARTH : That ' s correct . 
THE COURT : That ' s the record that we have . 
Instruction fI E " is --
MR . SCARTH : Given. 
THE COURT : -- already given in my stocks . 
MR . SCARTH : Yeah . So I don ' t object to it . I don ' t 
object to " F ." Don ' t take exceptions to them . I would -- and 
I take exception to the court not giving any other reasonable 
hypothesis instruction , which is our label " G." 
THE COURT: All right, counsel . Let me make a record 
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MR . SCARTH : And I need to make some more exceptions . 
Go ahead , though . 
THE COURT : Let me do that , counsel , while I have it 
in mind. Th e court , in analyzing the evidence and testimony 
that came before this jury , first of all , from the state ' s 
witnesses , the expert witnesses , the chemist who analyzed the 
material seized by the deputies from the trunk of the blue 
corsica , did not elicit , in any form , any weight of controlled 
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weight of phosphorous of any kind , and no we i ght of ephedrine. 
The only evidence of the presence of iodine crystals in an 
amount sufficient to meet the 12 - ounce statutory threshold 
under the statute , as i t exists now and as it existed bac k in 
1999, was the evidence offered by Mr . Messer himself indicating 
that the witness , Karen Hardy , displayed to him a 1 gallon 
ziplock bag contain i ng h i s , in his estimate , 2 pounds of what 
he described as iodine crystals . That testimony was 
independent and separate fr om any of the supporting testimony 
whatsoever . The only logical inference that the court can have 
regarding a source of iodine crys t als for these parties is the 




Ove rson ' s Farm Supply and from Intermountain Farmers . ' ,"" 
The testimony was clear , a total of 5 gallons , one 
from Intermountain Farmers at maximum. And there was some 
'. 
conflict there , may be none , from Intermount ain Farmers , and 
four or five from Overson ' s . Mr . Messer is the only person who 
testified that there were five . Mr . Overson testified that 
that was a 7 percent solution of t inc tu re of i odine . A 1 
gallon plastic bag containing only the iodine fr om that many 
gal lons of 7 percent solution could not possibly have the 
volume described by Mr . Messer . And I have no idea as to the 
weight because my chemistry is way too old to remember the 
atomic weight of iodine or th ? potential weight of a gallon of 





' . 10 . 
14 
Let me give you the right fo r other exceptions , 
counse l.· 
MR . SCARTH : The only thing i n regards to your 
findings , Your Honor , is you stated that Mr . Messer ' s testimony 
was that Karen Hardy displayed the crystalline iodine to him . 
But his test i mony was in f act that he handled it . 
THE COURT: That ' s correct , counsel . He did testify 
that he handl ed it . And fee l ing , that wonderful phrase that he 
did not use , but I will use , the heft thereof , estimated it . at 
2 pounds , but that ' s the only testimony that we have on that 
issue . 
MR . SCARTH : I understand , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Okay . Anything else , Mr . Scarth? 
MR . SCARTH : No . I ' m just finishing my notes . 
15 THE COURT: All right . Other than that , other than 
., 
'J ' 
116 ' the jury instructions , do you still want to make record? 
MR . SCARTH : I want to make record . I think the 
court -- it ' s probably not numbered - - but it ' s the special 
instructions as to verdict 
THE COURT : Yes , counsel . 
MR . SCARTH : - - that precedes the verdict form . 
THE COURT : Actually , it ' s number 18 . 
MR . SCARTH : Well , I ' m talking about the one I 
proposed . 
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any of thes e people ? 
MR . RE I D: I don ' t believ e so . 
THE COURT: Oka y . That ' s fine . Mr . Sca r th , anything 
else? 
MR . SCARTH : He seems awfully uncomfortable giving 
that answer , You r Honor . Could you inquire a little further? 
THE COURT : Oh , I ' m satisfied with Mr . Reid ' s comfort 
level , couns el . Anything else , counsel? 
MR . SCARTH : Nothing , Your Honor . 
TH E COURT : All right . Do you pass t he panel for 
cause , Mr . Bittmenn? 
MR . BITTMENN : State does . 
THE COURT : Mr . Scarth? 
MR . SCARTH : Yes , we do , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : All right. Pass panel for cause . Now , 
members of the jury , let me tell you what ' s going on now . 
Eight of you will hear the lawsuit . That means eight of you 
are going to be excused . If we did not excuse any of you , and 
if counsel gave up the challenges that they are now having, we 
would start with Mrs . Messer and go down to Mrs . Palmer. And 
they would be the eight jurors . Everybody else would go . 
However , it may be that someone desperately wants Mr . Tripp to 
be on the jury . So they may move that block of eight people by 
st riking the first three or four jurors just because of the 
chair that you are seated in . Or it may be that counsel does 
52 
not wish to have one of you seated on the jury who has a 
different hair style , or no hair at all like some of us have. 
You may be e xcused for any number of reasons that have 
absolutely nothing to do with your ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror , to be a competent member of this trial . It 
may just be f or reasons that you have no control over . So if 
you are excused , please don ' t go away mad . 
Those of you who are in the main body of the 
courtroom, it ' s unlikely that you will be selected at all . L 
would not go down to Las Vegas today because it's probably - not 
your lucky day . But , again , let me take this opportunity while 
counsel a~e doing this to extend to you my personal thanks . We 
havp. abused you terribly this morning by ma king you wait for so 
long before we even started up . Plus, it ' s inconvenient to 
come to jury duty no matter what , when , where or how . In St . 
George , it is not quite the drive that i -t is for some folks as 
, 17 it is for some of you to come here to Parowan , but it ' s still 
18 inconvenient . It still cu t s into your day . 
But let me tell yo u some thing about j urors and jury 
duty . I have been doing this work now for , I have been either 
a lawyer or a judge for over 26 years . I have been involved in 
literally hundreds of jury trials allover the state of Utah ; 
federal court , in state court, district court , justice court. 
Used to have circuit courts . In all of that experience , all o f 







































have never once seen a jury make a mistake based on th e f act s 
I 
?; and l aw that they were given in trial . I may have disagreed 
3 because I was an advocate for one side o r the other , but the 
4 jury verdict was always rationa lly based and sensib le and 
J -
logical . If y ou think I ' m an advocate o f the jury system , you 
6 are right . I think that jurors in the state of Utah have 
7 incredibly capable abilities to look at evidence , listen to the 
8 instruction of the court and make good sensible decisions . 
9. Were it not for folks like you , willing to come in f or no pay 
10 whatsoever , and I know you are going to get a check in the mai l 'II 




12 make it to lunch at McDonald ' s , but that is no compensation at 
" 
13 all for your worth in today ' s economy and , especially , the time 
,. 
, 




15 participate in this process . Right now , ou r system of I' I 
:,' I,' :['. 






people like you who stand up and support it . And for your 
willingness to come here to take the time out of your day for 
I It; 
I !j 





the insufficient pay that we give you and , basically , volunteer 
for this process , let me extend my personal and the court ' s 






22 In a minute , counsel will be finished with thei r 
23 peremptory challenges . And I ' ll be able to tell you who is 
?4 gOing to serve o n this jury with us . So sit back , take it 
.. 







MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , while there is a pause , I 
3 
would like to inform the court and counsel and the jury that I 
4 have an assistant that may sit at counsel table from time to 




name is Joy Taylor . 
THE COURT : Thank you , counsel . The bailiff is aware 
:1 
" ! I , j 
, I I 1_ ,: n , 
/ 
J 
8 o f her presence . And she may be needed by your operation . She J , 
9 can come and go as necessary . 
10 MR . SCARTH : Thank you , Your Honor . ' / 
11 THE COURT : Thank you , counsel . And , Mr . Bittmenn , if 
, 
12 any of your staff need to c ome and go , just let us know so 
, 1'I" 'ij 
.', 
13 we ' ll all know . 
14 MR . BITTMENN : Thank you . 
'. ' 
15 THE COURT : Thanks , c ounsel . All right . Mr . 
16 Bittmenn , in behalf of the state of Utah , d oe s this list 
17 const itute the jury as selected by the state? 
Ij 
I 
18 MR . BITTMENN : It does , Your Hon o r . 
:9 THE COURT : And , ~r . Scarth , in behalf of the defense , 
I 
20 does it constitute the jury as selected by che defense? i 
21 MR . SCARTH : It does , Ycur Honor . I I. 
22 THE COURT : Thank you , counsel . Members of the jury i 
I 23 




those selected to SErve on this jury . If your name is called , 

























open court outside the presence of t he jury . } 
THE COURT : All r i ght . The record wi ll reflect tha t 
the members of the jury have departed . And the back door is 
c l osed . 
Counse l , is now t h e appropriate time to take the 
foundat i onal tes t imony of Mr . Overson to determine whether or 
not the issues brought before the court shou l d be ruled upon 
either for the defense or the s t ate? Should we go forward now 
at this time , counsel? 
MR . SCARTH : Yes . I would like to make a motion 
11 first . 
12 THE COURT : If you wi l l , counse l. 
lJ MR. SCARTH : I t ' s a motion for mistrial , Your Honor . 
14 As I heard it during jury selection , the court advised the jury 
is panel in part , and I think I ' m quoting , "Our society is under 
16 assault now . It is you r job to -- " it ' s up to you to defend 
17 it . " 
THE COURT : All r i ght , counsel . That motion ' s 
19 overruled and denied . 
20 MR . SCARTH : Thank you . 
THE COURT : Than k you . Anything else except --
22 MR . SCARTH : I have some items , bu t I think they can 
wait . 
THE COURT : Why don ' t we use Mr . Overson ' s time as 
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3. RECESSES 
From time to time during the trial we will take recesses. During the recesses you are to 
be governed by the following admonition: 
"You are admonished that during this recess or any future break in the trial, you are not 
to discuss this case with anyone, or among yourselves, nor to form or express any opinion as to 
the innocence or guilt of the defendant until the matter is submitted to you. You are not to 
attempt to learn anything about this case outside this courtroom or visit any location mentioned 
in the trial . You are to avoid and disregard any media or other reports about the trial. " 
I also ask that you have no conversations at all with the attorneys, the witnesses, or the 
defendant. Please to not discuss this case or the law in general with the bailiff, the clerks or any 
of the persons involved with the trial as it progresses. 
4. THE INFORMATION 
The Defendant has been charged with the commission of a crime in a formal document 
called an Information . In a moment the clerk will read the Information in this case to you. Bear 
in mind that this is only an allegation to which the defendant has plead "Not Guilty." You may 
not consider the filing of the Information or the defendant's not guilty plea as evidence. You will 
hear the evidence from the witness stand and through any exhibits admitted during the trial. 
(CLERK READS THE INFORMATION) 
5. EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts , but you must determine the facts from the 
evidence produced here in court. If any evidence shall be ordered by me to be stricken, you must 
disregard it entirel y. 
No statement made by the attorneys should be regarded as evidence. However, if counsel 
for both parties stipulate or agree to any fact, you should regard that fact as being conclusively 
proven. 
6. OPINION OF THE JUDGE 
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact. You must decide such questions for 
yourselves from the evidence without regard to what you may believe I think about it. My 
opinion is immaterial. If any statement or ruling of mine seemed to indicate that I held an opinion 
of any fact, this was unintentional and you are instructed to disregard it. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOlf!hl~~J~g~AT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH miPU'I'Y el"f.;RK be '0 9 -
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH AND 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE. 
Criminal No. 991500647 
Honorable James 1. Shumate 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover 
and Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Prosecution has responded to Defendant's motions and 
the parties argued these motions at a suppression hearing before the Honorable J. Phillip Eves on 
October 20, 2000. Judge Eves recused himself from this matter and it was assigned to this Court 
on November 28, 2000 . At a February 5, 200 J, telephonic conference the pat1ies agreed that the 
Motion to Quash atld Motions to Suppress may be decided by this Court based upon review of the 
transcript and court files . 
Having carefully reviewed the transcript, heat'ings, the pa.t1ies' memoranda, and th e 
relevant legal authority, the Court now rules as fo llows: 
-1-
.. 
q 1"18 L , 
) 
'- FIl'I'DINGS OF FACT FOR MOTION TO OUASH. 
I. The Prosecution filed an infonnation charging Defendant with violation ofU.C.A. 
§ S,S-37-4(b) enhanced to a first degree felony for violations of § 5S-37d-5Cc), (d), 
\ 
or Ct) . These charges stem from Defendant's alleged ownership of a clandestine 
, 
methamp~tamine laboratory found in Iron County on January 21, 1999. 
, 
2. The Defendan.t was arrested in Washington County for parole/probation 
violations, failurCl, to stop on command, and aggravated assault on January 21, 
\ 
1999. Dan Endter Of the Washington County Drug Task Force authorized the 
arrest. 
3. A preliminary hearing was-held November 10, 1999. At the preliminary hearing, 
Larry Overson, manager ofOxerson's Farm Center, testified that on January 14, 
1999, the Defendant and a woman. entered. the store and purchased four gallons of 
tincture of iodine. 
4. Being informed by Iron County Drug Til(;k Force officers that this substance can 
be used in the production of methamphetam41e and being suspicious because of 
the large amount purchased, Mr. Overson wrote .down the license plate number of 
the "silver sports car" that Defendant and the woman drove off in and called the 
\ 
Task Force. Mr. Overson also gave a description ofth.e man purchasing the 
tincture of iodine. \ \ 
5. Detective Mark Gower of the Iron County Task Force chec~d the license plate 




'Qefendant. The physical description given by Mr. Overson also matched that of 
Deful1dant. 
6. Under CFpSS examination, Mr. Overson testified that he thought that it was the 
woman wit~Defendant who actually purchased the iodine, and that he did not 
recognize the ",,<man in or arowld the Courthouse that day. 
7. Karen Hardy testifi'ii;.d that she was with the Defendant the day they bought 
tincture of iodine from\ Qverson 's Farm Center. Ms. Hardy testified that they 
purchased the iodine to fac'i)itate in the production of methamphetamine. 
8. Ms. Hardy testified that Defer,~ant had a "boxed" methamphetamine laboratory 
, 
set up in the hunk ofa friend's, T'h.n Hasch's, car in Iron Connty, Utall. Ms. 
Hardy testified that Defendant possess,ed a key to the trunk of the car. 
9. . Ms. Hardy testified that all of the items n~cessary for producing 
methanlphetanune were in that "boxed lab." 
10. Ms. Hardy testified that she and Defendant had \'.pulled ephedrine" from pills in a 
shed located approximately 15 feet from Mr. HascJt' s residence. Ms. Hardy 
testified that ephedrine is a necessary ingredient needed to "cook" 
methamphetamine. 
11. Ms. Hardy testified that she saw the clandestine methamphetru:p.ine laboratory in 
production a "few days prior to the 21st of January." 
12. On cross examination, Ms. Hardy testified that she had been granted\nmmnity to 
testify against Defendant. It was also evident from testimony, that Ms. Hardy 
, 
'. 
appeared unsure of the scope of the immunity granted. 
13. Ms. Hardy testified that she had originalJy lied to officers about whose "boxed 
'l'ib" it was, telling them that it was Mr. Hasch's. Ms. Hardy told Detective Millet 
that she and Defendant had handled the lab and looked at the glassware, but she 
maintaine,d that it was Mr. Hasch's lab. 
14. Ms. Hardy ~o admitted to "cooking methamphetamine" in Washington County 
\, 
and on other ocCltsions. Ms. Hardy also testified that when she was arrested in 
, 
Washington Count)"on January 21, 1999, she only discussed a methamphetamine , 
lab in Iron County wit£: the Washington County Officers. 
IS. Ms. Hardy testified that sh~ has a relationship with a Terry Cammack, who was 
also involved with this "boxed lab," and who also was granted immunity in 
exchange to testify against Defen'qant. 
16. Ms. Hal'dy testified that she obtainet\ a protective order against Defendant. 
17. Ms. Hardy also testified that she had a l\~y to and regularly drove Defendant's 
silver Mitsubishi Eclipse. 
18. Detective Gower testified that after he arrested'pefendant in Washingt~n County, 
he went to Mr. Hasch's property, and Mr. Hasch V'Q,iuntarily opened the trunk to 
the car which contained the methamphetanline lab. 
19. Mr. Hasch told Detective Gower that the lab belonged to Defendant and that 
Defendant had a key to the trunk. 
20. The following day Detective Gower obtained Defendant's key and other property 
from the Washington COl1l11y Purgatory Facility without a warrant or Defendant's 
permiSSIOn. 
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21 . The key taken from the Defendant's property at the Washington County Purgatory 
Facility opened the trw1k containing the "boxed lab." 
22. The "boxed lab" was taken to the State Crime Laboratory where the items were 
inventoried, analyzed, and tested for fmgerprints. 
23. Detective Gower testified that the lab contained "SwUly-side" muriatic acid, a 
hazardous substance. 
24. Detective Gower opined that the items found were consistent with a clandestine 
methamphetamine lab. 
25. Detective Gower also received a list of items needed for the production of 
methamphetanline from Defendant's property at the Purgatory Facility . 
26. Criminalist JolUl Gerlits testified that he conducted a fingerprint search on the 
contents of the items taken from Mr. Hasch's car's trw1k, and he fowld eight 
fingerprint matches for Defendant and three fingerprint matches for Ms. Hardy. 
No other fingerprints were identified. Specifically, neither Mr. Hasch's nor Mr. 
Cammack's fingerprints were found on the "boxed lab." 
27. Mr. Gerlits opined that pseudoephedrine, hydrochloric acid, iodine, red 
phosphorous, and lye were contained in the "boxed lab." 
28. Mr. Gerlits testified that red phosphorous, hydrochloric acid, lye, and iodine were 
hazardous and consistent with the production of methanlphetanline. 
29. Detective Gower testified that the "boxed" methanlphetamine lab was located in a 
tnu1k of a car that was parked 50 to 60 feet from the Hasch residence. 
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30. Detective Keith Millet testified that some of the Hasch children and a boyfriend or 
husband to one of the Hasch children were seen coming and going to the 
residence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant moves this Court to quash the bindover because of insufficient evidence to 
suppoli the ch8l'ges. Defendant also moves this Court to suppress evidence procured through an 
illegal se8l'ch and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Cotlstitution. These motions will be addressed in tum. 
I. THE MOTION TO QUASH THE BINDOVER WILL BE DENIED AS THE 
STATE HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF. 
At a prelimin8l'Y hearing, in order to bind a defendant over for trial, the prosecution must 
pi'esent evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find "probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been conmlitted and the defendant has cOl11l11itted it." State v. Pledger, 896 P .2d 
1126, 1229 (Utah 1995)(quoting Utah R. Crinl. P. 7(h)(2». The prosecution "must ... produce 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime ch8l'ged." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 
(citations omitted). However, the burden of proof is different than that at trial. The prosecution 
only has to "present a quantum of the evidence sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the 
trier of fact." rd. (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980» . The Utah 
Supreme Court recently clarified the "quantum oftlle evidence necess8l'Y to support a bindover" 
as the sanle as the arrest warrant probable cause standard. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9. 
Specifically, the "prosecution must present sufficient evidence to suppoti a reasonable belief that 




At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution. State v. 
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998). Moreover, unless the evidence is wholly lacking to support 
the charge brought, the defendant should be bound over for trial. Id. The purpose of the 
preliminary hearing is not to try the guilt or innocence of the party charged. The purpose of the 
preliminary hearing is to "[ferret] ont groundless or improvident prosecutions." State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utall 1980). 
In reviewing a decision to bindover a defendant, this Court should give deference to a 
magistrate's factual determinations especially considering the demerulor of the witnesses. Id. at 
786. However, this Court need not show any deference to the magistrate's legal conclusions. 
State v. Hunwhrey. 823 P.2d 464, 466 (Utili 1991). As the preliminary heru'ing is a "gateway" 
to the trier of fact, any conflicting testimony or evidence should be left for the trier of facio State 
v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utall I998). 
In the present situation, Defendant is chru'ged with a second degree felony violating 
U.C.A. § 58-37d-4(b) enhrulced to a first degree felony pursuant to § 58-37d-5(c), or (d), or (g), 
between the dates of Januru'y 14-21, 1999. Therefor, the prosecution must have shown at the 
preliminruy hearing a quantum of evidence that Defendrult violated these provisions. 
A. THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
BIND OVER DEFENDANT FOR VIOLATING § 58-37d-4(b). 
§ 58-37d-4(b) states that "[I] t is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(b) possess laboratolY equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clruldestine laboratory 
operation." At the preliminru'y heru'ing, the Prosecution must have shown that Defendrult 
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knowingly or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation. The Prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a 
"reasonable belief' that an offense has been committed and that the Defendant committed it in 
order to bind over the Defendant on this section. 
The Prosecution gave evidence that Defendant purchased large quantities of iodine 
tincture. The Prosecution also proffered evidence that this chemical is essential in the production 
of methamphetamine. The Prosecution also put forth sufficient evidence that Defendant "owned" 
the "boxed lab" found in Mr. Hasch's car's trunk. The Defendant possessed a key that opened 
the car trunk containing the methamphetamine lab. Defendant's fIngerprints were found on 
items inside the lab. Prosecution witnesses testifIed that the lab equipment was intended to and 
had produced methanlphetamine. 
Taking this testinlony and viewing it in a light most favorable to the prosecution, tll is 
Court fInds that there is suffIcient evidence to bind over Defendant on charge of second degree 
felony of intentionally or knowingly possessing laboratory equipment and supplies for the 
production of a clandestine laboratory. 
B. THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
BIND DEFENDANT OVER FOR VIOLATING § 58-37d-5(c),(d), 01' 
(g), 
In order to enhance this second degree felony to a fIrst degree felony, the prosecution 
must also provide a quantum of evidence to form a "reasonable belief' that: 
anyone of the following conditions OCCUlTed in conjunction with that violation: 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratOlY operation, there was created a 
substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the environment, (d) 




of a residence, place of business, church, or school, or (g) intended clandestine 
laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine or methamphetamine base. 
§ 58-37d-5(c),(d), (g). 
First, the evidence showed, sufficient to form a reasonable belief in order to bindover 
Defendant, that the Defendant had possession of hazardous or dangerous materials in f'tniherallce 
of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. Constructive possession occurs where there is a 
sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug or, in this case, the chemical to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise domain and control over 
the drug or chemical. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). Using this same analysis for 
constructive possession of hazardous or dangerous materials in furtherance of producing drugs, it 
is clear that the Prosecution proffered enough evidence to bind over the Defendant for possessing 
hazardous or dangerous materials in fUliherance of a methamphetamine laboratory. The 
Defendant possessed a key that gave binl access to the methamphetamine laboratory. The . 
Defendant's fingerprints were identified on items inside the laboratory. Ms. Hardy testified that 
the methamphetamine laboratory belonged to Defendant, and that they did prepare to and did 
engage in the production of methanlphetanune. Mr. Cammack testified that the lab belonged to 
Defendant. Mr. Hasch also told police that the methamphetamine lab belonged to Defendant. 
Detective Gower testified that the items found in the car trunk were hazardous and 
consistent with the production of methamphetanline. Crinle Specialist Gerlits also testified that 
the items found in the clandestine laboratory were consistent with the production of 
methamphetamine and hazardous materials . Red phosphorous, hydrochloric acid, iodine and lye 
were identified as hazardous substances. 
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Second, the evidence showed, sufficient to fonn a reasonable belief in order to bindover 
Defendant, that intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500 feet 
of a residence. Ms. Hardy testified that the parties "pnlled ephedrine" in a shed ten to fifteen feet 
from Mr. Hasch's residence. Mr. Cammack confmned tllis testimony. The "boxed lab" which 
contained all of the precursor chemicals for the production of methamphetamine was contained 
in a vehicle located approximately sixty feet from the Hasch residence. Ms. Hardy testified that 
this laboratory produced methamphetamine at tllis location a few days before the 21" of January. 
Defendant argues that the car, the shed, and the residence were all contained within a 
fenced area and consists of one" common law" residence. The Defendant argues that there must 
be a separate residence located within five hundred feet of tile "residence" where tile lab was 
found in order to support enhancement. Defendant argues that "tile law doesn't say that it is a 
first degree felony to have a methamphetanline lab at a residence. It says 500 feet of a residence, 
which is referring to neighboring residences. " Prelinlinary Hearing transcript at 182. 
This portion of the statute reads "Cd) intended laboratOlY operation was to take place or 
did take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school." In construing 
statutory meaning, a court must first look to the plain language of a statute. State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998) . "Courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not 
already there." rd. The Defendant has cited no authority that tile statute in question is to be 
interpreted to mean a neighboring, residence, place of business, church or school. The Defendant 
has not pointed to any legislative history suggesting that the lab must be witllin five hundred feet 
of a "neighboring" residence. This Court finds anlple reason for not reading tllis requirement 
into the plain language of the text. Detective Keitll Millet testified that some of the Hasch 
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children and a boyfriend or husband to one of the Hasch children were seen coming and going to 
the residence. The hazardous effects felt from a methamphetamine laboratory operating next to a 
residence can be felt by ilmocents such as the Hasch children as much as children from a 
"neighboring" residence. This Court finds that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous 
and will not read additional terms into the statute. 
Third, the evidence showed, sufficient to fonn a reasonable belief to bindover 
Defendant, that intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine or 
methamphetanune base. Ms. Hardy testified that the lab actually produced methamphetan1ine. 
Mr. Cammack and Ms. Hardy testified that they were present with Defendant when they "pulled 
ephedrine" intending to produce methamphetamine. Detective Gower and Crime Specialist 
Gerlits testified that the lab contained the chemicals necessary to produce methamphetanune. 
The evidence shows that the lab was intended to produce methamphetamine. The Court infers 
that methamphetamine base is produced in the process of producing methanlphetanune. 
Taking this testimony and evidence and viewing it in a light most favorab le to the 
prosecution, tlus Court finds tlmt tllere is sufficient evidence to bind over Defendant on charge of 
first degree felony of intentionally or knowingly possessing laboratory equipment and supplies 
for the production of a clandestine laboratory with enhancements for possessing hazardous 
substances, intending operation of the lab to take place within five hnndred feet of a residence, 
and for the intended use of the laboratory to be for the production of methamphetamine. 
FINDINGS OF FACT FOR MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1. Defendant was alTested January 21, 1999, for a probation violation, failure to stop 
on conmland, and aggravated assault in Washington County. 
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2. Defendant was taken to the Washington County Purgatory Facility where he was 
to be held on a 72 hour parole/probation hold. The arresting officer and booking 
authority was then Corporal Dan Endter. 
3. Defendant was searched incident to being booked into jail. 
4. Defendant attempted to have an inmate who was being released take all of 
Defendant's property out of the jail with him. 
5. Deputy Bruckner inventoried the Defendant's property. 
6. While inventorying the property, Deputy Bruckner became suspicious of a 
"grocery list" which she recognized as being ingredients necessary in the 
production of methanlphetamine. 
7. Deputy Bruckner notified Corporal Endter of her suspicions and put Defendant's 
property in a property bag and set it aside for further inspection by Corporal 
Endter. 
8. Corporal Endter fOlmd the "grocery list," an "owe sheet," and red stains that he 
considered consistent with red phosphorous suspicious. Corporal Endter also said 
he was suspicious of Defendant's keys although he could not remember or 
articulate why. There was some testimony that a handcuff key found in 
Defendant's possession amused suspicion. 
9. Corporal Endter turned seven items of Defendant' s property, including 
Defendant's keys, over to Detective Gower of the Iron COWlty Drug Task Force 
the following day, January 22, 1999. 
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10. Detective Gower returned to Mr. Hasch's property and found that Defendant's 
key opened the car trwll<: containing the methamphetamine lab. 
11. At the time of the arrest, the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle was 
searched. The results of that search were a Daisy BB gWl, blue flannel jacket, 
Motorola cell phone, and a play station video game. Detective Gower indicated 
that he could also see a radio in the passengers compartment. 
12. Because the Defendant was taken into custody and Ms. Hardy was taken to the 
hospital, Defendant 's car was taken to the St. George Police Department's 
impound lot. 
13. Pursuant to police regulations, Dan Endter performed an impound search, and 
listed a "Radio Shack" radio as one of the items inventoried. 
II. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY PURGATORY FACILITY IS DENIED. 
The Defendant argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal 
propelty inventoried at the Washington County Pmgatory fac ility to make a search and seizme of 
these articles a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Defendaot argues that 
law enforcement officers from Iron County violated his Fourth Amendment rights by traveling to 
Washington County and requesting without warrant the personal property that Washington 
County Corrections was holding in safe keeping. 
The protection of the Fourth Amendment applies only in conte)"is where the citizen in 
question has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or things to be searched. Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[G]iven tile realities of institutional confll1ement, any 
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reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be ofa diminished 
scope." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
Searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless there is a valid exception to the 
Fonrth Amendment. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). Inventory searches conducted 
pursuant to booking a suspect into jail are a well recognized exception to the Fonrth Amendment. 
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d I (Utah App. 1988); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S . 367 (1987)(policies 
behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search). Also, in conducting 
the inventory search, "[ilt is not wueasonable for police to search any container or ariicle in an 
arrested person's possession as part of established inventory procedural incident to incarcerating 
an arrested person." I d. 
Tlus instance appears to be closely related to what Wayne R. LaFave in Ius seminal 
treatise on the Fourth Amendment refers to as "the delayed search and the second look." 2 
Wayne R. Lafave, Search & Seizure § 5.3(b) at 487 (2d ed. 1987). Given the lack of Utah Law 
directly on point, extensive quotation from Lafave seems appropriate. LaFave concludes that 
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S . 800, 94 S. Ct. 1234,39 L. Ed 2d 771 (1974), starlds for the 
proposition that: 
when (i) an object lawfully came into plain view at the time of a search upon 
arTestee's arTival at tlle place of detention, (ii) later investigation establishes that 
this item is of evidentiary value, and (iii) the item remains in police custody as a 
part of the arrestee's inventoried property, then it is pernussible for the police, 
without a warrant, to retrieve that object and thereafter deal with it as item of 
evidence. 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search & SeizUl'e § 5.3(b) at 491 (2d ed. I 987)(citations omitted). 
The facts of the present situation fit nicely witl1in Lafave's formulation. The items 
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lawfully came into plain view at the time of a search upon arrestee's arrival at the place of 
detention. Detective Gower's investigation established that the items were of evidentiary 
value. The items remained in police custody as a part of the arrestee's inventoried 
property. Therefor, it is permissible for the police, without a warrant, to retrieve that 
object and thereafter deal with it as item of evidence. Wayne R. Lafave, Search & 
Seizure § 5.3(b) at 491 (2d ed. 1987) 
The case of United States v. Ingo Grill, 484 F .2d 990 (1973), has a similar fact 
pattern to the present situation. In rngo Grill, the defendant was validly arrested by 
federal officers. Id. His baggage was taken to customs, and he was booked into county 
jail to be held as a federal prisoner. Id. Pursuant to being booked into jail, defendant's 
personal belongings, including a loose, single key, "were turned over to the jailer who 
listed them on a printed receipt form which the jailer and appellant signed." Id. An 
informant told customs officers that the defendant left a duffle bag containing cocaine on 
Bimini Island, Ballamas. Id. at 991. Customs officials seized the bag and noticed that it 
was secured by a small bronze lock. Id. A month later, a federal agent came to the jail to 
determine whether defendant's key would fit the bronze lock previously seized. Id. 
He neither obtained nor sought a search warrant but merely asked the officer in 
charge of tbe jail if be could look at [defendant' s) property in the custody of the 
jail, and the officer produced and laid out the property. The agent saw the key, 
inserted it into tbe lock and found that it would open the lock. With the consent 
of the officer, he took possession of the key and gave a receipt fo r it. 
Id. The rationale behind the cases holding tillS type of second look is valid "is tilat tile 
items in question have been exposed to police view under unobjectionable circumstances, 
so that no reasonable expectation of privacy is breached by an officer's taking a second 
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look at matter with respect to which expectation of privacy already has been partially 
dissipated." Id. The baggage taken from defendant at an-est was also subj ect to an 
inventory search. Id. The suitcase contained airline receipts and other papers that were 
evidence that defendant had indeed been in the Bahanlas. Id. Neither of these searches 
was deemed to be unreasonable or against the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
Defendant' s reliance upon the Oregon cases of State v. Perry and State v. 
Lawrence is misplaced as these cases specifically deal with persons placed on a civil hold 
for intoxication and the State's particular statutes. State v. Perry, 688 P.2d 827 (Or. 
1984); State v. Lawrence, 648 P.2d 1332 (Or. 1982). 
The October 20, 2000, hearing was very helpful in illuminating the facts 
surrounding tile original search and seizure of Defendant' s property. The Defendant was 
not searched incident to anest. However, the Defendant was searched pursuant to being 
booked into jail at the Washington County Purgatory Facility. In conducting this 
inventory search, Deputy Bmckner testified that she found what appeared to be a 
methanlphetamine cook list and tilat this li st raised a suspicion, so that she called the 
arresting officer, Corporal Dan Endter, and held the property for him to review. 
At that time, Corporal Endter became aware of the evidentiary value of the 
Defendant's property. Corporal Endter thought that a red stain on the Defendant's 
Dallas Cowboys Jacket was consistent with red phosphorous, which caused him to be 
suspicious. In addition to the stained jacket and the methanlphetanune "grocery list," 
other items such as an "owe sheet," handcuff key, and car keys were given to Iron 
COU1lty Task Force Agent Gower. Detective Gower gave Corporal Endter no warrant, 
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other court authority, or any signed consent from Defendant at the time he took 
possession of Defendant' s clothing. 
Utah case law, Federal case law, and law from other jurisdictions, supports the 
position that an inventory search, not conducted as a shanl, that produces evidence is not 
restrained by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the Defendant's 
items were put in a "property" bag and not an "evidence" bag is wlpersuasive to this 
Court. Also, Defendant's claim ofa expectation of privacy in this property is 
unpersuasive. First, it is well recognized that there is a diminished expectation of privacy 
in a conectional institution. Second, Defendant attempted to have a departing imnate, 
who he was not fanliliar with, take all of his property from the facility. 
Defendant made much of the fact that Iron COWlty Drug Task Force officials were 
taking evidence from the Washington COWlty Purgatory Facility. Defendant has not 
provided any authority showing that this fact somehow constitutes a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Therefor, this Court finds that the items taken from the Defendant incident to 
arrest are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's motion to suppress this 
evidence is denied. 
III. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM 
THE WASHINGTON COUNTY IMPOUND YARD IS DENIED. 
Defendant contends that a radio procured from his vehicle should be suppressed 
as evidence as it was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment as an illegal search or 




that the evidence was obtained from the "fruits of an illegal search" is erroneous, and 
therefor, any motion to suppress based upon that assumption is denied. The search of the 
Defendant's vehicle will now be considered. 
As an exception to the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers can search 
the entire automobile compartment incident to arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981). Therefor, the search of Defendant's vehicle at the time of his arrest for evading 
and aggravated assault was proper. The Defendant's car was then taken to the St. 
George Police Department's impound yard where it was subjected to a more extensive 
search in which the radio was identified. 
The existence of justification to impotll1d a car may be determined from the 
surroUl1ding circumstances. State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utal1 1987). In the present 
situation, Defendant was being arrested and his passenger, Ms. Hardy, who was claiming 
Defendant threw her out of the car, was being taken to the Dixie Regional Medical Center 
for treatment. As no one was present to remove the vehicle from the side ofthe road, 
impounding the car was proper. 
Further inventory of the vehicle was proper if "reasonable police regulations 
relating to inventory procedures" are administered in good faith. Id. (Citing Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S . 367 (1987). In the present situation, Corporal Endter condncted the 
search in pursuance of the St. George Police Department's regulation and procedures in 
impoUl1ding a car. Inventories of this nature are common to protect the police from false 
claims and the personal property of the vehicle's owners. The Defendant' s Fourth 
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Amendment rights were not violated by the search of his car at the time of an'est or 
impoundment 
In J olmson, defendant argued that the police could not conduct further 
investigation into the items seized in the inventory search to determine if they were 
stolen. Id. The court held that this "point is without merit" Id. The condition of the 
items led to probably cause, and since the items were "in the lawful custody of the police, 
no warrant was necessary ." Id. 
Here, the Defendant appears to make a similar contention. Although there is no 
contention that the radio found in Defendant's car was stolen, when the radio came to the 
attention of the police of having evidentiary value in a crime, because it was in the lawful 
police custody, no warrant was necessary to take it. 
THEREFOR, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS THAT: Defendant's Motion 
to Quash the Bindover is denied. Defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence are denied. 
Dated this 2-1 day of February 2001. 
Honorable James L. Shumate 
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THE COURT : I knew the box was in the trunk with the 
lab . 
MR . BITTMENN : Okay . 
MR . SCARTH : I may have misspoke , Your Honor . I 
accept the facts just stated by Mr. Bittmenn . 
THE COURT : I think that ' s accurate . And I think we 
are all on the same page . Anything else , Mr. Scarth? 
MR. SCARTH : No . I ' ll submit it. 
denied . 
THE COURT : Motion to suppress is still overruled and 
I am satisfied with the analysis the court already 
conducted and applicable to the case . However , I think we have 
a more complete record now with Exhibits 1 , 2 , and 3 . All 
right , counsel . We ' ll see you next time . 
MR. SCARTH : One other thing for the record , Your 
Honor . 
THE COURT : Yes . 
MR . SCARTH: Well , for the record , I found in my 
appe lla te work that if there aren ' t findings of facts made or 
even sufficient findings of fact made by the trial court in a 
suppression matter, that they will kick it back for the court 
to make it . 
THE COURT : Then I better make some findings of fac t 
with regard to these new exhibits . Exhibit No.3 does give to 
the court some additional factual finding . Mr . Messer 



























decision made by Sergeant Endter , to release the vehicle to one 
of his friends. Sergeant Endter declined that request . That ' s 
a fact that was not previously found . 
With respect to the policies and procedures of St . 
George Police Department in Exhibit No . 2 , and the operation of 
the impound lot, the court finds that those policies and 
procedures are contained within Exhibit No . 2 but , as a legal 
conclusion , finds that they have no impact upon the court ' s 
ruling arising from the Edwards line of case work . 
And, finally , with respect to the property in the 
Purgatory Correctional Facility seized directly from the 
defendant , the court -- I ' m sorry , counsel , I misspoke . The 
property in the defendant 's possession in the Purgatory 
Correctional Facility , is covered by the Edwards line of cases . 
I cited the wrong case to the wrong issue . The property under 
Exhibit No . 1, the policies and procedures of the Purgatory 
Correctional Facility with respect to preserving at the prison 
of property is covered by the Edwards line of cases. That ' s 
just a conclusion of law now further clarified by Exhibit 
No . 3 . 
Exhibit No . 2 , the policies and procedures regarding 
search of the vehicle has been received by the court . I do not 
find that it has any impact upon the prior ruling . But these 
are the policies and procedures . And that is found by the 
stipulation of the parti es . Parties have stipulated as to 
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Exhibits 2 ' s applicabi li ty to the circumstances of this case . 
MR. SCARTH : No . So fa r as it covers procedures at 
the St . George City impound l ot where my client ' s car was . 
THE COURT : That ' s correct , counsel . All right . 
Those findings are in . 
MR . BITTMENN : May I make a brief record without 
wast i ng much time? 
THE COURT : Certainly . 
MR . BITTMENN : May I approach the bench? 
THE COURT : Certainly . Got something? 
MR . BITTMENN : I have a copy of jury instructions to 
counsel and the defendant . I give the same . Al so I want to 
get on record if counsel got my October 5th , wherein I sent you 
cop i es of the four e xpert witnesses I intend to call that are 
background and resume type . 
MR . SCARTH : I received those , yes . 
THE COURT : Mr . Bittmenn , you have given me blank 
copies unnumbered --
MR . BITTMENN : Right . 
THE COURT : that I can use . Do you have a numbered 
set that you want to have stamped in by the clerk and make a 
record? I think you do somewhere . 
MR . BITTMENN : No, Your Honor. And this is why I 
don ' t. The last I feel is the court had some interrogatory 



























THE COURT : And I make sure that you get those 
counsel . The reason I put this out , in order to make a good 
record on jury instructions , the court really needs to receive 
from counsel two copies . One of them which would go along with 
your cover sheet , would be submits the following instructions 
number one through whatever . And that ' s filled in . 
MR. BITTMENN : Here ' s a photocopy . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . BITTMENN : I have them on computer , so I ' ll just 
reprint them . 
THE COURT: All right . 
MR . BITTMENN : Then , finally , just for the record , at 
the time of trial , state will also introduce a power poin t 
presentation to the jury . 
THE COURT : All right . 
MR . BITTMENN : Just making the court aware of that and 
counsel for the defendant . 
THE COURT : Are you going to use that opening and 
closing statements , counsel? 
MR . BITTMENN : Opening , no . Probably not during 
opening . I ' m probably going to use it more for explanation of 
how a methamphetamine laboratory works . 
MR . SCARTH : What ' s he talking about , Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You will use it i n conjunction with an 



























MR . BITTMENN : Yes . 
THE COURT : Okay . And also have it available for 
close , if you need to? 
MR . BITTMENN : Yes . 
THE COURT : Okay . That ' s on the record . All right , 
counsel . 
MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , request i ng additional 
findings of fact in regards to the denial of motion to 
suppress . At a hearing held on August 23 rd , 2001 , in this 
case , the court received a proffer on two points proffering the 
defendant ' s testimony . And I ' m asking the court to find those 
as facts for purposes of suppression . 
THE COURT : Let's double check the proffer again , 
cou nsel . I think that was my intention . But let ' s make a 
clear record on it . 
MR . SCARTH : Okay . The one proffer was that at the 
Washington County Jail on January 21st , 1999 I ' ll slow down 
for the reporter ' s benefit - - after defendant ' s booking , 
inventory of his personal property was complete , the defendant 
saw a man named Brett Rasmussen who was an acquaintance of 
defendant , and requested the booking deputy to release 
defendant ' s personal property to Mr . Rasmussen . And the deputy 
refused to release Mr . Messer ' s property to Mr . Rasmussen there 
at the jail . 
THE COURT : All right . The counsel , the court finds 
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that if called to testify , Mr . Messer would specifically 
testify a s to those fac t s . I do not make any findings on them 
because I do not believe they are relevant to the issues before 
the court . Do you want to make any record on that one , Mr . 
Bittmenn ? 
MR . BITTMENN : I reviewed the preliminary hearing 
proceedings . And Office r Bruckner Deputy Bruckner , in fact , 
testified that the defendan t tried to release all his stuff 
when he came into a n inmate named Rasmussen . I t h i nk we are 
talking about the same guy . 
THE COURT : Oka y . Then there is no dispute on that 
matter . And the court will find tho se facts , no t j ust find 
that Mr . Messer wi l l so testify . That ' s a fact . 
MR . SCARTH : Here ' s the other item that was proffered 
as being Mr. Messe r ' s testimony on August 23 rd of this year . 
That on February 2nd , 1999 , police officers wen t to the St. 
George impound lot and without a search warrant seized a 
telephone from defendant ' s car . 
THE COURT : A telephone? 
MR . SCARTH : No . I t should be radio . 
THE COURT : I thought it was the radio . And I so 
find, counsel , that ' s also stipulated . All right . Thank you 
gentlemen . We ' ll see you at the time of jury se l ection . 
MR . SCARTH : Thank you , Your Honor . Does that start 
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MR . GAITHER : Iron County . Thank you . 
THE WITNESS : Yes . 
3 BY MR . GAITHER: 
4 Q And then the form that they are in today , that is, 
5 those are in your , you placed them into evidence? 
I did . 6 
7 
A 
Q Did Karen Hardy tell you when you interviewed her that 
8 the l ab belonged to Tim Hasche? 
9 A She said it possibly could have belonged to him . I got 





Okay . Thank you . 
We asked Ms . Hardy wher e Terry ' s lab was . This is a 
1 3 quote right fr om Ms . Hardy . She said she , " Knew where the lab 
14 was but it was just not all Terry ' s lab ." 
15 Q Did you ever go and seize a two - way radio or two-way 
16 rad io box? Do you know what I ' m referring to? 
17 A I believe there was one collected inside of some o f the 
18 duffel bags or su i tcases with the lab . 
19 Q And do you recall , during the course of the 
20 investigation , that you collected a box which could have had 
21 some possible evidentiary value from a car down in Mr . Messer ' s 
22 car, the car you believed he was operating? 
23 A I don ' t recall ever collecting a box from his car . 
24 Q Did you ever g o to the impound l ot ? 






A Yes. She indicated that she knew where a lab or a box 
lab was . . And she mentioned the name Tim . We had been doing 
3 surveillance on Tim ' s h ouse . We asked her if it was Tim 
4 Hasche ' s property or house . And she indicated that it was. 
5 Q Okay . So did you go out there with Sergeant Excell and 






Yes , I did . 
And when you arrived there , who went to the door to 




13 door . 
I believe -- you kn ow , it ' s been nearly two years 
agents , I believe I was one of them that went to the 
14 Q Okay . So you heard the conversation or you were part 






And did he give consent to -- actually , did he stick 
18 the key in the trunk of the car and open the trunk where the 













I believe he did . 
And he told you it was okay to look in there? 
Yes , he did . 
And whose car did he say that was? 
I believe it was his or his wife ' s . 



























A He said it belonged to Terry Messer . 
Q To the best of your knowledge , at that time when you 
found the box lab , did you know anything about a separate key 
in the property of Mr . Messer at the Purgatory Correctional 
Facility? 
A Prior to that , no . 
Q When did you first find out about that key in Mr . 
Messer ' s possession? 
A That night , Mr . Hasche indicated to us that he had 
given Mr . Messer a key so that he could come and pick up his 
lab when he needed it . 
Q Okay . So he didn ' t have to bug Mr . Messer to get it? 
A Right . 
Q Or Mr . Hasche . I ' m handing you what ' s been marked as 
State ' s Exhibit No . 10 . Can you recognize that? 
A Those were items that were found in the trunk of the 
vehicle . 
THE COURT : It ' s actually a photograph of items ; is 
that correct? 
THE WITNESS : Yes , correct . 
BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q How about number 11? 
A Same . 
Q Okay . No . 12? 
A More items that were photographed that came from the 
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during that interview . 
Q In the car , did she tell you and Deteciive Gower it ' s 
not all Terry ' s lab , it ' s Tim ' s too? 
A Yes . 
Q So then you brought her home to Parowan . You dropped 
her off . And then what did you do? 
A We went to Tim Hasch ' s residence . 
Q About what time of day was that? 
A It was at about 11 : 30 at night on the 21st of January , 
' 99 . 
Q And when you arrived at Mr . Hasch ' s residence , who was 
with you? 
A David Excell , Agent Gower , Sergeant Kelly Edwards , and 
Patrolman J . R . Robinson . 
Q And who went to the door? 
A I believe myself , Sergeant Excell and Sergeant Edwards . 
Q And who answered the door? Did you knock o n the door? 
A Yes , we knocked on the door. 
Q Who answered? 
A I don ' t remember whether it was Tim or his wife . 
Q Okay . What happened after you got some response at the 
door? 
A - We indicated that we kne w there was a lab on the 
prope rty and asked him to show us where it was at . 
























A Tim Hasch. 
Q Okay . And what happened next? 
A He led us to an older Chevy corsica parked out in his 
driveway area , reached down with a set of keys and opened the 
trunk. Inside the trunk were two large suitcases and a large 
duffel bag , I think , and a backpack . 
Q I ' m showing you what ' s been entered into evidence as 
State ' s Exhibit 16 , 16A and 16B . I ' ll ask you to look at 16 
specifically . And if you could , tell the jury which structure 
in there is the residence . 
A This is probably very difficult for you to see from 
where you are sitting . This is the shed right here . And this 
is a trailer house it has been built onto . And this is the 
actual residence . 
Q The trailer house? 
A Yes . 
Q The o n e with the bright roof on the right-hand side of 
the phot ograph there? 
A Yes . 
Q Then the shed , does that appear to be a two-tone, maybe 
a three-tone roof , some brown , some gray? 
A I believe it ' s shing l es made fr om different colors , 
odds and ends of shingles . So they are different in colors , 
I but gray , brown , black . 
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the main house ; is that correct ? 
A Yeah . There is a driveway right here , and a fence that 
goes in the same direction as the road leading i nto the 
residence . 
Q Where was the blue Chevy corsica located? 
A It was parked right about where this little white car 
is in the photograph . Maybe a little bit closer to the fence. 
Q So right about on the corner of the main road and the 
driveway? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay . And when you looked inside , you said you found a 
suitcase , two suitcases , a duffel bag and a backpack? 
A Yes . 
Q Are those photographs , photographs of the items you 
found in the trunk? 
A Yes . These are photographs of the items that we 
located . 
Q Okay . What did you do with the stuff in the trunk? 
A We photographed it. I believe Sergeant Excell 
photographed it. We opened it up briefly just to see what it 
contained . The items that it contained were consistent to our 
knowledge o f clandestine laboratory materials . 
Q Okay . 
A And we seized tho se items . 
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1 A I wouldn ' t know a number . '. , ' 
2 Q One? ! ; 
I: 
3 A Probably over 10 to 20 . 
Q Do they give off a certain odor? 
5 A They do . 
-r 
6 Q And when you opened the trunk , did you recognize that i 
1 odor? 
8 A Yes , I did . I :'1 
9 Q And would you identify that odor that you encountered 
, 




o when you open the trunk with t he odor that ' s typical of around " I; 
, 
methamphetamine laboratories? } 
A Yes . !i Ii, 
" Q So tell the jury what y ou did with the stuff in the 
.! I 
t runk. 
A We took it to our evidence lockers - - in evidence 
lockers at the task f o rce , held it there for safekeeping until 
we c ould get it to the State Crime Lab to analyze . 
Q And when did you take it to the crime lab , do you 
remember? 
A I believe on the 25th of January . 
Q Okay . And then what d id you do at th e crime lab? 
A We took each individual suitcase , opened them up 
individually, brought everything ou t of those suitcases onto 
tables , photographed the items , and then dusted them for 





























Q Did you help Agent Gower and Agent Millet go out to the 
Hasch property on January 21st , 1999? 
A Yes . 
Q About what time of day? 
A It was at night . 
Q Okay. What time of night? 
A I would say approximately eight or 9 o ' clock at night . 
It was after dark . 
Q Do you know for sure? 
A No . 
Q If I told you that according to the task force police 
reports it was around 11 , 11 : 30 , would that be accurate? 
A At night? 
Q Yes . 
A Yes . That would be right . 
Q What did you do when you got to the Hasch property? 
What was your role? 
A We went to the Has c h residence to speak to Tim . 
Q Do you know Mr . Hasch? 
A I do . 
Q And what -- just tell the jury what happened when you 
got there . 
A We went to the door . I knocked on it . I asked for Tim 





























Q Which vehicle? 
A It was a Chevrolet corsica . 
Q · Okay . Keep going . 
A It was parked out front of his house right by the 
entrance gate . 
inside the car . 
I asked him if we could go look at the contents 
Q What happened at that point? 
A Tim then retrieved some key s from somewhere inside the 
residence , walked out to the car with us. 
Q Okay . Did he let you look in the trunk? 
A He did . 
Q Okay . What did you find in the trunk? 
A There was some items in the trunk that were bagged up . 
It was suspected that it was a methamphetamines lab . 
not? 
Q Okay . And that ' s the sum of your involvement , ' is it 
A Yes . 
MR . BITTMENN : No further questions . 
THE COURT : Mr . Scarth, do you want to cross? 
MS . SCARTH : Yes . 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q Officer Edwards , from everything you observed that 
night about Tim Ha sch and his actions , did it appear that he 




























A No . 
Q He had the key , he opens the trunk , it ' s his wife ' s 
car , but you conclude it's not his lab? 
A Yes , sir . 
Q Wha t did you base that conc l usion on? 
A Conversation with Mr . Hasch . 
Q He told you it wasn ' t his lab? 
A He did . 
Q And that ' s what you base that conclusion on? 
A Yes , sir . 
Q And you believed him? 
A I did . 
Q You knew he had a crimina l record at that time? 
A I knew he had some . 
Q And you knew that some of it was for drug conviction? 
A I did not know that , 
MS . SCARTH : Okay, No other questions . 
THE COURT : Anything else , counsel? 
MR . BITTMENN : No , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : All right . Thank you , Mr . Edwards, And 
you can leave , Your next witness . 
MR . BITTMENN : Tim Hasch . 
THE COURT : Let ' s ask Mr . Hasch to come in . 




























A I -- I don' t know. 
Q Would that surprise you? 
A As far as what? 
Q As far as whether they got in the trunk and --
A No . That should be the - - that ' s what happened . 
Q To the best of your recollect i on , that ' s what happened? 
A That ' s the best of my recollecti o n , yeah . 
Q What was in the trunk? 
A There was a meth lab in the trunk . 
Q Was it yours? 
A No . 
Q Had you ever used that meth lab to cook 
methamphetamine? 
A No . And I had never seen it before . 
MR . BITTMENN : Okay . No f urther questions . 
THE COURT : Mr . Scarth . 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q So , Mr . Hasch , it ' s your testimony that on the 21st of 
January 1999 , there at your home , you didn ' t tell any of those 
o fficers that the re was in fact a meth lab in the trunk of the 
corsica? 
A No . 
Q If I were to tell yo u that several of th em have 
testified that you told them that , would you say that ' s , that 
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1 they are incorrect? 
- , 
) 2 A I didn ' t know what was in the trunk of the car . 
3 Q No idea? 
4 A No . 
5 Q Okay . Have you eve r been convicted of a crime that 
6 involved giving false evidence or untruthfulness? 
7 A No . 
8 Q Okay . Do you know how to cook methamphetamine? 
9 A No , I don ' t . 
10 Q Back in ' 99 , January of ' 99 , did you know Karen Hardy? 
11 A Terry had Karen that he hung around with , but I didn ' t 
12 know her . 
13 Q Bu t Karen hung around wi t h Terry . Was she a b l onde ? 
14 A I believe so . 
15 Q Before the 21st o f January 1999 , had you become aware 
16 that she knew how to cook methamphetamine? 
17 A I had no idea that -- no . 
18 Q Okay . So you never gave Terry Me sser a key to the 
19 trunk of that corsica ; is that right? 
20 A No , I didn ' t . 
21 Q If he had a ke y , would you have any idea how he got it? 
22 A Probably took it out o f the car . The car is parked out 
23 by the road . 
24 Q Okay . 




























Q Now , if you saw someone out there at night getting into 
the trunk of that corsica , what would you have done? 
A Probably called the police . 
Q Do you have any guns at the house? 
A At that time I did , yeah. 
Q Did you ever give a key to the trunk of that corsica to 
Karen Hardy? 
A No . 
Q Did you give a key to the trunk to that car to Jonathan 
Cammack? 
A No . 
Q Do you know Jonathan Cammack? 
A I know of him . 
Q Okay . On the 21st of January 1999 , did you know 
he was involved in the distribution of methamphetamine? 
A Who? 
MR. BITTMENN: Objection . Assume d facts not in 
evidence. 
Q Jonathan . 
A No . 
that 
THE COURT : Overruled, counsel . It ' s c ross . He ca n 
do that . Let ' s make sure we have a clear record . Would you 
repeat that question one more time . 






1 Q Question : On January 21st or , before , of 1999 , did you 
2 know that Jonathan Cammack was involved in the distribution of 
3 methamphetamine? 
4 A I don ' t know what his business is , no . 
5 Q Did Jonathan Cammack provide you wi t h any 
6 methamphetamine prior to that date ? 
7 A No . 
8 Q Had Karen Hardy? 
9 A No . 
10 Q Had Karen -- well , Karen , the blonde with Terry Messer, 
11 had she talked to you about methamphetamine prior to that date? 
12 A No . 
13 Q Did she come to your home on January 21st , 1999? 
14 A I don ' t recollect . Dates don ' t mean anything to me . I 
15 d o n ' t know . If she was with him , then she was there , yeah . 
16 Q So did Terry Messer c o me to your home on the day of the 
17 night the police came to y our house? 
18 A That day? 
19 Q Yeah. Before the police got there? 
20 A He was there earlier in th e morning , I believe . 
21 Q In the morning? 
22 A Yeah . 
23 Q Okay. Did he have a female with him? 
2 4 A I think so . 




























officers that have testified here , that you told them that you 
had given Terry Messer a key to the trunk of your corsica, 
would you say they were lying? 
A I never told anybody I gave a key to anybody . 
Q Okay . You were surprised when you saw that meth lab in 
the trunk of the corsica , weren 't you? 
A Yes , I was. 
Q So you had no idea who it belonged to, did you? 
A No . 
Q And you didn ' t tell the police who you thought it 
belonged to? 
A I didn ' t say anything to the police other than they 
came and asked for permission to search . 
permission to search . 
I gave them 
Q After they found what they told you was a meth lab, did 
the y accuse you of being the owner of t h a t lab? 
A They made some accusations that if my fingerprints were 
found on that lab that I could be charge d with it, yes . 
Q Did they question you about the contents of the trunk 
of the corsica? 
A They asked me if I knew anything about it. I told them 
I , you know, I didn't put it in the re . 
in there . 
I don ' t know how it got 
Q Do you know how they got the idea to send for the key 




























A I don't know. 
Q I believe you testified that you had to wait while some 
officers brought a key from Washington County; is that right? 
A Right . Yeah . 
Q You don ' t have any idea how those officers knew there 
was a key to the trunk of that corsica in Washington County? 
A I assumed that Karen told them. I don ' t know . 
Q Okay . Did you give a written statement to any of the 
police officers on the night of January 21st , 1999? 
A I have given no written statements to anybody about 
anything . 
Q In this case? 
A In any case. 
Q Okay . So this Karen woman that had come to your place, 
or at least you knew to be associated with Terry Messer, had 
never asked you to store the meth lab in the corsica? 
A No . Nobody ' s asked me anything about storing anything 
anywhere . 
Q Did you -- at that time , did you know whose lab it was? 
A At what time? 
Q January 21st , 1999 . 
A No . I --
Q Are y ou a mechanic? 
A Yeah . I ' m an auto body man and a backhoe operator . 
Q All right . Before January 21st , 1999 , had Terry Messer 
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his expert here from the Salt Lake City area . 
THE COURT : That ' s under advisement , counsel . 
MR . SCARTH : Thank you , you r Hon or . 
THE COURT : All r i ght . Anything else? 
MR . SCARTH : Nothing , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Mr . Bittmenn , a n ything else we need to do 
before the lun ch break? 
MR . BITTMENN : No . 
THE COURT : I think we used up all our time . Counsel , 
let ' s try to be back here at 25 after one . I don ' t know what 
you are going to find to eat , but it better be quick . We ' ll be 
in recess until 1 : 25 . 
(Whereupon , a lunch recess was taken . ) 
THE COURT : All right . We are back on the record in 
State vs . Messer. It is 1 : 37 in the afternoon . The court 
having taken under advisement the issue of the eye witness 
, . 
identification , Mr . Overson , the court having heard the 
testimony of Mr . Overson and conducting the analysis under the 
State vs . Ramirez standards , there are areas of concentration 
that the court must ake findings and conclusions on . The 
first area is the time available to the witness for the 
observation . Mr . Overson's testimony was that the observation 
was in two dif f erent time periods . One was at the area in the 
I 
store where the iodine was located , and that he observed the I , 















period of some two or three minutes is how Mr . Overson 
described it . And then an additional two or three minutes at 
the second locat i on i n the store where t h e purchase was made . 
The location of the purchase at the counter and the timing 
there would give anywhere from fou r to si x minutes of contact 
with Mr . Messer . 
The degree of attention is the next area . And the 
I 8 court paid some very careful attention to t he nature of 
,< 
t~: ' 
9 interest that Mr. Overson expressed about this event because of' 
~. 
~~ i 10 his prio r informa t ion received from Mr . Ex cell o f t h e drug t ask' 
, 
11 force in Iron County . He was aware that purchases of iodine 
" ~. 12 were potentiall y linked to drug ma nu factu r e . He wa s also awa r e 
. ', . 
13 thAt. this was an unusua l time to be purchasing iodine . It was 
• 14 not purchased a t a time or season of the year when the 
15 
.. " 
livestock indust r y i n the area had a particular need for it . 
,
16 Though , the use of iodine on horses , appareritly , can be 
. 
17 year-round . And the quantity of the iodin e he usually sel l s at 
. , 
:a 1 gallon at a time . And this was 4 gallons , gave a high degree 
:9 of attention on Mr . Overson . Mr . Overson ' s capabil i ty to 
20 observe and see Mr . Messer was not obstructed by anything 
21 brought out on examination . Mr . Overson was wearing his 
22 glas s es at the t i me . He was wearing his glasses today . He 
23 testified that he always wears his glasses . And that at a 
:: 4 distance of some 5 feet a way from Mr . Messer across the 
I 5 














The las t factor denominated i n the Rami rez analysis is 
the product of suggestion and whether or not. the iden t ification 
is a product of suggest i on . Substan t ially d i fferent from the 
Ramirez case where this was done in a very quick show-up after 
the events of an armed robbery or a robbery , I can 't remember 
if i t was armed or not at this point on the record , Mr . Messer 
and Mr . Overson ' s encounter was singular . Mr . Overson 
testif i e d he never seen Mr . Messer before. That he saw them on 
this day . And t hat he was distinctive about Mr. Messer ' s 
appearance , dressed all in white , even the white s h oes with a 




not so dis t inctive because Mr. Overson has not been able to 
ide nt ify t hat young woman until such today that he could not , 
even though he has seen her in t h e same potentially suggestive 
't ~:. 
. 15 circumstances as he has seen Mr . Messer , that is , in court as a 
person involved in the case . And that is telling to this 
i7 court ' s analysis u nde r whether or not this identificat i on was a 
'8 product of sugges t ion, because there was no contact whatsoever 
:9 between Mr . Ove r son and Mr . Messer between the 14th of January 
2J of 199 9 and t he courtroom appearance on November 10th of 1999. 
21 While there is some possible suggestibility in the 
... 22 prosecutor ' s question of Mr . Overson in the preliminary 
hearing , asking whether or not the defendant , Mr . Mess e r, 
sea t ed at t he tab le to the left o f the prosecutor was t he same j ' ~~ r son that Mr . Overson saw in the store , the fact tha t the 
I 10 3 
I ! 
I. 
same incident on January 14th did not present an ability to 
identify the female presen t gives this court more confidence in 
the ability to identify Mr . Messer after a length of ~early 11 
months between January 14th and November 10 . Therefore , the 
court does not find that there is a due process violation in 
this identification . It is not the product of suggestibility 
but , rather , is an admissible identification . And so Mr . 
Overson ' s testimony will be received as the court applies the 
Ramirez ana l ysis . 
At this point , counsel , we ' ll bring the jury back ip . 
Mr . Bailiff , will you - -
MR . SCARTH : May I make a quick proffer , Your Honor? 
THE COURT : Yes , counsel . 
MR . SCARTH : I would proffer that if the defendant 
were called to testify to this issue , the eye witness 
r 
16 identificat i on , he would testify , tha t he , Terry Messer , is 
17 5- foot 11 inches tall --
.. 
• : 1 B ' THE COURT : Thank you . 
19 MR . SCARTH : -- if that affects your ruling . 
20 THE COURT : Counsel , my observations of Mr . Messer 
21 would comport with that . Mr . Messer appears to be 5 - foot 
22 11 inches tall . And the record should so reflect . 
, 
23 
, MR . BITTMENN : Can I make one brief record ? 
~ 
T .J 24 THE COURT : Yes . 
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2 BY MR . SCARTH : 
3 Q Mr . Messer , please state your name . 
4 A Terry Arnold Messer , Jr. 
5 Q And what was your most recent employment? 
6 A Urn , that would be Angel Care. 
7 Q Doing what? 
8 A Helping Elderly people . 
9 Q In what city? 
10 A It varied. Mesquite. St . George . 
11 Q Did you go to the Overson Farm store here in Cedar City 
12 on January 14th, 1999 with Karen Hardy? 
'3 A Yes, I did. 
14 Q And tell us what happened. 
15 A Urn, Karen Hardy purchased 5 gallons of tincture of 
iodine . 
17 Q Okay . Five? 
18 A I believe it was five . It was a case of one extra 
19 gallon . 
20 Q Who paid for it? 
21 A Karen Hardy. 
22 Q Okay . Did you know what she was going to do with it? 
23 A I had an idea . 
Q Okay . What was that idea? 
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methamphetamines. She ' s talked about it . 
Q Okay . What did you do once you got out of the store 
and into the eclipse in regards to the iodine? 
A I don ' t understand . 
Q Well , were you - - what was your attitude at that time? 
Were you happy or unhappy? 
A I wasn ' t really pleased to be there . I expressed that 
to he r. But she told me that she was doing a favor for a 
friend . 
Q Okay . What happened to that iodine? 
A' I carried it out to the car . And I put it in the hatch 
of the eclipse . 
Q Who had the use of that eclipse at that time? 
A Karen Hardy . 
Q For how long had she had the use of that car? 
A Ever since we have been dating . 
Q So you got to tell us. How long was that? 
A I believe she got out of prison late ' 98 . I can ' t give 
a n exact date or a month . 
) Q And when did the r omance with Karen Hardy break up? 
1 A Urn --
2 Q Your romance . 
3 A When she lied to police about me throwing her out of 
4 the car . But , then she came and testified to the truth that I 
S didn ' t . Or she didn ' t testify , some affidavits, which resulted 
787 
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1 with , the owe sheet. 
" 
) 2 THE COURT : Urn , probably the best way to do it would 
3 be to ope n the bag . 
4 MR . SCARTH : Oh , there is a photocopy. 
5 THE COURT : Oh , we have a photocopy of the owe sheet? 
6 All right . Any objection to publishing that to the jury at 
7 this time , counsel? 
8 MR . BITTMENN : Could I do my prosecution , then when he 
9 gets up he can ask to have the same published and stuff . 
10 MR . SCARTH : I would like them to see it now . 
11 THE COURT : Well, I guess we ' ll wait , counsel . It ' s 
12 Mr . Bittmenn ' s case in chief . 
13 BY MR . BITTMENN : 
14 Q Who wrote that? 
15 A Terry. 
16 Q That ' s his handwriting? 
17 A Yes . 
18 Q Okay . I ' m showing you what ' s been marked as State ' s 
19 Exhibit No . 28 and ask you if you can identify that? 
20 A Yes . It ' s a letter . 
21 Q Whose handwriting is that? 
22 A Terry ' s . 
23 Q And have you seen that document before? 
2 4 A Yes . 
2 5 Q When? 
: 
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1 A I think he sent it to me . lt was for right after he 
') 2 went to jai l. 
3 Q And he sent it to you . And what did you do with it? 
4 A I just read he told me things to do in here , so I 
5 tried to do as much as I could . 
6 Q Di d you respond to it? 
7 A You mean write back? 
8 Q I just want to know if you responded to it . 
9 A I don ' t know wha t you mean . 
10 Q Okay . Take a second and read through that document , 
11 would you , please . Are you already done? 
12 A Yes . 
13 Q Okay . There are certain areas · in there where items are 
14 circled ; is that correct? 
15 A Yes . 
16 Q And who circled them? 
l7 A Terry . 
18 Q Okay . And what -- you are telling me that you got that 
19 letter when he was in jail? 
20 A Yes . 
2 1 Q And what does it communicat e to you to do? 
22 MR . SCARTH : Your Honor, it shouldn ' t be testified to 
23 until it ' s been received into evidence . And I do have an 
24 object ion to its receipt . 
; 25 TnE COURT: All 
" 
right , counsel . I ' m going t o take 
492 
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your objection under advisement . Let ' s get on to a different 
are a , counsel . Hang on to that letter . We ' ll deal with that 
when we make other records later on . But f or now , let ' s go on 
to another area . 
MR . BITTMENN: The court would not entertain a motion 
to submit State ' s No . 28 . 
THE COURT : At this point , it ' s still under submission 
on the initial objection there . So we ' ll hold off on it . 
MR . BITTMENN : Okay . 
BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q I ' m showing you what ' s been marked -- and I thought I 
had a photocopy of this , but I guess I don ' t -- as State ' s 
No . 27 . There is two sheets of paper in there , right? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay . And do you recognize that? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay. Your Honor , can I open that e xhibit with some 
scissors? 
I ' m going to break Detective Gower's seal and show you 
that there is a smaller sheet of paper . 
note , right? 
A Yes . 
It looks like a sticky 
Q And the n there ' s one that says , Virgin River 
Hotel/Casino and Bingo on the back ? 
A Yes . 
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1 my involvement in it at all. I just told them . I , basically , 
, 
\ 2 , just i mpl icated myself completely with them --
3 Q Okay . 
4 A -- without even thinki ng I would get off o n an ything. 
5 Q Does the fact tha t you have been granted immunity by 
6 the Iron County Attorney 's Off i ce , does that have any bearing 
7 on your testimony toda y? 
8 A No . 
9 Q So you are not lying to this jury because we made a 
10 deal with y ou? 
11 A No . 
12 MR . BITTMENN : No fu r ther questions . 
13 THE COURT : All right . Members of the jury , before 
14 Mr . Scart h sta rts o n his cross - exam i nation , I ' m going to excuse 
15 y ou for about a 10 , 15 minute break while we make a record 
16 outs i de your presence . You take your recess now . Don ' t 
17 discuss the case among yourselves or with anyone else . Don ' t 
18 form or e xpres s a ny opin i on as to the innocence or guilt of the 
19 defe ndant unt il it ' s finall y submitted to you . We ' ll tr y to be 
20 back in session with you no later than 10 : 30 . If you ' ll go 
2 1 wi t h the bailiff . 
22 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in 
23 open court outside the presence of the jury . ) 
24 THE COURT : All right . Now , the members of the jury 





Counsel, Mr . Scarth ' s objection that I held until --
MR . SCARTH: May my assistant approach the clerk and 
3 mark the exhibits , Your Honor? 
4 THE COURT : Certainly . Mr . Scarth ' s objection , which 
5 I took under advisement, was a request to ask Miss Hardy to 
6 read from Exhibit No . 28 , which is not in evidence , has not yet 
7 been offered , though it has been discussed in some 
8 particularity. Mr . Scarth, you didn ' t want it read from until 
9 it was in evidence . And you don ' t believe it can be placed in 
10 evidence because of lack of foundation . Mr . Scarth , are there 
11 other objections to it because of the questionable foundation, 
12 the provinces of this document have some question? 





THE COURT : You certainly can . 
MR . SCARTH : I need to have the exhibit . 
THE COURT : I think it 's there , isn ' t it , 





MR . SCARTH : May I approach , Your Honor? 
THE COURT : Certainly . 
MR . SCARTH: No. 28 . 
THE COURT: It ' s stapled to the bags on the page . 
23 Right there . Yes. 
24 
25 Bittmenn? 



























MR . BITTMENN : Yes . 
VOI R DIRE EXAMINAT I ON 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q Showing you the copy of Exhibit 28 , there is more than 
one handwriting on it , isn ' t there , Miss Hardy? 
A I don ' t I don ' t think so . 
Q Does Jonathan Cammack ' s handwriting appear on it? 
A I don ' t think so . 
Q Did you see Mr . Messer write this letter? 
A No . 
Q How is it that you can identify his handwriting? 
A Because I was with him . I mean , I just can tell . 
kind of -- I just can tell . And everything he says in the 
letter is about him . So I know it ' s him . 
Q Is this the entire letter? 
A I don ' t know . 
He 
Q Doesn ' t it look like it ' s the second or some subsequent 
sheet to the first? 
A I can ' t remember . Could have been . 
Q Do you know what that first word is? 
A I' Did .'I 
Q Okay . And also looks like a portion of it has been cut 
off by a copy machine. Does it look that way to you? 
A It does . 



























the photocopy he ' s l ooking at . 
MR . SCARTH : Well , may I open the exhibit , Your Honor? 
THE COURT : I sn ' t i t about time we got into it , 
counsel? 
MR . BITTMENN : I don 't care . 
THE COURT : Go ahead. 
MR . SCARTH : You got a pocket knife , Your Honor? 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q Do you know how the police or deputies got this letter? 
A I can ' t recall . It might have been -- I don ' t know. 
might have given it to them. 
don ' t know . 
I can ' t recall though . So I 
Q Was it seized from another inmate , n ot Terry Messer, 
but another inmate cel l at the Purgatory jail? 
A I don 't know . 
MR . BITTMENN : Objection , Your Honor . 
said she can ' t recall . 
She already 
THE COURT : Over ruled, counsel . Mr . Scarth can l ead . 
I t ' s your witness , 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q I see that there ' s some writing in pencil . Most of 
it ' s in ink , but there is some in pencil . Do you recognize 
that handwriting? 
A I don 't know . That could be mine or Terry ' s . I don't 




























Q Okay. Like , for instance , it seems to say he ' ll get it 
there at one point in lead writing . 
that? 
Do you recognize who wrote 
A Can I see this? 
Q Um- hmm. 
A I don ' t know . 
Q Okay . Who is Dog Dude? 
A That ' s what he called Jonathan . They like call their 
buddies , what ' s up dog? It ' s a guy thing . 
Q And when it refers to Brian , who is the Brian? 
A Urn , can ' t remember . I think it might be -- well , I 
can ' t really say for sure. But I ' m assuming it ' s that kid that 
worked at Taco Time in Hurricane . But I ' m not sure . 
really remember . 
I can ' t 
Q I have another objection , Your Honor. It ' s irrelevant 
and immaterial. Reading the entire thing has nothing to do 
wi th the i ssues of this case . 
THE COURT : Counsel , even before I take the document 
and review it myself , I am most concerned about the substantial 
conflict in the evidence regarding the source of this item . 
Now , Mrs. Hardy has indicated that she recognizes the 
handwriting . Mr . Bittmenn, let me give you a chance . You 
wanted to say something . 
BY MR . BITTMENN: 
Q If I showed you other examples of the defendant ' s 
510 
1 handwriting would that help you to be sure that this is his --





Urn , yeah . 
Okay . That file is fr om the Iron County victim 





Probably , yes . 
Are those letters that were mailed to you by the 
8 defendant while he was in Purgatory Correctional Facility 












And where did 
Took them for 
what did you do with those letters? 
you mean at what time? 
How did they get in that file? 
I took them first to a P-O . I think it was Gale , 
15 because I think Brad was out of town or something . He was my 
16 p-o at the time . 
Okay . 






stop . So she said she would try to contact the victim services 
20 o r something. And I got Danean ' s number. And I cal l ed Danean 
2 1 Peterson and filed a protective order against Terry. They were 
22 all the evidence I had of his threats on me . 
23 Q Do the l etters contain his signature? Do you remember? 
24 Have you seen those in a while? 
25 A I haven ' t seen them in a long time . 
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1 Q Okay . Well , let me show you this one . 
-
, 
, 2 continuation . 
3 THE COURT : All right. Mr . Bittmenn --
4 MR . BITTMENN : Yes, sir . 
5 THE COURT : it ' s the state ' s position , as I see it 
6 now through this witness , to authenticate this writing because 
7 of her familiarity , having received a number of letters after 
8 his incarceration , this particular letter having been made at 
9 least according to the record that we have so far in the early 
10 portion of Mr . Messer ' s incarceration at Purgatory Correctional 
11 Facility after his arrest on January 21 , 1999. And by that 
12 means you intend to co nnect this document directly to Mr . 
13 Messer because this witness has letters that she has read and 
14 can recognize the handwriting? 
15 MR . BITTMENN : She can authenticate that that ' s his 
16 handwriting , yes , sir . 
17 THE COURT : All right. The ability of a non-expert 
18 witness to au t henticate handwriting is acceptable in the c ourt 
19 for foundational purposes . But I have this question , and this 
2 0 question alone , are you willing to risk your record on this 
2 1 matter over what I see would be probably t he most questionable 
22 issue we have c ome across in this case over Exhibit 28? Is 
23 it ' s probative nature and its relevance so viable to the 
2 4 state ' s case that you feel it absolutely has to c ome in? 



























appellat e court , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : I am , counse l . That ' s why I asked the 
question . 
MR . BITTMENN : Can I finish? I am here to prosecute 
this case to the fullest extent with all of the relevant 
evidence I have . I submit to the court that the letter Miss 
Hardy is authenticating is an attempt by Mr . Messer to get his 
property out of Purgatory . And it shows his state of mind . 
There are statements in there about , Don ' t worry babe . We got 
to stick together . Don ' t flip on me . There were statements in 
there about , even if our fingerprints are found on the lab they 
ain ' t got enough to conv i ct us . 
I don ' t think it ' s prejudicial . 
I think it ' s highly probative . 
It ' s his writing . It ' s his 
words . If the court reviews the item and finds that it ' s too 
inflammatory , that ' s your duty to do that and to second guess 
the appellate court . No t mine . I ' m submitting it to you . I 
am authenticating it . I think it ' s relevant . I think it's 
probative . I think it ' s something the jury needs to see . 
THE COURT : All right . Miss Hardy , would you hand me 
that piece of paper? Thank you , ma ' am . Appreciate that . 
Mr. Scarth, you want me to read it and rule on 
relevance entirely? 
MR . SCARTH : Yes . 
THE COURT : Okay . Let me take a look at it . 




























THE COURT : Well , hearsay , the f i rst par t of my 403 
concerns , counse l. I have no idea if any member o f th i s jury 
would look at th i s and say on the third line of the document , 
" Stay on my PO . Circle yes or no . ' Y ' or TN. '" 
THE WITNESS : My strong suspicion that PO means 
probat i on or parole officer . 
MR . BITTMENN : I suggest that , not the entirety of the 
letter , seems too prejudicial . 
them . 
I would ask the court to redact 
THE COURT : Al l right . 
MR . BITTMENN : I understand the court ' s already ruled 
we can ' t talk about his parole status . 
THE COURT : Mr . Scarth , I have had a chance to read 
through it. What else do you want to tell me about it as far 
as its admissibility? 
MR . SCARTH : Well , Your Honor , I don ' t know the 
purpose for which it ' s being offered . It doesn ' t appear to be 
relevant . My client doesn ' t want it in because it makes 
references to his sisters , and they are going to be witnesses 
for him . I think it could be construed like where he wants his 
grandma or her grandma to get the vehicle and make a list of 
things in it . It could be construed possibly by the jury 
misconst rued as being an attempt to cover up evidence when in 





























about their saying I think it ' s harmless . But he thinks it ' s 
harmful . It just doesn ' t t ie in . How does it fit with the 
evidence of this case? What will i t mean to the jury? Will it 
confuse the jury? I submit that it will . That ' s where we are 
at , Your Honor . 
THE COURT: All right. Do you offer 28 , counsel ? 
MR . BITTMENN: I do . 
THE COURT : All right . Twenty - eight ' s received with a 
redaction o f the third line of the document . Counsel , I am 
taking the black marker that you provided and completely 
removing all references to probation officer or P-O . The 
remai ning porti on of the docume nt is r eceived . 
MR . SCARTH : Will you read the back of it, Your Honor? 
thing . 
THE COURT : I have . I have gone over the entire 
MR . SCARTH : May I read that again? 
THE COURT : Certainly , c9unsel . 
MR . BITTMENN : May I ask a questi on ? 
THE COURT : Certainly , counsel . 
MR . BITTMENN : I stopped my examination. We have now 
received evidence . And I would like to inquire . 
THE COURT : We ' ll go bac k on the record and lay your 
foundation with this witness in front of a jury so they will 
understand . 



























THE COURT : Yes . 
MR. BITTMENN: I haven ' t gone to Mr . Sca rt h yet . 
THE COURT : Well , you sort of have , because I still 
had this pending . And I am going to give you a chance to 
finish up wit h this witness before Mr . Scarth starts . 
MR . SCARTH : On Exhibit 28 , Your Honor , I request that 
a photocopy of the front page only be submitted , because on the 
last page it shows the letterhead of Washington County 
Purgatory Correctional Facility . 
THE COURT : Counsel , that document showing the 
Purgatory Correctional Facility is relevant and probative 
because it gives specif i c timing . If Mr . Messer was able to 
write on this document , it came from the jail , it would 
indicate , at least for the purposes of this case , that it came 
after 21 January 1999 . So I ' ll send it in the way it is. It ' s 
received in i t s original form . 
Ma ' am , you are probably going to need it for a minute . 
So you keep it there . 
Counsel , Mr . Has ch is with us ; is that correct? 
MR . SCARTH : Yes . 
THE COURT : All right . Let me suggest that we retire 
to chambe rs o n the record and conduct our wo rk with Mr . Hasch 
immediately . 
MR . BITTMENN : May I have my marker back? 
THE COURT : I suppose you better have it, counsel . 
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1 MR . BITTMENN : Thank you. 
\ 2 , THE COURT : All right . Miss Hardy , we are going to 
3 take a recess here in court . You can go ahead and just stay 
4 available outside . But you can step down now . All right. 
5 Counsel , let's meet in chambers . And let ' s bring Mr . Hasch 
6 back. 
7 (The following proceedings were 
8 held in chambers : ) 
9 THE COURT : Okay . Can you hear us , ma ' am? 
10 KRISTEN: Um- hmm . 
11 THE COURT : All right . You are talking to Judge 
12 Shumate . I am district judge down in Fifth District Court in 
13 Iron Count y right now . 
14 KRISTEN : Okay . 
15 THE COURT : I have Tim Hasch , who just dialed the 
16 number and is now going eat it . I want you to u nderstand t hat 
17 we are doing this because in Terry Messer ' s trial , which we 
18 have going right now , Mr . Messer ' s lawyer, a man by the name of 
19 Jim Scarth , needs to ask you some questi ons , if you know 
20 anyth ing about conversations that happened a while ago . 
21 Mr. Scarth , let me go ahead and let you ask -- first 
22 of all , would you tell us your name . 
23 THE WITNESS : My name is Kristen . 
24 THE COURT : All right . Thank you . Mr . Scarth , go 




























called by DEFENDANT , not having been duly 
sworn , was exami ned and testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q Kristen , do you recall rece i ving a phone call or a 
meeting with Jonathan Cammack about the middle of 1999 in which 
Jonathan Cammack asked you to tell the police that t h e lab 
found on Mr . Tim Hasch ' s property belonged to Tim Hasch? 
MR . BITTMENN : Objection . Hearsay. 
THE COURT: All right , counsel . Go ahead , Miss 
McKlosky . Tell us your answer . Do you remember that? 
A Not really. I kind of remember him freaking out about 
Terry going to jail , but that was about it . 
BY MR . SCARTH : 
Q So he didn ' t tell you at any time that he wanted you to 
tell the police t h at the lab belonged to your stepfather , Mr . 
Hasch? 
A I don ' t remember that , no . It could have happened, but 
it ' s , you know , like two years ago . 
out . 
Q Okay . No memory about that? 
A No . Like I said , I just remember him kind of freaking 
MR . SCARTH : Well , thanks for helping us , Kristen . 




























your help. And we ' ll shut the phone off . And you can go back 
to your life . 
KRISTEN : Thank you . 
THE COURT : Appreciate your help , Tim. That ' s as much 
as we can do . We ' l l go out and go back to work . And Tim can 
go back to his house. 
MS . SCARTH : Just befor~ we do , not to squabble with 
you , Your Honor , but on the admission of rule 28 -- I mean 
Exhibit 28 --
THE COURT: Exhibit 28 . 
MR . SCARTH : - - it's my recollection that Officer 
Gower testified he got that letter from Officer Brecke who got 
it from the jail personnel. 
THE COURT : That is the clear record that we have , 
counsel . And that is my understanding. I ' ll put on the 
record , now that I have no confidence whatsoever as to the 
statements or the testimony as to the chain of custody of that 
letter made by Miss Hardy . It ' s not because I have a question 
about her truthfulness, but her use of controlled substan ces 
throughout this process makes her memory on the whole issue 
extremely questi onable and she was very vague . It is coming in 
based on this sole reason for foundati on . And it ' s tie is 
solely because Miss Hardy is testifying that she recognizes 
that handwriting as Mr . Hardy ' s and for no other reason. 
MR . BITTMENN : Mr . Messer ' s . 
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THE COURT : I ' m sorry . Mr . Messer ' s . Miss Hardy is 
testifying . She ' s recognizing that handwriting as Mr . 
Messer ' s . And that is the only foundation that it has to tie 
it to Mr . Messer . The jail staff wasn ' t able to give any kind 
of foundation , where it came from. But it is the identity of 
this , lay identification of that handwriting as Mr. Messer ' s, 
which is the sole basis for the court ' s admiss ion of it. That 
was the reason for my inquiry of Mr . Bittmenn as to the 
frugality of this record on that issue. And he ' s given me his 
position he wants it in . 
MR . SCARTH: I want to make a record . 
THE COURT : Go ahead . 
MR . SCARTH: Your Honor , I do request that you 
suppress from evidence in this trial State ' s Exhibit 28 . And I 
do so on the grounds that it has no probative value that would 
not be outweighed by the prejudicial value to the defendant; 
upon the further grounds , that chain of evidence regarding this 
Exhibit 28 , which is a letter allegedly written by the 
defendant , has not been established . And it should not be 
admitted into evidence . 
THE COURT : Thank you , counsel . That 's a good record. 
My ruling is that it is received . And we ' ll go back to work in 
front of the jury . 
MR . SCARTH : Thank you , Your Honor . 





1 (State ' s Exhibit No. 28 
2 was received into evidence . ) 
3 (Whereupon , the f ollowing proceedings 
4 were held in open court in front of the jury . ) 
5 THE COURT : All right. We are back on the record in 
6 State of Utah vs . Messer . Mr . Messer is here together with his 
7 counsel. Mr. Bittmenn is here . Miss Hardy is back in the 
8 courtroom . And she'll be up o n the witness stand . 
9 Members of the jury , Mr. Bittmenn has another area 
10 that he needs to cover with this witness . Counsel , you may 
11 proceed . 
12 KAREN HARDY- CONTINUED , 
13 called by PLAINTIFF , having been duly 
14 sworn , was examined and testifies as follows : 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION (cont ' d . ) 
16 BY MR . BITTMENN : 
17 Q Thank you, Your Honor . Miss Hardy, when the jury 
18 stepped out , you remained , didn ' t you ? 
19 A Yes . 
20 Q And we talked about State ' s Exhibit No . 28 , right? 
21 A Yes . 
22 Q This note? 
23 A Yes . 
2 4 Q Okay . Do you recognize that handwriting in that note? 




























Q Whose handwriting i s it? 
A Terry ' s . 
Q Okay . There i s some in i nk and some in pencil? 
A Yes . 
Q Can you tell me which one you recognize as being 
Terry ' s , or are they all Terry ' s or? 
A They look like all Terry ' s . I just can ' t remember . 
Q Have you seen his handwriting before ? 
A Yes . 
Q And isn ' t i t true that during his t i me away from yo u he 
sent you quite a few handwritten letters? 
A Yes . 
Q Have you seen the letters in this file before? 
A What file? 
Q This one right here . Take a second and look through 
that and see if you 
A Yeah . Just wh e n you set them down a while ago . 
Q Okay . And did those letters get sent to you? 
A Yes. 
Q That ' s how you recognize the handwrit ing in t hat note 
there? 
A Yes . 
Q What does t he note talk about? 
A Um--




























MR . SCARTH : It speaks for itself . 
THE COURT : All right . 28 is r eceived . And , counsel , 
doesn ' t the note speak for itself? Can ' t the members of the 
jury read it? You can focus on some specific areas . 
MR . BITTMENN : May I? Because I ' m afraid Dog Dude , 
they won ' t know who Dog Dude is . 
THE COURT : You can do that , but be conscious o f time . 
BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q Who is Dog Dude? It says something about Dog Dude in 
there. 
A That would be Jonathan Cammack . 
Q Okay . And it says the key to the trailer . What does 
that mean to you? 
A The key that was on Terry ' s key ring . It ' s like a long 
story . It ' s kind of a long story , what that means to me . 
Q Go ahead. 
A Okay . Like 
MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , with Mr . Bittmenn standing 
where she ' s looking at him 
THE COURT : Ma ' am , try to keep your voice up for Mr . 
Scarth . 
THE WITNESS : Okay . Tim Hasch owed Terry money for 
drugs . And he was going to give him a trailer . He had a 
trailer out at his proper t y . And so Terry had a key to that . 




























time he -- he said if he got arrested or anything , tell the 
police it was the key to the tra i le r --
MR . SCARTH : Move to strike , Your Honor . 
THE WITNESS : instead of the -- what ? 
THE COURT : Keep going , ma ' am . 
THE WITNESS : Instead of -- okay . 
THE COURT : All right . Hang on a second . Counsel , 
your motion ' s overru led . Now , another question , counsel so 
Miss Hardy can get back on stream . 
BY MR . BITTMENN: 
Q The note refers to a gold roundish key ; is that right? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay . Is the key that opened the trunk to the blue 
corsica a gold roundish key? 
A Yes . 
Q Does that note direct you to get rid o f the key to the 
Chevy corsica? 
MR . SCARTH : Objection , Your Honor . I want to see 
that key , first of all . 
THE COURT : All right , counsel . Take a look at 
Exhibit 26 . 
MR . SCARTH : The object ion is he ' s leading the 
witness . 
THE COURT : Well , he is , counsel. And you are 
correct . Let ' s t ry to avo id that . I ' ll sustain that 
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BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q Let me ask it . I ' ll start allover again . I ' m sorry . 
State ' s Exhibit No. 26 . Can you please describe that for me . 
A That? 
Q Yes. 
A It ' s a key . 
Q What color? 
A Goldish . 
Q And what shape? 
A Round . 
Q If I told you that Detect ive Gower testified earlier 
that th is key opened the b lue Chevy corsica on the Tim Hasch 
property where the meth lab was located , Hould that comport 
Hith your knowledge , or do you recognize the key? 
A I can ' t remember what the key looked like . 
Q Okay . Do you remember whether or not it was a gold 
roundish key that opened the trunk to the meth lab? 
A I couldn ' t ever remembered beforehand , but Hhen I read 
this letter I remembered . 
Q Okay . Part of the letter talks about fingerprints . 
What ' s that referring to? 
MR . SCARTH : Before he goes on , I move to strike the 
previous testimony because she now says she doesn ' t knoH if 



























THE COURT : Counsel , overruled . Next question . 
BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q Karen , would you look at the note . And pa r t of it 
talks abo ut something to t h e effec t of , you kn ow , never h ave 
enough fingerprints for t r ial . And we have got to stick 
together . Don ' t take a deal . What does that mean ? 
MR . SCARTH: He ' s asking her to say what the author of 
the lette r meant . 
THE COURT : And that ' s correct . Let ' s clarify the 
question . Miss Hardy , what does that mean to you? 
THE WITNESS : Urn , it means if we get arrested for 
because of our fingerprints , then just not to say anything to 
the police , just , urn , don ' t take any other deals and go all the 
way to trial . And , you know what I mean? Just , like stick 
together . 
BY MR . BITTMENN : 
Q Okay . Are you shocked to find that your fingerprints 
were located on the methamphetamine lab? 
A No . 
Q Did you expect that? 
A Yes . 
Q Would you be shocked to find that his fingerprints are 
located on the meth lab? 
A No . 
Q Do you know whether or not you went over to Tim Hasch ' s 
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1 house on or about the 15th , 16th or 17th of January , 1999? 
... " 
\ 2 J MR. SCARTH : Objection to the form of the question . 
3 She 's already testified that it was on the 18th or 19th , Your 
4 Hono r . 
5 MR . BITTMENN : I thought she testified 17th or 18 th . 
6 THE COURT : This may be a different time . It ' s just 
7 preliminary . Overruled . Do you have any recollection , ma ' am, 
8 o f a prio r visit in those dates , 17th -- 16th , 17th o f January? 
9 THE WITNESS : Yes . 
10 BY MR . BITTMENN : 
11 Q Okay . And do you know whether or not you went over 
12 there on the day and Tim Hasch was using that lab to cook meth? 
13 A Tim Has ch didn ' t use the lab to cook meth . 
14 Q Okay . Do you know whether or not that you and the 
15 defendant went over there sometime during that time and Tim was 
16 using the lab to make meth and h ande d the defendant one of the 
17 pans and that ' s how his fingerprints got on the lab? 
18 A Tim Hasch never did anything with the lab. I just lied 
19 to the police and said he did . 
20 MR . BITTMENN : Okay . Thank you . Nothing further. 
21 THE COURT : Mr . Scarth , you may cross . 
22 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. SCARTH : 
24 Q Thank you , Your Honor . The prosecutor asked if you had 
25 been conv~cted of felonies. And you told him about it . Have 
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THE COURT : All right . Where did the conversation 
take place? 
THE WITNESS : In my cell . He was friends with the guy 
who was my celly . I don ' t remember his name . But he was in 
there talking to him . And I was just sitting in there too , 
tal king to him . 
THE COURT : All right. Do you recall if the 
conversat ion at all mentioned Mr . Terry Messer? 
THE WITNESS : Yeah. 
THE COURT : Do you know Mr . Messer? 
THE WITNESS : I met him once two months ago . 
THE COURT : And in the Washington County Jailor Iron 
Count y? 
THE WITNE SS : Iron County . 
THE COURT : All right. In the conversation with Mr. 
Hasch , what was said and by whom regarding Mr. Messer? 
THE WITNESS : He said 
THE COURT : Which he? 
THE WITNESS : Hasch . 
THE COURT : Okay. 
. THE WITNESS : He was getting in trouble for a meth lab 
in the trunk o f a car on his property . And he was telling me 
al l kinds of people ' s names . I didn ' t know Tim Hasch . I 
didn ' t know Terry Messer . I didn ' t know any of them . I was 
just sitting there listening . And he said he didn ' t want to go 
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1 down for it . And he wanted to help Karen and Jonathan try to 
2 put it on Terry . 
3 THE COURT : And th i s was in February of 1 999? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
5 THE COURT: It's offered for impeachment , counsel . 
6 MR. SCARTH: It is. And it ' s rebuttal also . Not 
7 rebuttal . 
8 THE COURT : But it is hearsay . 
9 MR . SCARTH: Those witnesses were present . They could 
10 have been held by the prosecution . They are still available 
11 most likely . 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Hasch is definitely available . 
13 MR. BITTMENN : That ' s not an exception to the hearsay 
14 rule. 
15 THE COURT : That ' s what I am aSking . Is there any 
16 exception under Rule 803 or 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
17 that would allow this evidence to come in , Mr. Scarth? 
18 MR . SCARTH : May I check? 
19 THE COURT: Why d on't we all. Mr. Bittmenn , let me 
20 ask you , how long ago were you first informed of this witness ' 
21 being subpoenaed and the general subject matter of his 
22 testimony? 
23 MR. BITTMENN : On Monday morning, after the defendant 
24 arrived , which was late . Mr . Scarth handed me a list of 




1 list , handwritten by the defendant , of what their suspected 
2 tes timony would be . 
3 
4 
5 Honor . 
THE COURT : All right . That ' s what I thought . 
MR . SCARTH : You might loo k at 2 4 under 803 , Your 
6 
7 
THE COURT : That ' s where I have been looking , counsel . 
MR . SCARTH : And with some questions , foundation 
8 questions fr om me to this witness, we might get it in under 
9 subsection (2) of 803 and excited utterance . But I ' m still 
10 looking . And also subsection (4) (b) under 804 . 
11 THE COURT: What year book are you reading out of , 
12 counsel? 
MR . SCARTH : It ' s an older one . 13 
14 
15 
THE COURT : That ' s why I asked . 804 doesn ' t have a - -
MR. SCARTH : It ' s the last section . I remember they 
16 added a section in between . The other exception is --
17 THE COURT : (5) (b) , hearsay exceptions. Okay . Well 
18 my real problem wi th it to begin with is the threshold matter 
19 that Mr . Bittmenn should have been given notice at least in 
20 advance of trial to be able to meet the statement made by this 
21 witness from the Washington or the Iron County Jail . I got 




MR . SCARTH : I can call him back tomorrow . 
THE COURT : So that ' s not enough notice , counsel . 








objection to that ground , counsel . I don ' t think there is 
adequate notice . It might otherwise be allowable under the 
3 hearsay exception . But while we have this witness on the 
4 stand , do you wish to preserve any other record if I ' m wrong , 
5 Mr. Scarth? 
6 MR . SCARTH : I believe he ' s testif i ed out of the 
7 hearing of the jury as to what Mr . Hasch told him . Am I 
8 correct? 
THE COURT : He has , counse l. 9 
10 MR . SCARTH : That ' s our record . And we think that it 
11 is admissible under the exception . We think we gave adequate 
12 notice to counsel . With all these years of practice , I hate to 
13 admit ignorance , but I don ' t know of the rule that , the 
14 requirements , that defense give notice of witnesses prior to 
15 trial . 
16 THE COURT : I am in 803 - 24 . The last sentence of the 
17 rule , "A statement may not be admitted under this exception 
18 unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
19 sufficient l y in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
20 adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it , 
21 the proponent ' s intention to offer the statement , and the 
22 particulars of it , including the name and address of the 
23 declarant ." 
2 4 
25 



























2 5 ; 
THE COURT : That ' s correct . 
MR . SCARTH: Your Honor , may I question this witness 
in an attempt to lay foundation that it may be an excited 
utterance ? 
THE COURT: Al l right , counsel . Go right ahead . The 
jury ' s st ill ou t . 
BY MR . SCART H: 
Q Okay . Mr . Halstead , why was Mr . Hasch there at your 
cell? 
A My cell mate was one of his friends . 
Q Okay . And what brought up the conversation where he 
made th is statement to you? 
A I don ' t know. I guess it was just on his mind or 
something . He was talking with his celly . And I don ' t know . 
I had never even heard of him . It was the first time I had me t 
him and was just going off about all kinds of stuff . 
Q Do you know what I mean when I say demeanor , how a 
person appears , how they are acting? That ' s what demeanor 
means . Will you describe Mr . Hasch ' s demeanor at the time he 
had this conversation with you? 
A Nervous and edgy . 
Q Can you try to put a degree on that? How edgy? How 
nervous? 
A He was pretty nervous about it . 
Q Do you know why he was nervous? 
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1 A I don ' t know . He didn ' t want to get in trouble for it . 
\ 2 I Q Okay . Was anything said by anyb ody else to frighten 
3 him or to excite him? 
4 A Nope . 
5 Q Okay . 
6 THE COURT : Mr . Halstead , do you know just generally 
7 how long Mr . Hasch may have been in the jail prior to this 
8 conversation , how many hours or days he might have been in 
9 jail? 
10 THE WITNESS : I think maybe just a day or two . 
11 THE COURT : Day or two? Okay . Anything else , 
12 counsel? 
13 MR . SCARTH : I have no other questions , Your Honor . 
14 THE COURT : All right. Counsel , my analysis of the 
15 excited utterance exception under 803 does not come anywhere 
16 near to the description Mr . Halstead ' s going to give us of this 
17 conversation . The need to be under the stress or excitement 
18 caused by the event or condition, I am presuming the condition 
19 would be the arrest of Mr . Hasch , that would have had to have 
20 taken place at least a day or two before this conversation that 
21 Mr . Halstead told us about . The nature of whether it ' s a 
22 startling event or conditi on was a little bit unsure or 
23 unclear , because I don ' t know why Mr . Hasch was even 
2 4 incarcerated at that time . Presuming the worst, that it was 





























s t ill doe sn ' t tell me much about the nature of the events 
because , even the officers who were closest to the information 
o f the investigation did not presen t the matter for charge 
unti l June , after the fingerprint analysis . 
that level of excitement . 
I just can 't make 
The objection on the basis of hearsay is granted . The 
testimony will not come before the jury . Anything e l se that 
Mr . Halstead can tell us that might be re l evant or probative 
that is not covered by my ruling, Mr . Scarth? 
MR. SCARTH : I don ' t think so, Your Honor . May he be 
excused? 
THE COURT : We can certainly excuse Mr . Halstead . Mr . 
Halstead , you may leave . Unless you need to make a r ecord , 
Mr . Bittmenn? 
MR . BITTMENN: Not regarding this witness. 
THE COURT : Thank you . You may leave us . 
MR . BITTMEN N: I would as k the court to str ike the 
testimony on grounds of hearsay . 
THE COURT : No . It will stay with what impact it has . 
What is your next witness , Mr . Scarth? 
MR . SCARTH : Karen Angel . She ' s right outs ide . 
THE COURT : Mr . Scarth , she ' s not there . Would your 
assistant be able to find her in the lady ' s room if she ' s 
there? My bailiff could no t . 
MR . SCARTH : I think I ' ve got another one . 
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I 2 BY MR . BITTMENN : 
3 Q Sure it wasn ' t like a Mercury sable or some so r t of 
4 Ford automobile ? 
5 A Positive . 
6 MR . BITTMENN : Thank you . 
7 THE COURT : Anything more , counsel? 
8 MR . SCARTH : I have nothing , Your Honor . 
9 THE COURT : Al l right . Thank you , ma ' am . You can 
10 leave us . Your next witness . 
11 MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , my next witness was supposed 
12 to be here at nine . I didn ' t see her when I came in . And I 
13 need to talk to her . Can I go look for her? 
14 THE COURT : Go on out and look for her , counsel . 
15 MR. SCARTH : Troy Thode. 
16 TROY THODE , 
17 called by DEFENDANT , having been duly 
18 sworn , was examined and testifies as follows : 
19 THE COURT: Please come around and have a seat on the 
2 0 witness stand . 
21 MR . BITTMENN : Can I have a moment, Your Honor? 
22 THE COURT: Just a second , Mr. Scarth . 
23 MR . BITTMENN : Can you repeat the name of the witness , 
24 Mr . Scarth . 
25 THE COURT : Oh , he ' s going to tell us right now. Sir, 
745 
) 





THE WITNESS : Troy Thode . T- h-o - d - e . 
THE COURT : And in what city do you live , sir? 
THE WITNESS : St . George . 
MR . BITTMENN : Before the witness testifies , I would 
6 like·an opportun i ty to voir d i re the witness outside the 
7 presence of the jury . I had no ide a this witness was going to 
8 be called . I would like to at leas t see --
9 TH E COURT : Members of the jury , we are without our 
10 bailiff right now . But I think you can make your way across 
11 the hall and into the jury room . Would you please go in there 






and wonde r what I have done to you . 
(Whereupon , the following proceedings were held in 
open court outside the presence of the jury . ) 
MR . SCARTH: Your Honor , if it will help 
THE COURT : Let ' s wait until the door is closed , Mr . 




MR . SCARTH : I think I had his name misspelled on the 
summary I gave to Mr . Bittmenn . I had it spelled T-o-d-d-y . 
THE COURT : All right . Mr . Bittmenn , why don ' t you 
22 take that and see if Mr . Scarth can point out to you where it 
23 is on that summary . 
MR . SCARTH : I guess I didn ' t give him that one , Your 24 



























THE COURT : Let ' s find ou t what you are intending to 
cover with this witness . 
MR . SCARTH : Just go ahead? 
THE COURT : That ' s right . 
DIRECT . EXAMINATION 
BY MS . SCARTH : 
Q What ' s your present business or occupation , Mr . Thode? 
A I ' m a field engineer for AGC Applied Technical 
Engineering Consultants . 
Q Was there a time when you worked as a bail bondsman? 
A Yes. 
Q Which bail bonds? 
A Always Easy Does It Bail Bonds. 
Q For what period of time? 
A I t' s for about a year and-a - half, starting let ' s 
see . We are in -- it would have been about summer of '98 to 
end of ' 99 , I believe . That ' s a rough guess . 
THE COURT: Was your employer Tim Tiller? 
THE WITNESS : Yes , he was . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . BITTMENN : I didn ' t get that name . 
THE COURT : Tim Tiller , counsel . 
MR . BITTMENN : Is that the bail bonds? 
THE COURT : He was the bonding surety . 
MR . SCARTH : Off the record , I would like to explain 
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1 something to court and counsel , Your Honor . It ' s not 
2 unbearable . But I ' m having some pain today . And that ' s why 
3 I ' m hesitant in my - -
4 THE COURT : Need a minute? Don ' t worry about it . 
5 BY MR . SCARTH : 
6 Q Yes . While employed as a bai l bondsman in ' 98 or ' 99 , 
7 did you have any dealings with Karen Hardy? 
A Yes , I did . 8 
9 Q Do you recall whether or not your company posted any 






About when was that , best as you remember? We know 
13 your memory is not perfect . Mine i s , but yours isn ' t . 
14 A I believe it would have been early in the year , like 














'88 , I believe . 
You mean ' 98? 
' 98 , sorry . That ' s just a rough guess . 
Do you recall what she secured that bond with? 
Yes . She secured it with some jewelry . That ' s what 
22 she secured the cash part of the bail with . And the b ond she 





Okay . What happened to the vehicles? 


























) 2 5 
facil i ty . And they we r e gone the next day . 
Q Okay . So you r compa ny wound up wi thout t h ose vehicles? 
A Exactly . 
Q Did you f ind out anyth i ng unusual about the jury 
jewelry she had put up for security? 
A Yeah . It came to my knowledge , oh , probably about six 
months after the fact , that the jewelry was supposedly stolen . 
Q Okay . What do you mean by supposedly stolen? 
A Well , I had Todd Farnsworth in my house visiting . And 
she said that the jewelry she believed was her ' s . And at that 
time I had her describe to me what it was in and what jewelry 
was supposedly in the box . 
Q 
A 
Okay . Did it match? 
It matched . I mean , everything , basically , that she 
said was there was there . 
Q That Todd said was there? 
A Todd said was there . 
Q What did you do with that jewelry? 
A I still have it. 
Q Okay. I think he should be instructed about his fifth 
amendment rights , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Well , all right . Mr . Thode , the law 
provides that if Mr . Scarth and Mr . Bittmen n were to ask you 
an y question which might possibly implicate you in a criminal 





1 Utah Constitution , the United States Constitution to decline 
answering such questions if you believe that the y might 2 
3 incriminate you . In order to exercise that right , all you need 
4 to do is inform me that you intend to exercise your right 
5 against self - incriminat i on and that you wish to decline to 
6 answer the question . Go ahead , counsel . 
7 BY MR . SCARTH : 
8 Q Did you ever talk with Karen Hardy about the vehicles 
9 trying to get her to p r oduce some security fo r th e bond after 
10 they --
11 A When I took her home f~om the , from bailing her out , 
12 she showed me the vehicles and didn 't have titles for them , but 
13 said that they were her ' s . And after that , I only was able to 




Q Okay . And what was the results of that? 
MR . BITTMENN : Objection . Calls for hearsay . 
THE COURT : Overruled . 





Just the results , not what was said . 
Results were she gave me an additional 80 bucks on to 





Did you ever investigate the titles to those vehicles? 
Urn , without -- after that first day , I didn ' t get 
24 enough information to where I could even investigate her . 




























proceeding ? In other words , did you ever pull the bond ? 
THE COURT : Actually , did y ou eve r revoke the bond , 
sir? 
THE WITNESS : Yes , we did revoke the bond after she 
failed to appear in court and we were ordered to produce her or 
the $20,000 that we bailed her out on . 
BY MR . SCART H: 
Q Okay . If you were still in the ba il bonding bus i ness , 
would you post another b ond fo r her? 
A No . 
Q Why not? 
A Because I wouldn ' t - - un l es s I had the full amount of 
the bail upfront , I wouldn ' t have enough security to know that 
she ' s going to be there when she needs to be in court . 
Q Do you know Mr . Terr y Messer , the defendant? 
A Yes , I do . 
Q Did he ever do any work for your company or help you 
ou t in the bai l b ondi ng bus iness ? 
A Yes , he did . 
Q What did he do ? 
A Urn , he was hired , I believe , by my boss , Tim Tiller . 
And he basically got new people that came into the jail . He 
di r ected them to use our services that ba i led him out of jail . 
Q Okay . At any time did Mr . Terry Messer have a key to 
you r home? 
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1 A Yes , he did . 
2 Q How did that come about? 
3 A Urn , he needed a place to stay. He didn ' t have anywhere 
4 to go. And I trusted Terry . I felt in my dealings with him 
5 that he was on the up and up . So , basically , I trusted him 
6 with possession of my house. 
7 Q Have you ever known Mr . Terry Messer to engage in any 
8 criminal activity? 
9 A Not that I 
10 MR . BITTMENN: Objection . 
11 THE COURT: Overruled , counsel. You can finish your 
12 question . 
13 THE WITNESS : Not that I know of , no . 
14 THE COURT : And onl y overruled for this proceeding 
15 outs ide the presence of the jury. 
16 MR . BITTMENN : Okay . 
17 MS. SCARTH : I need a minute with my client . 
18 THE COURT : Certainly, counsel . 
19 MR . SCARTH : I have no other questions , Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT : All right . Do you have an objection to 
21 this testimony , Mr . Bittmenn? 
22 MR . BITTMENN : In its entirety . 
2 3 THE COURT : You are right , counsel . This is 
24 impeachment in a far too collatera l issue with respect to the 



























grant your motion to suppress this evidence , not al l ow it to 
come through before the jury . Mr . Thode can be e x cused . And 
we have a good record if I am in error . What other record do 
you n eed to make , Mr . Bittmenn ? 
MR . BITTMENN : I don ' t have any further record I want 
to make , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : All right . Thank you , sir . You can leave 
us . Your next witness , Mr . Scarth . 
MR . SCARTH : Your Honor , I need to address the court 
in that regard . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . SCARTH : I don ' t think Marilyn Messer is here yet . 
I told her to be here at nine . We wanted to call her , then 
call the defendant . And I need some time with the defendant 
before I call him . 
THE COURT : All right . 
MR . SCARTH: He has some questions . 
THE COURT : Then , counsel , let ' s take about a 10 
minute recess to let you and Mr . Messer go over his testimony. 
If Marilyn Messer shows up , we ' ll call her first after you have 
a chance to talk with her . And the n we ' ll come back into 
session roughly 10 o ' clock . In the meantime , I ' ll go get the 
jury instructions ready . 
MR . SCARTH : And I should tell the court and counsel , 

























































UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Validity, under First Amendment and 42 
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UT ST § 58-37c-3 
U. C . A . 1953 § 58-37c- 3 
C 
West ' s Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~~ Chapter 37C . Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Ac t 
~ § 58-37c-3 . Definitions 
In addi tion to the de fi nitions in Section 58-1-102 , as used in this chapter : 
Page 2 of7 
Page 1 
(1) " Board " means the Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory Board created in 
Section 58-37c-4 . 
(2) "Controlled substance precursor" includes a chemical reagent and means any o f 
the following : 
(a) Phenyl-2-propanone ; 
(b) Methylamine ; 
(e) Ethylamine ; 
(dl D-lysergic acid ; 
lei Ergotamine and its salts ; 
I fl Diethy1 malonate ; 
(gl Malonic acid ; 
Ihl Ethyl malonate ; 
Iii Barbituric acid ; 
(j) Piperidine and its salts ; 
(k) N-a ce tylanthranilic acid and its salts ; 
(1) pyrrolidine ; 
(m) Phenylacetic acid and its salts ; 
(n) Anthranilic acid and its salts ; 
(0) Morpholine ; 
Ipl Ephedrine ; 
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(q) Pseudoephedrine ; 
(rl Norpseudoephedrine i 
(s) Phenylpropanolamine ; 
(t) Benzyl cyanide ; 
(u) Ergonovine and its salts ; 
(v) 3,4-Methylenediaxyphenyl-2-propanone ; 
(w) propionic anhydride ; 
(xl Insosafrole ; 
(y) Safrole ; 
(z) Piperonal; 
(aa) N- Methylephedrine ; 
(bb) N-ethylephedrine ; 
(ee) N-methylpseudoephedrine ; 
(dd) N-eth yl pseudoephedrine i 
(ee) Hydriotic acid ; 
Iff) gamma butyrolactone (GEL) I including but yrolactone , 
oxanolone , tetrahydro-2-furanone , dihydro-2 (3H}-furanone , 
glycol , but not including gamma aminobutric acid (GABA) ; 
1 , 2 butanolide , 2-
and tetramethylene 
(gg) 1 , 4 butanediol ; 
(hh) any salt , isomer , or salt of an isomer of the chemicals listed in 
Subsections (2) (a) through (gg) ; 
(ii) Crystal iodine ; 
(jj) Iodine at concentrations grea t er t han 1 . 5% by weight in a solution or ma t rix ; 
(kk) Red phosphorous, except as provided in Section 58-37c-l9 . 7; 
(11) anhydrous ammonia , except as provided in Section 58-37c-l9 . 9 ; 
(mm) any con t rolled substance precursor l isted under the provision s 
Federal Control l ed Substances Act [FNl] which i s designa ted by t h e 
under the emergency listing provisions set forth in Section 58-37c- 14 ; and 
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(nn) any chemical which is designated by the director under the emergency listing 
provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14 . 
(3) " Deliver ," 
constructive , or 
"delivery, " " transfer, II or " furnish " means the 
attempted transfer of a controlled substance precursor . 
actual , 
(4) "Matrix " means something, as a substance , in which something else originates , 
develops , or is conta ined . 
(5) " Person " means any 
partnership , joint venture , 
individual , group of individuals , 
corporation , or organiza tion of any type 
proprietorship , 
or kind . 
(6) " Practitioner " means a physician , dentis t, podiatric physician , veterinarian , 
pharmacist , scientific investigator , pharmacy , hospi tal , pharmaceutical 
manufacturer , or other person licensed , registered, o r otherwise permitted to 
distribute, dispense , conduct research with respect to , administer , or use in 
teaching , or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of 
professional practice or research in this state . 
(7) (a) "Regulated distributor " means a person within the state who 
sells , furnishes , transfers , or otherwise supplies a listed controlled 
precursor chemical in a regulated transaction . 
provides, 
substance 
(b) "Regulated distributor " does not include any person excluded from regulation 
under this chapter . 
(8) (a) "Regulated purchaser " means any person within the state who receives a 
listed control l ed substance precursor chemica l in a regulated transaction . 
(b) "Regulated purchaser " do.es not include any person excluded from regulation 
under this chapter . 
(9) "Regulated transaction" means any actual , constructive or attempted : 
(a) 
to 
transfer , distribution , 





furnishing by a person within the state 
the state of a threshold amount of a 
listed precursor chemical ; or 
(b) purchase or acquisition by any means by a 
another person within or outside the state of a 
precursor chemical . 
person within the state from 
threshold amount of a listed 
(l O) "Retail distributor " means a grocery store , general 
store , or other en tity or person whose activities as a 
almost exclusively to sales for personal use : 
(a) in both number of sales and volume of sales ; and 
merchandise 
distributor 
store , drug 
are limited 
(b) either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transactions by 
direct sales . 
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( 11) "Threshold amount of a listed precursor chemical " means any amount of a 
controlled substance precursor or a specified amount of a controlled substance 
precursor in a matrix i however , the division may exempt from the provisions of 
this chapte r a specific controlled substance precursor in a specific amount and in 
certain types of transactions which provisions for exemption shall be defined by 
the division by ru l e adopted pursuant to Title 63 , Chapter 46a , Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act . 
(12) "Unlawful conduc t " as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes knowingly and 
intentionally : 
(a) engaging in a regulated transaction without first being appropriately 
licensed or exempt ed from licensure under this chapter ; 
(b) acting as a regulated dis t ributor and selling , transferring , or in a n y other 
way convey i ng a controlled subs tance precursor to a person within the state who 
is not appropriately licensed or exempted from licensure as a r egulated 
purchaser , or selling , trans f erring , 
substance precursor to a person outside 
transaction as required ; 
or o t herwise conveying 
o f the state and failing 
a cont r olled 
to report the 
(c) acting as a regulated purchas e r and purchas ing or i n any other way obtaining 
a controlled substance precursor from a person wi thin the state who is not a 
licensed r egulated distributor , or purchasing or otherwise obtaining a control l ed 
substance precu r sor from a person outside of the state and failing t o report the 
transaction as required ; 
( tl) ellt::Jdt::Jl. lIY in a L"ey ulaLeLl LL'dnsaction and falLi. ny La s u bm.LL L'el1oLLs dwl keep 
requi r ed records of inventories requ i red under the provisions of th is chapter or 
rules adopted pursuant to thi s chapter ; 
(e) making any fa l se statement in any application for license , i n any record to 
be kept, or o n any report submitted as required under this chapter ; 
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping o r repor t ing 
requirements of this chapter and rules related to this chapter , receiving or 
distributing any listed controlled substance precursor chemica l in any manner 
designed so that the making of records o r filing of reports required under this 
chapt er is not required; 
(g) failing to take immediate steps to 
recordkeeping requirements of this chapter 
comp ly with licensure , repo r ting , or 
because of lack of knowledge of those 
requirements , upon becoming informed of the requirements ; 
(h ) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or \-,lhen receiving or 
purchasing a listed control l ed substance precurso r chemical ; 
(i) creating 
repo r ting or 
a chemical mixture for 
r ecordkeeping requirement 
chapter , or receiving a chemical mixt ure 
the purpose of evading 
of this chapter or rules 
created for that purpose ; 
any licensure , 
related t o this 
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(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, employing, hiring , using , 
persuading , inducing , enticing , or coercing another person under 18 years of age 
to violate any provision of this chapter , or assisting in avoiding detection or 
apprehension fo r any violation of this chapter by any federal , state , or local 
law enforcement official ; and 
(k) , obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess an y controlled substance 
precursor or any combinat ion of controlled substance p recursors knowing or having 
a reasonable cause to believe that the cont r ol l ed substance precursor is intended 
to be used in the unl a wful manufacture of any controlled substance . 
(13) " Unprofessional conduct " as defined in Section 58 - 1-102 and as may be further 
defined by rule includes the following : 
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter , the Controlled Substance Act 
[FN2) of this state or any other state , or the Federal Controlled Substance Act ; 
and 
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or authorized law 
enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or 
or records or reports relating to purchases 
controlled substance precursors as such records 
this chapter . 
controlled substance precursors 
and sales or distribution of 
and reports are required under 
Laws 1992 , c . IS5 , § 3 ; Laws 1993 , c . 297 , § 183 ; Laws 1996 , 
Ju l y 1 , 1996 ; Laws 1998 , c . 100 , § 1 , eff . May 4 , 1998 ; Laws 
eff . May I , 2000 ; Laws 2000 , c . 272 , § I , eft. May 1 , 2000 . 
[FN1] See 21 U. S . C. A . § 801 et seq . 
[FN2J Section 58 - 37 - 1 et seq . 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Definitions relevant to this chapter , see § 58-37-2 . 
Exemption from licensure under Title 58 , see § 58 - 1-307 . 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Disc overy 2 
Included offenses 1 
1 . Included offenses 
c . 232 , § 11 , eft . 
2000 , c . 271 , § 3 , 
Possession of controlled substance precursor functioned as lesser included offense 
of operating methamphetamine laboratory , requiring reversal of defendant ' 5 
conviction and sentence on lesser count , where special verdict form was not 
employed ; general verdict form used made it impossible to be certain whether or 
not jury had relied on subsection of methamphetamine laboratory statute referring 
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Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~~ Chapter 37C . Utah Con trolled Substance Precursor Act 
~ § 58-37c - 8. License--Exceptions from licensure or regulation 
Page 2 of 3 
Page 1 
(1) Jl.ny person engaged in a regulated transaction must be appropriately licensed 
under this chapter as a regulated distributor and regulated purchaser unless 
excepted from licensure under this chapter . 
(2) The division shall : 
(a) establish the form of application for a license , the requirements for 
licensure , and fees for initial licensure and renewal ; and 
(b) identify required information to be contained in the application as a 
condition of licensure . 
(3) A practitioner vJho holds a Utah Controlled Substance License and a Controlled 
Substance Registrat i on issued by t he Drug Enforcement Administration of the U . S . 
Gove r nment is excepted from licensure under this chapter . 
(4) Any purchase, sale, transfer, furnishing, or receipt of any drug intended for 
lawful use in the diagnosis , cure, mitigation , treatment, or prevention of disease 
in man or other animals, which contains ephedrine , pseudoephedrine, 
norpseudoephedrine , or phenylpropanolamine if such drug is lawfully purchased, 
sold , transferred , or furnished as an over-the-counter medication without 
presc r iption pursuant to the federal Food , Drug and Cosmetic Act , 21 USC , Sec . 301 
et seq ., or regulations adopted thereunder are excepted from licensure , reporting , 
and record keeping under this chapter . 
(5) Any purchase , sale, transfer , receipt, or manufacture of any dietary 
supplement , vitamins , minerals , herbs, or other similar substances including 
concentrates or extracts , which are not otherwise prohibited by law, which may 
contain naturally occurring amounts of chemicals or substances listed in this 
chapter , or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63 , Chapter 46a , Utah 
Arnninistrative Rulemaking Act , are exempt from licensure under this chapter . 
(6) A purchaser of two ounces or less of crystal iodine in a single transaction is 
not required to be licensed as a regulated purchaser if the transaction complies 




purchase , sale , transfer, receipt , 
any precursor chemical listed in 
not intended for human consumption 
or manufacture of any 
Subsection 58-37c-3 (2) (ff) 
is exempt from licensure , 
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West ' s Utah Code Annotated Curren tness 
Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~0 Chapter 37C . Uta h Controlled Substance Precursor Act 
~ § 58-37c-l1 . Penalty for unlawful conduct 
Page 20f3 
Page 1 
(1) Any person who violates the unlawful conduct provision defined in Subs e ctions 
58 - 37c-3 (12) (a) through (j) is gu i lty of a class A misdemeanor . 
(2) Any person who violates t he unlawful conduct provisions defined in Subsection 
58-37c-3 (12) ( k) is gu i lty of a second degree felony . 
Laws 1993 , c . 297 , § 186 ; Laws 1999 , c . 21 , § 54 , eff . May 3 , 1999 . 
CROSS RE:FERENCES 
Attempt , elements and classification , see §§ 76-4 - 101 and 76-4-102 . 
Conspiracy and solicitation , elements and penalties , see § 76- 4- 201 et seq . 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony , see § 76-3-301 . 
Inchoate offenses , limitations on sentencing , see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302 . 
Penalties for felonies , see § 76-3-203 . 
Penalties for misdemeanors , see § 76-3 - 204 . 
Prohibited act and penalties , Controlled Substances Act, see § 58-37-8 . 
Right to trial by jury , see Const . Art . 1 , § 10 . 
Unlawful or unprofessional conduct , generally , see § 58-1-501 . 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Controlled Substan ces ~20 . 
Westlaw Key Number Search : 96Hk20 . 
U. C . A . 1953 § 58-37c-11, UT ST § 58 - 37c- 11 
Current through end of 2005 Firs t Special Session 
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Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~~ Chapter 37C . Utah Control led Substance Precursor Ac t 
~ § 58-37c-18. Recordkeeping requirements for sale of crystal iodine 
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Page 1 
(1) Any person licensed to engage in a regulated . transaction and who sells 
crystal iodine to another person shall : 
(a) comply with the recordkeeping requirements of Section 58-37c-lO i 
(b) require photo identif i cation of the purchaser; 
(el obtain from the purchaser a signature on a certificate of identification 
provided by the seller ; and 
(dl obtain fr om the purchaser a legible fingerprint, preferably of the right 
thumb, which shall be placed on the certificate next to the purchaser ' s signature . 
(2) Any failure to compl y with Subsect i on (1) is a class B misdemeanor . 
Laws 199B , c . 100 , § 3 , eff . May 4, 1998 ; Laws 1999 , c . 21 , § 55 , eff . May 3, 
1999 . 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification , see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 . 
Conspiracy and solicitation , elements and penalties , see § 76-4-201 et seq . 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or fel ony, see § 76-3-301 . 
Inchoate offenses , limitations on sentencing , see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302 . 
Penalties for misdemeanors , see § 76-3-204 . 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Controlled Substances ~10 . 
'iJest1aw Key Number Se arch : 96HklO . 
U. C.A. 1953 § 5B-37c- 18 , UT ST § 5B-37c-1B 
Current through e nd of 2005 First Special Session 
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-+ § 58-37c-19.5. Iodine solution greater t h an 1.S%--Prescription or permit 
required--Penalt i es 
(1) As used in this section , " iodine matrix" means iodine at concentrations 
greater than 1 . 5% by weight in a matrix or solution . 
(2) A person may offer to sell , sell , or distribute an iodine matrix only : 
(a) as a prescription drug , pursuant to a prescription issued by a veterinarian 
or physician licensed within the sta te; or 
(b) to a person who is actively engaged in the legal practice of animal husbandry 
of livestock , as defined in Section 4-1-8. 
(3) Prescriptions issued under this section : 
(a) shall provide for a specified number of refills ; 
(b) may be issued by electronic means , in accordance with Title 58 , Chapter 17b, 
Pharmacy Practice Act ; and 
(cl may be filled by a person other than the veterinarian or physician issuing 
the prescription . 
(4 ) A retailer offering iodine matri x f or sale : 
(a) shall store the iodine matrix so that the public does not have access to the 
iodine matrix without the direct assistance or intervention of a retail employee ; 
(b) shall keep a record , which may consist of sales receipts , of each person 
purchasing iodine matrix ; and 
Ie) may , if necessary to ascertain t he identity of the purchaser , ask for proof 
of identification f rom the purchaser . 
(5) A person engaging in a regulated transaction under Subsection (2) is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor if the person , under circumstances not amounting to a 
violat.ion of Subsection 58-37d-4 (1) (el , offers to sell , sells , or distributes an 
iodine matrix to a person who : 
(a) does not present a prescription or is not engaged in an ima l husbandry, as 
required under Subsection (2) ; or 
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(b) is not excepted under Subsection (7) . 
(6) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who, under circumstances not 
amounting t o a violation of Subsection 58-37c-3(12) (k) or 58-37d- 4(1) (a) : 
(a ) possesses an iodine matrix without proof of obtaining the solution in 
compliance with Subsec t ion (2) ; or 
(b) offers to sell , sells , or distributes an iodine matrix in violation of 
Subsection (2) . 
(7 ) Subsection (6) (a) does not apply to : 
(a) a chemis t ry or chemistry-related laborat ory maintained by : 
(i) a public o r private regularly established secondary school ; or 
(ii) a public or private 
a regional or national 
Department of Education ; 
institution of higher education that is accredited by 
accrediti n g agency r ecognized by the United States 
(b) a veterinarian licensed to practice under Title 58 , Ch apter 28 , Veterinary 
Pract ice Act ; 
(c ) a general acute hospital ; or 
(d) a veterinarian , phys ician , pharmacist , reta i l distributor , wholesaler , 
manufacturer , warehouseman , or common carrier , or an agen t of any o f t hese 
persons who possesses an iodine matri x i n t he regula r course o f l a wful bus i nes s 
ac t ivities . 
LaHs 2000 , c . 272 , § 2 , eff . May I, 2000 ; Laws 2004 , c . 280 , § 55 , e ff . July I , 
2004 . 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt , elements and classification , see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 . 
Conspiracy and solicitation , elements and penalties , see § 76-4 - 201 et seq . 
Fines upon conviction of misdemean or or f elony , see § 76-3-301 . 
Inchoate offenses , limi t a t ions on sentencing , see §5 76-4-301 and 76- 4- 302 . 
Penalties for misdeme anors , see § 76-3-204 . 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Controlled Substances ~9 T 2 4 . 
Westlaw Key Number Searches : 96Hk9 ; 96Hk24 . 
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C 
~l1est ' 5 Utah Code Annotated Cu rrentness 
Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~ Chapte r 370 . Clandestine Drug Lab Act 
~ § S8-37d-4. Prohibited acts--Second degree felony 
(1) I t is unlawful for any person to knowingly o r intentionally : 
{al possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operat i on ; 
(bl possess labora tory e qu ipmen t or suppl i es wi t h the intent to engage in a 
cland estine laboratory operation ; 
(el sell , distribute , or otherwise supply a precursor chemical , laboratory 
equipment , o r laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to believe 
it will be used for a clandes t ine laboratory operation ; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58 , Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled 
Subst ance Precursor Act , or the regulations i ssued under that act , knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will 
be used for a clandestine laboratory operation ; 
(e) conspire with o r aid a nother to engage in a clandes t ine laboratory operation ; 
(f) produce o r manufacture , or possess with intent to produce or manufacture a 
controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58 , Chapter 
37 , Utah Controlled Substances Act ; 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the intent to 
distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or conveying the 
controlled or counte r feit substance o r by any othe r person regardless of whether 
the final destina tion for the distribution is within this state or any other 
location ; o r 
(h) engage in compounding , synthesis , concentration , pur i fication , separat i on , 
e}: tra c tion , or other physical or c h emical processing of any substance , i n cluding 
a controlled substance precursor , or the packaging, repackaging , labeling , or 
relabeling of a container holding a substance that is a product o f any of these 
activities , knowing or having reasonable cause to believe t hat the substance is a 
product o f any of these activities and will be used in the i llegal manufac ture of 
specified controlled substances . 
(2) A person who v i olates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
deg r ee felony . 
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U. C . A . 1953 § 58 - 37d- 5 
C 
West ' s Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58 . Occupations and Professions 
~~ Chapter 370 . Clandestine Drug Lab Act 
~ § 58-37d-5. Proh ibited acts--First degree felony 
(1) A person who violates Subsection SB-37d-4 {Il (a) I (bl , (e) , (fl f or (h) is 
guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds anyone of the 
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation : 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(bl use of a booby trap ; 
(el illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous 
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in 
furtherance of a clandestine laboratory ope r ation I there was c rea ted a 
substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the environment ; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place wi thin 500 
feet of a residence , place of b u siness , church , or school ; 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a specified 
controlled substance ; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine 
base or methamphetamine base . 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
.s ubsect i. ons (1) (a) through (fl of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation , at sentencing for the first degree felony : 
(a ). probation shall not be granted ; 
(b) the execution o r imposition of sentence shall not be suspended ; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense . 
Laws 1992 , c . 156 , § 5 ; Laws 1997, c . 
65 , § 1 , eff . t'Jay 4, 1998 ; Laws 2000 , 
c . 115 , § 3 , eff . May 5 , 2003 . 
CROSS REFERENCES 
64 , § 12 , eff . May 5 , 
c . 187 , § 1 , eff . May 
1997; Laws 1998 , c . 
1 , 2000 ; Laws 2003 , 
Attempt , elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 . 
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Utah Rules of Evidence , Rule 608 
C 
West ' s Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Uta h Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annas) 
~~ Art i cle VI . Witnesses 
~RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
Page 2 ofl9 
Page 1 
character. The credibility of a witness 
in the form of opinion or reputation , but 
evidence may refer only to character for 
(2) evidence of truthful character is 
of the witness for truthfulness has been 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence o f 
may be attacked or supported by evidence 
subj ect to these 1 imi ta tions : (1) the 
t ruthfulness or untruthfulness , and 
admissible only after the character 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise . 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of t he conduc t of a 
'",itness , f or the purpose of a t t.acking or supporting the witness ' character for 
truthfulness , other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609 , may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence . They may , however , in the discretion of the court, 
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness , be inquired into on 
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness 1 character for 
truthful ness or untruthful ness , or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified . 
The giving of testimony , whether by an accused 
operate as a waiver of the accused ' s or 
self-incrimination when examined with respect 
character for truthfulness . 
or by any other witness, 
the witness ' privilege 
to matters that relate 
(e) Evidence of bias. Bias , prejudice or any motive 
to impeach the witness either by examination of 
otherwise adduced . 
[Amended effective October 1 , 1992 ; November 1, 2004 . ] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
to mis represent may 







Rules 22 and 6, 
and (b) are the federal rule , verbatim, and 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except to 
limits such evidence to credibility for 
Rule 22 (cl , Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
Subdivision (a) 
untruthfulness . 
are comparable to 
the extent that 
truthfulness or 
allowed a broader 
attack on the character of a wi t ness as to truth , honesty and integrity . 
T'1is rule should be read in conjunction with Rule 405 . Subdivision (b) allows, in 
the discretion of the court on cross-examination , inquiry into specific instances 
© 2006 Thomson/West . No Claim to Orig . U. S . Govt . Works . 








Rule 803 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE UTAH 
the crime w~s not hearsay because it was know the facts is not stating them under oath; 
(~ ) that person is not present for cross-exami-
nation. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 
388 (1957). 
presented for the truth of the m,~a;t;te~r;"t;:~:i~~;:)~ 
explain why the officer took the it 
trustworthine~s . . The term "be 
business, InstItution, assoclatIo: 
kind whether or not conducted 
Chemical b1:eath an alysis. 
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the adro~ssion of 
chemical breath analysis , is a valid statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule. Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
Nonbearsay. 
Police officer's recounting.ofvictim's report of 
steps that he did. State v. Bryant, 965 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Purpose. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared P"'"OS."" 
the exclusion of evidence not subject to 
examination concerning the truthfulness 
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
(Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Case Law Develop-
ment: IV. Criminal Law and Procedure: B. The 
Unconstitutionality of Statutes of Limitation 
on Habeus Corpus Relief and the Need for 
Reliability Findings for Child Victims' Out-of-
Court Statements, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 619. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Com-
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in 
Courtroom: New Utah' Rules and Their r .n,,,C '·'J 
tutional Implications , 15 J. Contemp. L. 
(1989). 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of Ut:Clar:am; '· 
immaterial. 
The ,following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though th~' 
declarant is available as a witness: ., 
(1 ) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or ,. 
immediately thereafter. " 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. . 
(3) Then existing me/ital, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of , 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health ), but not including a 'statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it r elates to the execution, revocation, identi· . 
fication, or terms of declarant's will. ~ 
(4 ) Statements for p urposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or . 
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been ' 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the wi tness' " 
memory and to r eflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum '. 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit , 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or . 
diagnoses, made at or near the t ime by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in th e course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and ifit was the regular practice of that business activity to make the ".-
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the i 
tes timony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of . 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of . 
(7} Absence of entry in reeD l' 
ragraph (6). Evidence that , ~:ports, records, or data compila 
. _ provisions of Paragraph (6), to I= 
Illstter, if the matter was of a ki 
data compilation was . regularl) 
information or other Clrcumstar 
, (8) P~blic records and rel!0rt, 
lations, m any form, of pubhc of! 
oft\Ie office or agency, or (B) mat 
as to which matters there was a 
cases matters observed by poliCE 
or (C) in civil actions and procee 
cases, factual findings r esultir 
authority granted by law, unle, 
stances indicate lack of trustwo 
(9) Records of vital statistics. 
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or I 
public office pursuant to requin 
. (10) Absence of public recoro 
report, statement, or data COllI 
nonexistence af a matter of ' 
compilation in any form, was re 
or agency, evidence in the form 
or testimony, that diligent sear 
ment, or data compilation, or e l 
(11) Records of religious 01'& 
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, arc 
other similar facts of personal 0 
record of a religiou::; urgani'z_atic 
(12 ) Marriage, baptismal, an 
tained in a certificate that the IT 
or administered a sacrament, I 
person authorized by the rules 0 
to perform the act certified, and 
the act or within a reasonable t 
(13 ) Family records. Staten: 
history contained in family Bit 
inscriptions on family por t raits, 
the like. 
(14) Records of documents a~ 
document purporting to establi: 
the content of the original recol'( 
each person by whom it purport' 
of a public office and an apI 
documents of that kind in that 
(15) Statements in docume;,t, 
contained in a document Purl 
property if the matter stated , 
unless dealings with the prope 
inconsistent with the truth of t 
(16 ) Statements in ancient d, 
ence twenty years or more th e 
. (17) Market reports, commer 
tions, lists, directories, or othe 
relied upon by the public or by 
Rule 803 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 684 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the a tten tion ' of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established 
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other 
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. . 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, 
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Repu tation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands in the community, and r eputation as to events of general 
history important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
(2 1) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) J udgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upori a plea of nolo contendere), 
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not 
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for 
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against per sons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect 
admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by 
evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (e ) the general purpose of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under t lus exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. - This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is 
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971). " 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 
63(4)(b), Utah Rules ofEv;dence (1971). State v. 
McMman, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978). 
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule 
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (5) had no express counterpart in 
Utah Rules of Evidence (197 1), although Rule 
63(4Xc) embodied some of the substance but 
applied only where the declarant was unavail-
able. D.ecisions of tllE Utah Supreme Court 
have recognized such an exception. Sagers v. 
International Smelting Co., 50 Utah 423, 16B 
Pac. 105 (1917). The Utah courts have sanc-
tioned the admission of the record of the past 
recollection, contra to this rule. Sagers v. Inter· 
naiional Smelting Co., supra. 
Subdivision (6) is comparable to Rule 63(13), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Former Rule 
63(13) has been given broad application. 
Bambrough v. Bcthers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 
1976); State v. Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1977); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. 
Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). The 
rule allows computerized records and data to be 




Subdivision (7) is similar to Rul 
Utah R~l.e~ of Evidence (1971). 
Subdlvlslon (8) is simi lar to RuJes 6' 
(16), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), ' 
Code Annotated, Sections 78-25-3 all( 
(1953). Barney v. Cox 588 P?d 6' 1978). ,.- , 
Subdivision (axC) is substantia lly 1 
as Rules 63(15), (16) and (17), Utah 
EVldence (1971). See also, Price v. 1\ 
Utah 2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972); B 
Union Pacdic R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281 . 
738 (1971). ' 
Subdivision (9) is similar to Rull: 
Uta~ R.ulcs of Evidence (1971), as rela 
a.dmlsslon of evidence of certificates 
na?"e and Rules 63(24) and (25), Utah 
~vld~nc~ (1971), covering vital stat 
certalD Instances. See also In re Le, 
Utah 385, 242 P.2d 565 (1952). 
Subdivision (10) is comparable t 
63(17Xb), Utah Rules of Ev;dence (197 
r Subdivisions (11), (12) and (13) are r;-
. ble to Rules 63(23) through (26), Utah 
.?V1dcnc:e. ( ~971), and In re Lewis, sup; 
SubdiVISions (14) and (15) are compl-! 
Rules 63(19), (22) and (29), Utah F 
EVldence (1971). 
, Subdivision (16) is comparable tt 
93(19) and 67, Utih Rules of EvidencF' 
and Olsen ~. Swapp, 535 P.2d 1233 (Ut:( 
SubdiVISIOn (17) is comparable t 
63(30), .U~ Rules of Evidence (1971). 
' . SubdiVIsIon (18) is comparable t 
63(~1), . Uniform RuJes of Evidence 
WhlCh was not adopted in Utah. Howev( 
~ode Annotated, Section 78-25-6 (19': 
Yides for the admissibility of historical 










Present sense impression. 
Public records and reports . 
Records of regularly conducted activitie 
Then existing mental, emotional or JC 
condi tion. ' 
Cited. 
Business records. 
. ~o~lpute r printout~ made by driver's 
diVISIon can be admitted to show a ( 
accumulated p.oint totals as part of the bl 
records exceptIOn to the hearsay rule. B 
Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). 
Summary cased on books and records · ~he normal course of the business, but· 
~tse~f was n.ot made in .the regular courS{ 
usme.ss , did not qualIfy as a business 1 
exception to the hearsay rule. Shurtleff 
'fuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
For eVIdence to be admissible as a bl'! 
Page 2 of7 
West!aw 
Page 1 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 
C 
West's Utah Court Ru les Annotated Currentness 
State Court Ru les 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
~~ AI1icle IX. Authentication and Identificat ion 
.. RULE 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTlCA TlON OR IDENTlF1CA TlO N 
(a) Gen eral Prov ision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
adm issibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims. 
(b) lIlustra tion s. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identificat ion confonning with the requirements of this rule: 
(I) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon 
familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation . 
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with 
specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics, taken ill conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic 
transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances cOImecting 
it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was made to the number 
assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, 
Circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of 
a business, the ca ll was made to a place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably 
transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or fi led and in fact 
recorded or filed in a public office, or a purpol1ed public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient Documents or Dala Compilation. Evidence that a document or data compi lat ion, in any foml, (A) is 
in slIch condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, 
wou ld likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered . 
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and show ing that the 
process or system produces an accurate resu It. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Ru le 90 I 
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by court rule 
or statute of this state. 
ADV ISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (b)(2) is in accord with State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447 (1906). Subdivision (b)(8) is 
comparable with Ru le 67, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except that the fonn er ru le imposed a 30-year 
requirement. Subdivision (b)(IO) is an adaptation of subdivision (/0) in the comparable fed eral rules to confonn to 
state practice. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Official records, proof, see Rules. Civ. Proc., Rule 44. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARJES 
Riggs, Computer Evidence: What Is It and What Is Allowed?, 12 Utah B.J. 37 (Spr ing-Summer 1984). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law <8=339, 386, 388, 404.10, 444, 458. 
Evidence <8=102, 11 7, 148,150,366 to 383, 480. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: IIOk339; 110k386; 11 0k388; 1l0k404.10; IIOk444; 110k458; 157k 102; 
157k117; 157k148; 157k150; 157k366 to 157k383; 157k480. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 754 to 755, 761,799,846, 1025,1028, 1030, 1032, 1041,1046,1058. 
C.J.S. Evidence §§ 3 to 5, 197,208,2 1 1,2 16 to 226, 246 to 247, 547 to 549, 818 to 822, 824 to 833, 839, 870 
to 878, 88 1, 884, 889, 904, 908, 916 to 919,932 to 933, 935 to 939, 949, 957, 959 to 962, 964, 976, 982 to 
983,986,988,992 to 994, 998,1000 to 1006, 1008, 1010 to 1022, 1026 to 1036. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice A ids 
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 17 : I 6, Handwriting exemp lars, authentication. 
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 19:3, Authentication, generally. 
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 20:5, Photographs, adm issibility. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
Audiota pes 7.5 
Constitutional rights 2 
Handwriting 6 
Personal knowledge o r familiarity 3 
Photographs 5 
Public records or reports 4 
Review 8 
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Rules App.Proc. , Rule 24 
C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Almos) 
"ill Title V. General Provisions 
... RULE 24. BRIEFS 
Page 2 of 43 
Page 1 
(a) Brief of the appella nt. The brief of the appellant shaLl contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceedillg in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to 
be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list shou ld 
be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appel late review 
with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Const itutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules , and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph ( I I) of this ru le. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. llle summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation 
of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is an·anged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
autborities, statlltes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
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record evidence that supports the challenged fin ding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal 
sha ll state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)( IO) A short conclusion stating the precise rel iefsought. 
(a)( ll ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The 
addendum shall be bound as part of the bri ef un less doing so makes the brief unreasonab ly thick. If the addendum 
is bound separate ly, the addendum shall conta in a table of contents. The addendum shall conta in a copy of: 
(a)( I I )(A) any consti tutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central impOltance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(I I )(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the COlllt of Appeals opinion; in a ll cases any COUlt 
opinion of central importance to the appeal but not ava ilab le to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)( 1 I )(C) those parts of the record 0 0 appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal , 
such as the chall enged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandulll decision, the transcript 
of tile court's oral decis ion, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appell ee. The brief of the appellee shall con form to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(l) a statement of the issues or oftlte case un less the appellee is di ssatisfied with th e statement of the appe llant; 
or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not inc luded in tile addendum] of the appellant. The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(e) Reply brief The a ppella nt may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appe llee has 
cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in rep ly to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The 
content of the reply brief shall confonn to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and ( 10) of this ru le. No 
fu rther briefs may be fi led except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) Refe rences in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a 
minimu m reference!) to panies by such designations as "appellanf' and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
des ignations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of panics, or descript ive 
tenns such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the reco rd. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule II Cb) or to pages of any statement or the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or II (g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shaIl identify the 
sequential num ber of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each 
separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposi tion or transcript as marked by the transcriber. 
References to exhibits shaIl be made to the exhibit ntlmbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of 
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at whi ch the ev idence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by penn ission of the court, principa l briefs shaIl not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the tab le of content'S, tables of citations and any addendum 
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contain ing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involv ing cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length .ofbriefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-a ppea ls. If a cross-appeal is fil ed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall 
be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless tbe parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherw ise orders. The brief of the appella nt shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the 
appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer 
to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant sha ll then file a brief wh ich 
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appe llee's 
response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length . The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, wh ich 
contains only a reply to the appe\lantts answers to the original issues raised by the appe\lee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this ru le are exclusive of table of contents, table of author ities, and addenda and 
may be exceeded on.ly by permiss ion of tile court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases in volving multipl e appell ants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appell ee, inc luding cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, 
and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may simi larly join 
in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supp lemental auth orities . When pertinent and significan t authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that pmty's brief has been filed, or after ora l argument but before decis ion, a palty may promptly adv ise 
tbe clerk of tile appellate court, by letter setting fO li h tbe citat ions. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed 
in the Supreme COUlt. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a po int argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall 
without argument state the reasons for the supp lemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of 
fil ing and shall be simi larly limited. 
U) Req uir'emcn ts and sa nctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, pre~enleu with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immateria l or scandalous matters. Briefs 
wh ich are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court 
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
[Amended effective October I, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; Apr il I, 1998; November I, 1999; April I, 
2003; November 1,2004.] 
ADV ISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 24 (a)(9) now refl ects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 
(Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial coul1's 
findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshall ing duty ... , the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fast id ious order, every scrap of competent ev idence introduced at 
trial wh ich supports the very findin gs the appe llant resists.''' ONEIDAISLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and 
Warehouse, Inc., 872 P .2d 1051 , 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Wesl Valley City v. 
Majeslic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 13 15 (Utah App. 1991)). See also Stale ex rei. MS v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 
1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Ehler, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 
738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of.rev iew and citation 
of supporting authority. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS Rule 103 
Libl-ary References 
Courts <PBS. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: l06k85. 
C.J.S. Courts § 130. 
Notes of Decisions 
Construction and application 
1. Construction and application 
When interpreting an evidentiary rule, su~ 
preme court applies principles of statutory con-
struction, and thus looks first to the plain lan-
guage of the ru le. State v. Mead, 2001, 27 P.3d 
11 15, 200 1 UT 58. Criminal Law"'" 11 34(2) 
Supreme Court will look to the interpretation 
of federal rules of evidence by the federal courts 
to aid in in terpreting the Utah rules of evidence. 
State v. Gray, 1986,717 P.2d 13 13 . Courts oS=> 
97(1) 
RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling, Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(I ) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to str ike appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offe,. of Proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the 
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evi-
dence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer 
of p roof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which il was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon . It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(e) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or 
asking questions in the heari ng of the jury. 
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
[A~ended effective November I, 200 1.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal r w e, verbatim. 
The 200 I amendment adopts changes 
made in Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) 
effective December I, 2000. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Labrum, History and Application of the Plain 
Error Doctrine in Utah, 2000 Utah L Rev. 537 
(2000). 
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